feat(sdk): encryptedFor helpers and moderation charter readers

[QuantumExplorer]

Issue being fixed or feature implemented

The moderation charters system contract (#4898, protocol version 14) holds who moderates a contract that declares elected moderation, but no client could read it without hand-writing document queries, and nothing could write a join or resignation request: both carry a message encrypted to the leader under the encryptedFor declaration (#4919), and the SDKs had no helper for that scheme outside dashpay contact requests. The decisions recorded in #4865 fix what the reads mean (a seated charter is the one stored electedCharter for the target; its team is the leader plus the members and additions, less the removals; a resignation request changes nothing until the leader removes the member).

What was done?

1. encryptedFor helpers, for any contract (dash_sdk::platform::encrypted_for)

Everything is read from the document type's declaration, so the same calls work for any contract that declares one.

• encrypt_property(document_type, property, plaintext, &keys, &mut properties) encrypts under ecdh-secp256k1-aes256-cbc (libsecp256k1 ECDH SHA256((y & 1 | 2) || x), a random 16-byte IV, AES-256-CBC with PKCS7). It writes the ciphertext and the declaration's recipientKey and senderKey properties. It uses the same platform-encryption primitives as create_contact_request.
• decrypt_property(document_type, property, &properties, &recipient_private_key, &sender_public_key) refuses bytes of the wrong shape (not an IV plus whole blocks) before decrypting. The scheme has no authentication tag: a wrong key fails the padding check except about once in 256 tries, and then it returns garbage. The docs say so.
• EncryptedPropertyEnvelope::read(document_type, property, &document) returns the recipient id, the sender id and both key ids, which is what a reader fetches before decrypting. The sender is the document owner, the writer whose key encryption uses; another identityPublicKey reference on the sender key id does not change it. A document whose owner may have changed since (it carries a transfer time, or its type allows transfers or purchases and records none) is refused with SenderUnknownAfterTransfer: its sender key id may name a previous owner's key, and the document does not say who that was.
• select_encryption_keys picks keys by the document type's own keyRequirements, judged with the same IdentityKeyReferenceRequirements::first_unmet_by that consensus runs:
  • The sender key is the writer's key whose public key the given private key derives.
  • The recipient key is the enabled ECDSA_SECP256K1 key with the highest id among those that meet the requirements, a decryption key before an encryption key.
  • When the schema states no purpose, the dashpay convention stands in (sender ENCRYPTION; recipient DECRYPTION or ENCRYPTION), so an authentication key is never used for ECDH.
  • When the schema states no boundTo, a contract-bound key is used only if it is bound to this contract or this document type of it (a group bound never). Consensus leaves the scope of encryption and decryption keys to clients, and a key bound elsewhere is one another application may hold.
  • When one property keeps both key ids, the writer's own key serves both sides, and encrypt_property refuses two different ids for it (SharedKeyIdProperty) instead of letting one overwrite the other.
• encrypt_property_for picks the keys, writes the recipient property and encrypts.
• EncryptionKeys borrows the sender's private key, so copying it never copies key material.
• Errors come as a typed EncryptedForError, surfaced as the new dash_sdk::Error::EncryptedFor variant and, in wasm-sdk, as the new WasmSdkErrorKind::DecryptionFailed and EncryptionKeyNotFound kinds (other variants are InvalidArgument).

2. Charter and team readers (dash_sdk::platform::moderation_charters)

All of these are proved document queries on the system contract. There is no new endpoint.

Method	Query
Sdk::fetch_seated_charter(target)	electedCharter.byTargetContract, limit 1 (only a winner is stored)
Sdk::fetch_submitted_charter(id), Sdk::fetch_elected_charter(id)	by id
Sdk::fetch_moderation_team(target)	seated charter, then every page of addedModerator and removedModerator (byElectedCharterMember), combined by ModerationTeam::from_documents through ElectedCharter::active_members
Sdk::fetch_submitted_charters(target, page)	submittedCharter.byTargetContract ordered by $createdAt
Sdk::fetch_join_requests(proposal, page)	joinRequest.bySubmittedCharter ordered by $ownerId
Sdk::fetch_pending_resignation_requests(charter)	resignationRequest.byElectedCharterOwner, less the writers the charter has a removedModerator for (a request changes nothing until the leader removes the member)

Every query carries the order clause that pins its index. A bare equality on the first property of a two-property index is proven absent rather than served, as the contact request code notes.

