The ateapi PostgreSQL store can run against
Cloud SQL for PostgreSQL. The
supported, most secure configuration uses the
Cloud SQL Auth Proxy
(source) as a
sidecar on ate-api-server with automatic IAM database
authentication:
- Transport security — the proxy establishes a TLS 1.3 tunnel to the instance using ephemeral certificates and verifies the instance's identity. No server CA files to download, mount, or rotate. ateapi connects to the proxy over pod-local loopback; that traffic never leaves the pod's network namespace.
- Authentication — establishing the tunnel requires the IAM permission
cloudsql.instances.connect, and the database session itself is authenticated with a short-lived OAuth token for the pod's Workload Identity (--auto-iam-authn). No database password exists anywhere — nothing to store, leak, or rotate; access is revoked in IAM. - Cloud-agnostic code — ateapi itself knows nothing about Cloud SQL. The
sidecar is a deployment-time patch
(
manifests/ate-install/cloudsql/proxy-sidecar-patch.yaml) applied byhack/install-ate.shonly when a Cloud SQL instance is configured.
The cluster must have Workload Identity enabled (clusters created by
setup-gcp create cluster do), and the VPC needs private services
access
(one-time per VPC; the tool prints the two gcloud commands if it is
missing). Then:
export PROJECT_ID=<project>
go run ./tools/setup-gcp create cloudsql --region=<cluster region>
# other flags: --instance, --tier, --edition, --storage-size, --gsa-name, --networkThis idempotently creates:
| Resource | Value |
|---|---|
| Cloud SQL instance | PostgreSQL 18, Enterprise edition, private IP only, cloudsql.iam_authentication=on, automated backups + point-in-time recovery, deletion protection |
| Database | atepg |
| Google service account | ate-api-server@<project>.iam.gserviceaccount.com |
| Project IAM roles | roles/cloudsql.client, roles/cloudsql.instanceUser on the GSA |
| Workload Identity binding | roles/iam.workloadIdentityUser for <project>.svc.id.goog[ate-system/ate-api-server] on the GSA |
| IAM database user | the GSA, type CLOUD_IAM_SERVICE_ACCOUNT |
Note: The repo otherwise uses WIF-direct
principal://bindings, but Cloud SQL IAM database users must be service accounts — federated Kubernetes principals cannot log into the database. The KSA is therefore annotated withiam.gke.io/gcp-service-accountso the proxy's ambient credentials resolve to the GSA.
Deletion protection means an instance cannot be deleted until it is cleared:
gcloud sql instances patch <instance> --no-deletion-protection
gcloud sql instances delete <instance>Backups, point-in-time recovery, and the shape of an existing instance are
never reconciled — the settings above apply at creation. Change them later
with gcloud sql instances patch.
IAM database users
are created with no privileges. By default, ateapi connects as the
IAM user and then assumes substrate_owner for migrations or
substrate_readwrite for application queries. Create these roles, grant the
IAM user membership, create the substrate schema, and configure the
owner's default privileges before deploying. The IAM database username is the GSA email without
.gserviceaccount.com.
Getting that postgres session on a private-IP-only instance takes two
steps: give postgres a temporary password (fresh instances have none), and
run psql from inside the cluster, which is the only place with a network
path to the instance. Replace <project>, <instance>, and <temp-pw> below:
gcloud sql users set-password postgres --instance=<instance> --password='<temp-pw>'
IP=$(gcloud sql instances describe <instance> --format="value(ipAddresses[0].ipAddress)")
kubectl run psql-grant --rm -i --restart=Never --image=postgres:18-alpine -- \
psql "postgresql://postgres:<temp-pw>@${IP}:5432/atepg?sslmode=require" \
-v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 <<'SQL'
BEGIN;
CREATE ROLE substrate_owner NOLOGIN;
CREATE ROLE substrate_readwrite NOLOGIN;
GRANT substrate_owner TO postgres WITH SET TRUE;
GRANT substrate_owner, substrate_readwrite TO "ate-api-server@<project>.iam";
CREATE SCHEMA substrate AUTHORIZATION substrate_owner;
GRANT USAGE ON SCHEMA substrate TO substrate_readwrite;
ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES FOR ROLE substrate_owner IN SCHEMA substrate
GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON TABLES TO substrate_readwrite;
ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES FOR ROLE substrate_owner IN SCHEMA substrate
GRANT USAGE, SELECT, UPDATE ON SEQUENCES TO substrate_readwrite;
ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES FOR ROLE substrate_owner IN SCHEMA substrate
GRANT EXECUTE ON ROUTINES TO substrate_readwrite;
ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES FOR ROLE substrate_owner IN SCHEMA substrate
GRANT USAGE ON TYPES TO substrate_readwrite;
COMMIT;
SQLThe grant back to postgres lets this non-superuser administrator configure
the owner role's default privileges.
