Given a single location has policy to verify a BIB and BCB of the same target, if a bundle with a BIB and BCB with the same target is processed, the BIB will attempt to check the HMAC against the encrypted target, resulting in a BIB failure.
For now, the policy provider should be updated to drop the BIB secop in this scenario (before execution). BSL backend should also include a warning that there are conflicting secops, if possible.
In the long-term, it could be worth exploring a mechanism for the BIB to be verified alongside the BCB verification processing s.t. the HMAC can be checked against the plaintext.
Given a single location has policy to verify a BIB and BCB of the same target, if a bundle with a BIB and BCB with the same target is processed, the BIB will attempt to check the HMAC against the encrypted target, resulting in a BIB failure.
For now, the policy provider should be updated to drop the BIB secop in this scenario (before execution). BSL backend should also include a warning that there are conflicting secops, if possible.
In the long-term, it could be worth exploring a mechanism for the BIB to be verified alongside the BCB verification processing s.t. the HMAC can be checked against the plaintext.