Nothing caps additions until seating lands, so readers that must see a whole set drain every page. After 50 full pages of 100 they read one more: empty, the set is complete; not empty, they return an error rather than answer from part of the set.

The charters contract only exists from protocol version 14. An unpinned SDK starts mainnet and testnet at 13 and learns newer versions only from verified responses, and the contract's schema does not parse at 13, so the readers first refresh the protocol version when the SDK is below 14 and return a clear error when the network is still below it. Contract resolution goes through a new shared Sdk::fetch_system_data_contract (context provider first, then a proved fetch), which DashPay's and DPNS's helpers now use too; with no context provider set they now fetch instead of erroring.

3. Writers

Sdk::build_join_request and Sdk::build_resignation_request do the following:

1. Fetch the proposal (or the charter) and its leader.
2. Pick the leader's decryption key bound to submittedCharter and the writer's encryption key bound to joinRequest, the keys the schema's keyRequirements demand.
3. Encrypt the message.
4. Set submittedCharterId (or electedCharterId), recipientId, recipientKeyId and senderKeyId.

They return the document and its entropy for put_to_platform, resolving the contract once. The pure build_*_document functions take the fetched documents and identities, so they are tested offline.

4. JavaScript

wasm-sdk

• Statics, which run locally: WasmSdk.encryptDocumentProperty, decryptDocumentProperty and encryptedPropertyEnvelope.
• Instance methods:
  • Readers: getModerationSeatedCharter, getModerationSubmittedCharter, getModerationTeam (returns a ModerationTeam class), getModerationSubmittedCharters, getModerationJoinRequests and getModerationPendingResignationRequests.
  • Builders: buildModerationJoinRequest and buildModerationResignationRequest. They return a Document with its entropy set, ready for documentCreate.
• The moderation-charters-contract feature is on by default, so the trusted context serves the contract without a fetch.
• The page queries read their ids and cursor field by field as IdentifierLike, so Identifier instances work, and decrypt and envelope sanitize a JS-built document against its type (a Uint8Array property of a document built without its contract arrives as a list of numbers).

js-evo-sdk

• sdk.encryptedFor (encrypt, decrypt, envelope).
• sdk.moderationCharters (the six readers and two builders).
• The README's facade table and encryptedFor section are updated. That section used to say the helpers were "not part of the SDK yet".

docs/protocol/moderation-charters.md gains a short "Reading and writing from a client" table.
The book's encryptedFor section (book/src/data-model/documents.md) names the client helpers.

5. Trusted context provider: the moderation-charters-contract feature on its own now compiles

wasm-sdk now turns this feature on, which surfaced a gating bug from #4898 in rs-sdk-trusted-context-provider:

• MODERATION_CHARTERS_CONTRACT_INITIAL_PROTOCOL_VERSION was imported only under app-connect-contract.
• The feature was missing from both the load_system_data_contract import gate and the system-contract lookup block. On its own it would have been compiled out even with the import fixed.

Builds with all-system-contracts were unaffected, which is why nothing caught it.

