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docs: define core SSO architecture for OIDC domains - #1271

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docs: define core SSO architecture for OIDC domains#1271
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Add docs/sso.md describing the OIDC domain abstraction that mirrors the existing LDAP account domain model (internal/external, backed by a broker provider such as Keycloak), covering discovery, per-app client credentials, capability contracts, and its relation to existing LDAP domains. Cross-link it from docs/design.md.

Assisted-by: Claude Code:claude-sonnet-5

Add docs/sso.md describing the OIDC domain abstraction that mirrors
the existing LDAP account domain model (internal/external, backed by
a broker provider such as Keycloak), covering discovery, per-app
client credentials, capability contracts, and its relation to
existing LDAP domains. Cross-link it from docs/design.md.

Assisted-by: Claude Code:claude-sonnet-5
Some broker products (e.g. Keycloak's request-based hostname
provider) can present multiple FQDNs from one instance without
touching the OIDC domain model, since the FQDN already lives on the
domain's own srv/http/oidc key. Clarify this stays out of scope for
now.

Assisted-by: Claude Code:claude-sonnet-5
Agent-driven delegated access is a machine-to-machine flow (e.g.
OAuth token exchange, RFC 8693), not the browser-based authorization
code flow this document assumes. Note it as a future per-domain
broker capability rather than reopening the domain/broker model now.

Assisted-by: Claude Code:claude-sonnet-5
An auth-proxy sidecar can front a non-OIDC-native application, running
the auth code flow against the broker and forwarding identity via
headers. This is an app-integration pattern, not a change to the
broker architecture.

Assisted-by: Claude Code:claude-sonnet-5
- Internal domains expose user/group management as NS8 actions (an
  illustrative, non-exhaustive set), which may drive the broker's
  admin API internally but never expose it directly.
- External domains are read-only to NS8, matching external LDAP
  domains: core only registers applications against them.
- User federation and identity brokering are scoped to the OIDC
  domain (a realm, in Keycloak's terms), not shared across other
  domains a broker instance hosts, and are optional and managed
  independently of the domain's own lifecycle.
- Client registration follows RFC 7591 DCR; authorizing it (e.g.
  Keycloak's Initial Access Token) is broker-specific. External
  domains need a scoped-down admin credential able to mint IATs on
  demand, not a single pre-minted token, alongside the OIDC discovery
  manifest.
- Note that combining identity sources in one domain requires an
  explicit, admin-surfaced choice for email-based auto-linking.

Assisted-by: Claude Code:claude-sonnet-5
The paragraph covering user federation and identity brokering was
packed into the broker cardinality section, mixing two different
relations: domain-to-broker and domain-to-upstream-sources.

Give the upstream sources their own subsection and expand it: name
the two mechanisms separately, state why the federation/brokering
distinction matters for LDAP-only applications, and spell out what
survives adding or removing an upstream. Also state the problem the
broker layer avoids before the solution.

Assisted-by: Claude Code:claude-opus-5[1m]
A domain draws identities from many upstream sources, so wording that
treated the two as synonyms no longer holds: drop it from the Keycloak
realm aside and from the capability contract.

The srv key now advertises the sources a domain serves, which
contradicted the claim that adding or removing a source leaves the key
untouched. State instead what stays stable across the change, and note
that capabilities follow the upstream sources.

Assisted-by: Claude Code:claude-opus-5[1m]
Adopt Keycloak as the broker product instead of leaving the choice open,
and reduce what core owns to a one-shot provisioning procedure: create
the realm, optionally federate one existing LDAP domain, grant realm
administration, then step back. Everything else is configured by the
administrator in the Keycloak console.

This keeps the implementation cost of an MVP bounded. Mirroring
Keycloak's configuration surface in core would mean tracking its schema
forever, and a core view of the realm would need a reconciliation loop
to stay accurate.

Two consequences follow. The srv/http/oidc key becomes write-once, so
capabilities cannot live on it: applications discover domains through
the existing agent.list_service_providers() and then ask the broker
itself what it provides, filtering out domains that fall short. And
since an OIDC domain is a user domain, its creation and removal fire
the existing user-domain-changed event rather than a new one.

Assisted-by: Claude Code:claude-opus-5
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Define core SSO architecture for external identity providers

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