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Security: brstic/remote-acp

Security

SECURITY.md

Security

Report vulnerabilities privately to the maintainers (do not open public issues).

Model (summary — full version in docs/threat-model.md)

Untrusted: the website and its prompts, the relay/network, agent and tool output, deep links, custom adapters.

Implemented controls:

  • Outbound-only desktop. No listening sockets. http:// only for localhost relays.
  • Service authentication. Bearer <serviceId>.<secret>; secrets stored as SHA-256, compared in constant time.
  • Desktop authentication. Per-desktop random token stored in an owner-only (0600) file in the app data folder (same model as ~/.codex / ~/.claude); the OS keychain is not used, so unsigned rebuilds don't trigger authorization prompts.
  • Pairing. 256-bit single-use tickets (or 50-bit codes, rate limited to 5 failures/min/desktop), 30–600 s TTL, bound to the first desktop that redeems them. Service identity on the consent screen comes from the relay registry, never from the link. Unverified services get a red warning.
  • Consent. Explicit approval per connection with folder, access level, duration. Per-task approval on by default. Sensitive tool actions prompt locally; the website can only observe. "Allow for this task" is only offered for read/edit/search/fetch kinds.
  • Tenant isolation. A service can only see its own pairings, connections and tasks; tasks must name the same external user the desktop consented to (404 otherwise).
  • Workspace confinement for ACP fs methods: absolute paths only, canonicalization, symlink and hard-link escape checks, credential folder denylist (.ssh, .aws, .gnupg, .claude, .codex, …), size caps. Home folder and / cannot be chosen as a workspace.
  • Output firewall (website tasks). Real adapters read files with their own tools (not ACP fs/*), and Codex read-only can read the whole disk without asking. The bridge therefore inspects every tool call (title, raw input, locations) and permission request: any path outside the project folder in home/system/temp areas auto-denies the permission or stops the task, and nothing more is forwarded. Outgoing text is scanned (rolling window) for private keys and common token formats. Verified with real codex-acp 2.5.0 and claude-agent-acp 0.100.0 (tests/e2e/tests/real_agents.rs). The agent's own skill folders (~/.agents/skills, ~/.codex/skills, ~/.claude/skills, skills inside ~/.claude/plugins) may be read by non-mutating tools, because agents load the skills the user installed; credential files are outside those folders and stay blocked. Heuristic: an obfuscated shell command can evade path detection; the agent's own restricted mode and local permission prompts remain the primary control.
  • Website instructions and tools. Instructions are appended to the agent's system prompt (ACP systemPrompt) and are shown to the user on the task; they cannot change desktop policy. Website tools (MCP over HTTP) require the user-consented agent.tools scope, at most 8 servers, https, and a host equal to (or a subdomain of) the service's verified origin. This is checked on the desktop and prevents pointing the agent at localhost/LAN services. Header values go only to the local agent.
  • Agent sandbox. Remote sessions are switched to a restricted adapter mode (Codex read-only/workspace-write, Claude default/acceptEdits) or refused; permissive modes (auto, agent, bypassPermissions, *full-access*) are never selected, and a task is stopped if the agent switches into one. Terminal capability is not advertised.
  • Process control. Agents run with a cleared, allowlisted environment, in their own process group; cancel → session/cancel → kill tree after 10 s.
  • Kill switches. Pause bridge, pause/revoke a website, revoke all — effective immediately on both desktop and relay.
  • No credential handling. Provider OAuth caches are never read. Sign-in is always the official CLI flow (codex login, claude auth login); the app has no API-key handling.
  • Redaction. Workspace/home paths and token-like strings are scrubbed from titles sent to websites and from diagnostics. Account identity notifications from adapters are never forwarded.
  • Limits. 1 MiB frames, 64 KiB prompts, bounded queues/buffers, rate limits per service, max task duration, approval timeout, desktop-offline grace.
  • Audit log of pairing, grants, tasks, permission outcomes, fs denials.

Known gaps are tracked in PROGRESS.md (“Not done yet”).

There aren't any published security advisories