# before
$ cargo check -p rs-sdk-trusted-context-provider --no-default-features --features moderation-charters-contract
error[E0425]: cannot find value `MODERATION_CHARTERS_CONTRACT_INITIAL_PROTOCOL_VERSION` in this scope
# (and with app-connect-contract alone, the moderation constant was an unused import)

# after: each feature gates its own import and the lookup block lists it
$ cargo test -p rs-sdk-trusted-context-provider --no-default-features --features moderation-charters-contract -- moderation_charters
test provider::tests::should_serve_moderation_charters_only_from_protocol_14 ... ok

Usage

Rust, reading a contract's team and a join request's message:

use dash_sdk::platform::encrypted_for::{decrypt_property, EncryptedPropertyEnvelope};
use dash_sdk::platform::moderation_charters::{CharterDocumentsPage, JoinRequestInput};

let team = sdk.fetch_moderation_team(contract_id).await?; // None: no seated charter
if let Some(team) = &team {
    assert!(team.contains(&team.leader_id));
}

let charters = sdk.fetch_moderation_charters_contract().await?;
let join_request_type = charters.document_type_for_name("joinRequest")?;
let requests = sdk
    .fetch_join_requests(proposal_id, CharterDocumentsPage::default())
    .await?;
for request in requests.values().flatten() {
    let envelope = EncryptedPropertyEnvelope::read(join_request_type, "encryptedMessage", request)?;
    let sender_key = /* key envelope.sender_key_id of identity envelope.sender_id */;
    let message = decrypt_property(
        join_request_type,
        "encryptedMessage",
        request.properties(),
        &leader_decryption_key, // the key envelope.recipient_key_id names
        &sender_key,
    )?;
}

// Offering to join
let request = sdk
    .build_join_request(JoinRequestInput {
        submitted_charter_id: proposal_id,
        message: b"Five years moderating a forum".to_vec(),
        writer: identity,
        writer_encryption_key, // bound to joinRequest
    })
    .await?;
request
    .document
    .put_to_platform_and_wait_for_response(
        &sdk,
        join_request_type.to_owned_document_type(),
        Some(request.entropy.0),
        signing_key,
        None,
        &signer,
        None,
    )
    .await?;

JavaScript:

const team = await sdk.moderationCharters.team(contractId);
team?.members;              // Identifier[]; team.leaderId; team.contains(id)

const joinRequest = await sdk.moderationCharters.buildJoinRequest({
  submittedCharterId: proposalId,
  message: 'Five years moderating a forum',
  writer: identity,
  writerEncryptionKey: PrivateKey.fromWIF(encryptionKeyWif),
});
await sdk.documents.create({ document: joinRequest, identityKey, signer });

// Any contract declaring encryptedFor
const fields = await sdk.encryptedFor.encrypt({
  dataContract, documentTypeName: 'joinRequest', property: 'encryptedMessage',
  plaintext: 'hello', senderKey, senderPrivateKey, recipientKey,
});
// before: no helper; apps re-implemented ECDH + AES-CBC by hand
// after:  { encryptedMessage: Uint8Array(32), recipientKeyId: 2, senderKeyId: 4 }

Before and after, per API:

	Before	After
Who moderates contract X	hand-built getDocuments on electedCharter, then the additions and removals, combined by hand	sdk.moderationCharters.team(X) / sdk.fetch_moderation_team(X)
Encrypt a joinRequest message	not possible without reimplementing DIP-15 ECDH and AES-CBC	buildJoinRequest(...) or sdk.encryptedFor.encrypt(...)
Decrypt it as the leader	same	sdk.encryptedFor.decrypt(...) / decrypt_property(...)

Out of scope

• Swift and Kotlin are not included. The FFI and mobile SDKs get these in a follow-up.
• Seating itself (the cap on additions, retiring interim moderators, checking discounted fees against the seated charter) is consensus work for a later pull request. The readers only report what is stored.
• packages/wasm-sdk/generate_docs.py no longer exists (it was removed with the evo SDK), so there are no generated API docs to regenerate. The new APIs are documented in their TSDoc, the Rust docs, the evo-sdk README and the protocol guide.

Base branch test fix (commit from #4952)

moderation-charters-contract's should_load_the_schema_at_the_latest_platform_version has failed on v4.2-dev since #4898 merged: the crate's v1::document_types constants still described the old single charter type, and the Rust workspace tests stop at it on every pull request. This branch carries #4952's commit 255ecd9 unchanged (cherry-picked as 1c7f4b0), so the two merge cleanly whichever lands first.