Nothing deployed ever uses this password — afterwards you can scramble it
(gcloud sql users set-password postgres --instance=<instance> --password="$(openssl rand -hex 16)") or keep it for admin access such as
Cloud SQL Studio. Note that postgres is not a superuser on Cloud SQL.
This identity layout requires a fresh atepg database. Existing tables and
users need a separate migration of ownership and grants.
export ATE_API_POSTGRES_CLOUDSQL_INSTANCE=<project>:<region>:<instance>
export ATE_API_POSTGRES_CLOUDSQL_GSA=ate-api-server@<project>.iam.gserviceaccount.com
./hack/install-ate.sh --deploy-ate-system --credential-provider='{"name":"k8s.io"}'
# Existing installation: --deploy-ate-apiserver instead of --deploy-ate-systemWhat this does differently from a plain install:
- Skips the bundled PostgreSQL StatefulSet (a configured Cloud SQL instance counts as an external database); the install logs the skip and the database it deferred to.
- Writes the proxy's configuration (
CSQL_PROXY_*) into theate-api-server-envvarsConfigMap and synthesizes a passwordless DSN (user=<gsa-user> host=127.0.0.1 ... sslmode=disable) into theate-api-server-secret-envvarsSecret for both database connection pools. - Annotates the
ate-api-serverKSA with the GSA and patches thecloud-sql-proxynative sidecar (initContainer withrestartPolicy: Always; requires Kubernetes 1.29+) into the deployment. The sidecar's/startupprobe gates ateapi, so ateapi never races the tunnel. LeavingATE_API_POSTGRES_CLOUDSQL_INSTANCEunset on later redeploys keeps the current Cloud SQL configuration (it is adopted from the cluster's record); to remove the sidecar and annotation, set it to the empty string explicitly:ATE_API_POSTGRES_CLOUDSQL_INSTANCE="".
Optional environment variables:
ATE_API_POSTGRES_CLOUDSQL_IP_TYPE—private(default),public,psc. Selects which of the instance's addresses the proxy dials, for connecting to instances provisioned outside this tool:setup-gcp create cloudsqlitself only creates private-services-access (private IP) instances —publicandpscrequire an instance configured accordingly out-of-band.ATE_API_POSTGRES_READ_WRITE_ROLEandATE_API_POSTGRES_OWNER_ROLE— required stableNOLOGINroles (defaults:substrate_readwriteandsubstrate_owner). If you override them, create the custom roles and substitute their names in the grants in section 2.ateapirunsSET ROLEon every new connection; stable roles keep grants and object ownership across IAM username rotations.ATE_API_POSTGRES_SCHEMA— the schema holding the store's tables (defaultsubstrate). If you override it, create the named schema with the owner role as owner and target it in the grants in section 2.ATE_API_POSTGRES_POOL_MAX_CONNS— connections in the read/write pool (default:max(4, NumCPU)). It does not affect the owner and watch pools, which are capped at 2 and 3 connections.
Changing the installed configuration rolls ate-api-server: the install script
stamps a hash of the rendered configuration into the pod template
(ate.dev/env-hash).
kubectl rollout status deployment/ate-api-server -n ate-system
kubectl logs deployment/ate-api-server -n ate-system -c cloud-sql-proxy | head
# expect: "The proxy has started successfully and is ready for new connections"
kubectl logs deployment/ate-api-server -n ate-system | head -5
# expect the startup flag dump and no store connection errors
kubectl get secret ate-api-server-secret-envvars -n ate-system \
-o jsonpath='{.data.ATE_API_POSTGRES_READ_WRITE_CONNECTION_STRING}' | base64 -d
# expect: no password in the DSNCommon failure modes:
| Symptom | Cause |
|---|---|
proxy: PERMISSION_DENIED on startup |
GSA missing roles/cloudsql.client, or the Workload Identity annotation/binding is absent |
FATAL: Cloud SQL IAM service account authentication failed |
GSA missing roles/cloudsql.instanceUser, or the IAM database user was not created |
ateapi: role "substrate_owner" does not exist or permission denied to set role |
Create the roles and grant the IAM database user membership (section 2) |
ateapi: permission denied for schema substrate |
The one-time schema grants (section 2) were not run |
ateapi: permission denied for table |
The owner role's default privileges (section 2) were not configured before migrations |
| proxy: instance connection errors mentioning IAM | cloudsql.iam_authentication flag is off on the instance |
The provisioning defaults (db-custom-2-8192, 10 GB disk) suit development
and modest fleets. For sizing at large actor counts and high request rates —
instance shape and the data cache, storage/IOPS, connection-pool math,
proxy sidecar resources, and Managed Connection Pooling — see
docs/dev/cloud-sql-scaling-guide.md.
For explicit connection strings or a non-Cloud-SQL PostgreSQL database, see the general PostgreSQL configuration guide.