How Has This Been Tested?

Rust (cargo test -p dash-sdk --lib -- encrypted_for moderation_charters: 15 passed), all offline:

• should_decrypt_what_it_encrypts_and_fill_the_key_id_properties: round trip on the charters joinRequest type, and the sender reads its own message back.
• should_decrypt_the_dashpay_contact_request_vector_with_the_generic_helper: a pinned encryptedPublicKey produced by the functions create_contact_request calls (fixed keys and IV) decrypts through the generic helper on a dashpay contactRequest type that declares encryptedFor the way dashpay v2 is proposed to. Encrypting under the same IV gives identical bytes. The pinned bytes were cross-checked against an independent implementation (pure-Python secp256k1 ECDH and openssl enc -aes-256-cbc).
• should_write_an_iv_plus_whole_blocks_that_pass_the_consensus_shape_check: lengths 0 to 1023, checked by dpp's validate_encrypted_property_shapes.
• should_fail_to_decrypt_with_a_wrong_key (deterministic IV), should_refuse_bytes_of_the_wrong_shape_before_decrypting, should_refuse_a_property_that_declares_no_encrypted_for.
• should_refuse_a_ciphertext_that_is_not_bytes: the Rust helper takes bytes; the wasm bindings sanitize JS-built documents first.
• should_encrypt_under_one_key_when_one_property_keeps_both_key_ids, should_skip_keys_bound_to_another_scope_when_no_bound_to_is_required (absent and purpose-only keyRequirements, recipient and sender), should_name_the_owner_as_the_sender_whatever_else_refers_to_the_sender_key, should_refuse_to_name_a_sender_once_the_owner_may_have_changed.
• Paging, offline through collect_every_page: should_continue_after_the_last_document_of_each_page_in_query_order, should_read_a_set_of_exactly_the_page_budget_in_full, should_refuse_a_set_larger_than_the_page_budget, should_build_the_team_from_changes_on_every_page, should_keep_only_the_resignation_requests_whose_writer_was_not_removed, should_read_the_member_of_each_team_change.
• should_pick_the_keys_the_key_requirements_demand: skips disabled, unbound and wrongly bound keys; refuses an unbound writer key and a stranger's private key.
• should_write_the_recipient_and_read_the_envelope_back.
• should_combine_members_additions_and_removals_as_active_members_does, should_be_the_leader_and_the_elected_members_without_changes, should_refuse_a_team_change_of_another_charter: fixture documents.
• should_serve_every_reader_through_the_index_the_schema_declares_for_it: each reader's query converts, builds a provable path query and is served by the intended index.
• should_page_after_the_last_document_of_a_full_page_only.
• should_build_requests_the_leader_decrypts_that_the_schema_accepts: both builders' documents pass the contract's JSON schema and the shape check, and the leader decrypts them.

JavaScript:

• wasm-sdk tests/unit/encrypted-for.spec.ts: round trip, block shape, envelope, a wrong key never recovers the message (and reports DecryptionFailed), a mismatched private key and an undeclared property are refused.
• wasm-sdk tests/unit/moderation-charters.spec.ts: the page queries take Identifier instances and base58 strings, offline.
• js-evo-sdk tests/unit/facades/encrypted-for.spec.ts (real round trip through the facade) and moderation-charters.spec.ts (each facade method forwards to its wasm method).

Also run locally:

• cargo test -p rs-sdk-trusted-context-provider --no-default-features --features moderation-charters-contract: the activation test passes.
• cargo check of the provider with app-connect-contract, dpns-contract and all-system-contracts each alone: no warnings.
• cargo clippy -p dash-sdk -p rs-sdk-trusted-context-provider --all-targets -- -D warnings and cargo clippy -p wasm-sdk --target wasm32-unknown-unknown -- -D warnings: clean.
• cargo test -p wasm-sdk --lib: 132 passed.
• cargo fmt --check on the three crates: clean.
• yarn workspace @dashevo/wasm-sdk build then test:unit: 432 passing in mocha and in karma.
• yarn workspace @dashevo/evo-sdk build then test:unit: 266 passing in mocha and in karma.
• eslint on the new TypeScript: clean.

Not run locally: the workspace-wide --all-features clippy and the network-backed functional tests. The readers have no recorded test vectors; their query shapes are checked offline against the contract's indexes.

Breaking Changes

No consensus changes. dash_sdk::Error gains an EncryptedFor variant, so a downstream exhaustive match on it needs an arm (wasm-sdk's is updated), and WasmSdkErrorKind gains DecryptionFailed and EncryptionKeyNotFound at the end.

Checklist:

• I have performed a self-review of my own code
• I have commented my code, particularly in hard-to-understand areas
• I have added or updated relevant unit/integration/functional/e2e tests
• I have added "!" to the title and described breaking changes in the corresponding section if my code contains any
• I have made corresponding changes to the documentation if needed
• If I added or changed GroveDB structure, I described it in the area's structure.rs, regenerated grovedb-structure.json, and checked the structure viewer link posted on this pull request

For repository code-owners and collaborators only

• I have assigned this pull request to a milestone

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Summary by CodeRabbit

• New Features
  • Added SDK support for reading moderation charters, teams, proposals, join requests, and pending resignation requests, with tools to prepare join and resignation requests.
  • Added client-side encryption and decryption for document properties, including details about who encrypted a property and for whom.
  • Added guidance for using moderation charter and encrypted-property features across the Rust and JavaScript SDKs.

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📝 Walkthrough

Walkthrough

The changes add Rust, WASM, and JavaScript APIs for encrypted document properties and moderation-charter operations. The moderation-charter contract now defines seven document types. The SDKs add charter reads, team queries, and encrypted join and resignation request builders.

Changes

Encrypted properties and moderation charters

Layer / File(s)	Summary
Encrypted-property helpers packages/rs-sdk/src/platform/encrypted_for.rs, packages/rs-sdk/src/platform/encrypted_for/tests.rs, packages/rs-sdk/src/error.rs, packages/rs-sdk/src/platform.rs	The Rust SDK adds encryption, decryption, key selection, and envelope-reading helpers for encryptedFor properties. Tests cover ciphertext validation, key requirements, and encryption/decryption cases.
Moderation-charter schema and Rust SDK packages/moderation-charters-contract/src/v1/mod.rs, packages/moderation-charters-contract/src/lib.rs, packages/rs-sdk/src/platform/moderation_charters/*, packages/rs-sdk/src/platform/system_data_contract.rs, packages/rs-sdk-trusted-context-provider/src/provider.rs, packages/rs-sdk/src/platform/dashpay/mod.rs, packages/rs-sdk/src/platform/dpns_usernames/mod.rs	The contract defines seven document types. The Rust SDK adds indexed reads, team assembly, encrypted join and resignation request builders, and protocol-version checks. System-contract fetching is shared with DashPay and DPNS contract lookups.
WASM APIs and feature wiring packages/wasm-sdk/src/encrypted_for.rs, packages/wasm-sdk/src/moderation_charters.rs, packages/wasm-sdk/src/error.rs, packages/wasm-sdk/src/lib.rs, packages/wasm-sdk/Cargo.toml, packages/wasm-sdk/tests/unit/*	The WASM SDK exposes encrypted-property and moderation-charter operations, adds encryption error kinds, enables the moderation-charters feature, and adds tests.
JavaScript facades and client guidance packages/js-evo-sdk/src/encrypted-for/*, packages/js-evo-sdk/src/moderation-charters/*, packages/js-evo-sdk/src/sdk.ts, packages/js-evo-sdk/tests/unit/facades/*, packages/js-evo-sdk/README.md, book/src/data-model/documents.md, docs/protocol/moderation-charters.md	The JavaScript SDK exposes encryptedFor and moderationCharters facades. Tests exercise encryption round trips and facade calls. Documentation describes both APIs and the moderation-charter request flow.

Priority: ➖ Normal

Estimated code review effort: 4 (Complex) | ~60 minutes

Change: Feature

Sequence Diagram(s)

sequenceDiagram
  participant Client
  participant ModerationChartersFacade
  participant WasmSdk
  participant RustSdk
  participant encrypted_for
  Client->>ModerationChartersFacade: buildJoinRequest(options)
  ModerationChartersFacade->>WasmSdk: buildModerationJoinRequest(options)
  WasmSdk->>RustSdk: build_join_request(input)
  RustSdk->>encrypted_for: encrypt_property_for(message, leader)
  RustSdk-->>WasmSdk: request document and entropy
  WasmSdk-->>ModerationChartersFacade: DocumentWasm

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Suggested reviewers: lklimek, shumkov

Merge Risk: 🔵 Low · up to 3bc29

The new encryption helpers and moderation-charter APIs look mergeable. One narrow issue remains: for a document that was transferred to a new owner, the envelope names the current owner as the sender. Readers following it will fetch the wrong key and fail to decrypt, or rarely get garbage. Fix this or document that transferred documents are unsupported; it can reasonably be a small follow-up.

🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4 | ❌ 1

❌ Failed checks (1 warning)

Check name	Status	Explanation	Resolution
Docstring Coverage	⚠️ Warning	Docstring coverage is 72.92% which is insufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 144 functions across 25 files. (4 skipped…	Write docstrings for the functions missing them to satisfy the coverage threshold.

✅ Passed checks (4 passed)

Check name	Status	Explanation
Linked Issues check	✅ Passed	Check skipped because no linked issues were found for this pull request.
Out of Scope Changes check	✅ Passed	Check skipped because no linked issues were found for this pull request.
Description Check	✅ Passed	Check skipped - CodeRabbit’s high-level summary is enabled.
Title check	✅ Passed	The title clearly and concisely identifies the two primary feature areas: encryptedFor helpers and moderation charter SDK readers. It matches the main changes in the pull request, although it does not…

Full details: Docstring Coverage

Explanation

Docstring coverage is 72.92% which is insufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 144 functions across 25 files. (4 skipped: 4 unsupported.)

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Updated at 2026-09-23T23:12:53.159Z

[thepastaclaw]

🕓 Queued for automated review — 9th in line, estimated start in ~1.9 h (commit b74dc20)
Estimated review time once started: ~25 min (two-phase automated review; median of recent runs).

• Request priority review — click to move this review to the front of the queue.

[thepastaclaw]

Final validation — Phase 2 only (queue backlog)

The additions preserve proof-verified reads and client/server layering, but automatic recipient-key selection introduces a blocking cross-contract confidentiality issue. Offline checks confirmed the encryption metadata failures and the Identifier pagination conversion failure; all 15 targeted SDK tests passed. Four non-blocking findings cover metadata consistency, argument conversion, and whole-set pagination coverage.

🔴 1 blocking | 🟡 4 suggestion(s)

Review provenance

Source: reviewer 1: gpt-6-astra (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 2: gpt-6-astra (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: architecture-layering); reviewer 3: gpt-6-astra (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: ffi-engineer); reviewer 4: gpt-6-astra (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: rust-quality); reviewer 5: gpt-6-astra (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: security-auditor); final verifier: gpt-6-astra (agent: astra-verifier, role: final-verifier)

• Triage: critical by gpt-6-astra (effort low) — The large, cross-language diff directly adds cryptographic and key-handling logic in packages/rs-sdk/src/platform/encrypted_for.rs, including encrypt_property, decrypt_property, and select_encryption_keys, with schema-driven identity/key selection and ECDH/AES-CBC envelope handling exposed through WASM and JavaScript.
• Phase 1 reviewers: not run (skipped for throughput: 11 PRs queued, above the 10 limit)
• Fresh verifier: gpt-6-astra — final-verifier; agent astra-verifier
• Phase 2 reviewers: gpt-6-astra — general (completed, effort xhigh); agent phase2-reviewer, gpt-6-astra — architecture-layering (completed, effort xhigh); agent phase2-reviewer, gpt-6-astra — ffi-engineer (completed, effort xhigh); agent phase2-reviewer, gpt-6-astra — rust-quality (completed, effort xhigh); agent phase2-reviewer, gpt-6-astra — security-auditor (completed, effort xhigh); agent phase2-reviewer

🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents

These findings are from an automated code review. Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.

In `packages/rs-sdk/src/platform/encrypted_for.rs`:
- [BLOCKING] packages/rs-sdk/src/platform/encrypted_for.rs:394-403: Respect recipient key contract bounds before selecting an encryption key
  When keyRequirements omits boundTo, why_unfit never checks the recipient key's contract_bounds. An enabled DECRYPTION key bound to an unrelated contract can therefore outrank an eligible unbound key. An application holding only that unrelated contract's private key can decrypt the resulting publicly stored ciphertext using the sender's public key. ContractBounds explicitly delegates encryption/decryption scope enforcement to clients, so consensus checks do not prevent this disclosure. An offline reproduction with a DashPay-owned document type selected moderation-contract-bound key 9 over unbound key 2, and key 9's private half recovered the plaintext. Enforce the key's permitted scope independently of optional schema requirements before ranking candidates, while preserving explicitly requested same-contract bindings such as submittedCharter for join requests. Cover both absent and purpose-only keyRequirements.
- [SUGGESTION] packages/rs-sdk/src/platform/encrypted_for.rs:237-245: Reject conflicting key IDs when the declaration shares one key field
  The contract parser permits recipientKey and senderKey to name the same integer property. These sequential inserts then overwrite the recipient key ID with the sender key ID while returning success. An offline reproduction using an accepted declaration encrypted with recipient key 7 and sender key 3 but recorded 3 for both roles, so the envelope directs the recipient to the wrong decryption key. The WASM encryption helper delegates to this function and inherits the problem. Reject aliased paths with unequal supplied key IDs before modifying properties, and add a regression test. Equal IDs can remain supported.
- [SUGGESTION] packages/rs-sdk/src/platform/encrypted_for.rs:321-326: Keep encryption and envelope sender resolution consistent
  The envelope infers the sender from the first identityPublicKey reference naming senderKeyId, but encrypt_property_for encrypts with the supplied writer's key. These disagree for an accepted schema containing a plain senderKeyId and an auditIdentityId with refersTo: { type: "identityPublicKey", keyIdProperty: "senderKeyId" }. An offline reproduction encrypted with writer A while the envelope named auditor B; A's public key recovered the message, whereas B's did not. The existing scheme description in book/src/data-model/documents.md identifies the sender as the document owner, so independent key-existence references should not silently override that meaning. Retain owner-based resolution, or make encryption and envelope reading consume the same explicit sender interpretation. If alternate senders remain supported, also reject a missing required $creatorId instead of substituting the current owner: absence does not establish that those identities are equal. Add tests for independent identity references and creator/owner differences.

In `packages/wasm-sdk/src/moderation_charters.rs`:
- [SUGGESTION] packages/wasm-sdk/src/moderation_charters.rs:305-309: Decode IdentifierLike objects before deserializing pagination queries
  Both pagination interfaces advertise IdentifierLike, and the JavaScript facade forwards these values unchanged. However, deserialize_required_query converts through platform_value and serde, losing an Identifier wrapper's type information. IdentifierWasmVisitor::visit_map cannot reconstruct the wrapper from its remaining enumerable pointer property. With network access mocked, both getModerationSubmittedCharters({ targetContractId: id }) and getModerationJoinRequests({ submittedCharterId: id }) rejected actual Identifier instances before fetching, while base58 strings reached the fetch. An Identifier passed as startAfter fails the same way, including the natural lastDocument.id pagination path. Parse the required identifier fields with IdentifierWasm::try_from_options and the cursor with its optional equivalent, or normalize wrappers before serde conversion. Add boundary tests using actual Identifier instances.

In `packages/rs-sdk/src/platform/moderation_charters/readers.rs`:
- [SUGGESTION] packages/rs-sdk/src/platform/moderation_charters/readers.rs:399-405: Exercise the whole-set pagination loop with offline responses
  The new tests check first-page index selection and CharterDocumentsPage::after independently, but none executes fetch_every_page or either whole-set reader across multiple responses. This leaves the API's central completeness guarantee untested: those tests would still pass if a reader stopped after one page or omitted a removal from a later page. Add offline async coverage for a full page followed by a short page, with document IDs deliberately differing from index order, and assert the continuation query and final membership. Also cover an exactly-full terminal page followed by an empty page, plus page-budget exhaustion returning an error rather than partial data.

Out-of-scope follow-up suggestions (1)

These are valid observations, but they are outside this PR's scope and should be handled in separate issues or author/maintainer-requested PRs rather than blocking this review.

• Audit existing DashPay recipient selection for the same contract-boundary leak — The unchanged select_recipient_key_index in packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/identity/network/contact_requests.rs filters purpose, key type, and disabled status but not contract bounds. An unrelated contract-bound DECRYPTION key can outrank an unbound ENCRYPTION key, and the downstream validator and encryption path do not enforce those bounds. This is a concrete pre-existing confidentiality issue, not a regression caused by this PR.
  • Follow-up: Track a separate security fix for automatic DashPay recipient-key selection, with coverage for unrelated bound DECRYPTION keys alongside eligible unbound keys.

[coderabbitai]

Actionable comments posted: 1

---

• 🪄 Fix CodeRabbit comments on this PR

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Inline comments:
In `@packages/rs-sdk/src/platform/encrypted_for.rs`:
- Line 357: Before constructing the envelope in the flow that assigns sender_id
from document.owner_id(), reject transferred documents using their transfer
metadata; do not identify the current owner as the sender when the previous
owner’s key encrypted the bytes.

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📥 Commits

Reviewing files that changed from the base of the PR and between 58bfae8 and 3bc29b3.

📒 Files selected for processing (29)

• book/src/data-model/documents.md
• docs/protocol/moderation-charters.md
• packages/js-evo-sdk/README.md
• packages/js-evo-sdk/src/encrypted-for/facade.ts
• packages/js-evo-sdk/src/moderation-charters/facade.ts
• packages/js-evo-sdk/src/sdk.ts
• packages/js-evo-sdk/tests/unit/facades/encrypted-for.spec.ts
• packages/js-evo-sdk/tests/unit/facades/moderation-charters.spec.ts
• packages/moderation-charters-contract/src/lib.rs
• packages/moderation-charters-contract/src/v1/mod.rs
• packages/rs-sdk-trusted-context-provider/src/provider.rs
• packages/rs-sdk/src/error.rs
• packages/rs-sdk/src/platform.rs
• packages/rs-sdk/src/platform/dashpay/mod.rs
• packages/rs-sdk/src/platform/dpns_usernames/mod.rs
• packages/rs-sdk/src/platform/encrypted_for.rs
• packages/rs-sdk/src/platform/encrypted_for/tests.rs
• packages/rs-sdk/src/platform/moderation_charters/mod.rs
• packages/rs-sdk/src/platform/moderation_charters/readers.rs
• packages/rs-sdk/src/platform/moderation_charters/requests.rs
• packages/rs-sdk/src/platform/moderation_charters/team.rs
• packages/rs-sdk/src/platform/system_data_contract.rs
• packages/wasm-sdk/Cargo.toml
• packages/wasm-sdk/src/encrypted_for.rs
• packages/wasm-sdk/src/error.rs
• packages/wasm-sdk/src/lib.rs
• packages/wasm-sdk/src/moderation_charters.rs
• packages/wasm-sdk/tests/unit/encrypted-for.spec.ts
• packages/wasm-sdk/tests/unit/moderation-charters.spec.ts

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[QuantumExplorer]

Approved