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WalkthroughThe SSL wrapper now captures fatal BoringSSL handshake reasons and reports them through shared TLS error conversion. Client, server, and HTTP/2 upgrade paths use the shared conversion function. Tests cover fatal alerts, invalid TLS records, and early disconnects. ChangesTLS error reporting
Suggested reviewers: Priority: ➖ Normal Merge Risk: 🔵 Low · up to This change makes fatal TLS handshake errors over proxied or piped connections report the real TLS reason instead of a misleading certificate error or a false successful connection. The remaining concern is internal: the new error-reason value can outlive the text it points to if future code misuses it. Tightening that type is advisable, but current behavior looks correct. 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4✅ Passed checks (4 passed)
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Updated 4:23 PM PT - Sep 30th, 2026
✅ @robobun, your commit 79ca29cbc29d5cbed2e1ca991c5888b8597fe0fd passed in 🧪 To try this PR locally: bunx bun-pr 32929That installs a local version of the PR into your bun-32929 --bun |
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Found 2 issues this PR may fix:
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I read both before adding any #9365: the reported callback is #20727: the symptom there is a hang. Per the reporter's own trace the fatal alert is received and the socket is closed, but no error ever reaches JS, so the promise never settles. This PR does not change whether any callback fires, only which error value the handshake callback carries once it does, and it only touches the |
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I didn't find any issues — the fix cleanly mirrors the C path's ssl_dispatch_parked_reason and the stack-backed reason pointer follows the same synchronous-clone contract — but since this is unsafe Rust in the TLS handshake path it's worth a human look.
Extended reasoning...
Overview
This PR fixes error reporting in SSLWrapper::update_handshake_state (src/uws/lib.rs), the Rust TLS wrapper used when tls.connect() is given a generic Duplex (or Windows named pipe) instead of a real socket. On a fatal handshake failure it now captures ERR_peek_last_error() before ERR_clear_error() and passes it to the handshake callback as an EPROTO-shaped us_bun_verify_error_t, instead of falling through to the unrelated X509 verify result. A new test in node-tls-connect.test.ts covers both the direct and duplex-proxy paths for the ALPN-mismatch alert.
Security risks
The change is in error reporting only — it does not alter what handshakes are accepted or rejected, nor any verification logic. The only memory-safety consideration is that us_bun_verify_error_t.reason now points into a stack [u8; 256] that lives for the duration of the synchronous trigger_handshake_callback. I verified this matches the existing C-path contract exactly (ssl_dispatch_parked_reason in openssl.c:1420-1435 uses a stack char reason[] the same way), and that the two SSLWrapper consumers (UpgradedDuplex::on_handshake, WindowsNamedPipe::on_handshake) immediately clone code/reason into owned Box<CStr> before any later use. net.ts already recognizes the EPROTO shape and routes it through tlsHandshakeError. I see no new attack surface.
Level of scrutiny
Medium-high. The logic itself is small and well-contained, and it brings the Rust wrapper into parity with a pattern that already exists and is tested in the C path. However, it is unsafe Rust (FFI, raw-pointer-backed C strings, the laundered-self re-entrancy pattern) inside the TLS handshake state machine, so it warrants a human reviewer who knows this code rather than a bot rubber-stamp.
Other factors
No CODEOWNERS apply to the touched paths. The bug-hunting system found nothing. The added test is well-targeted (asserts the exact ERR_SSL_TLSV1_ALERT_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL code and that checkServerIdentity is never invoked) and runs under both transport variants in the existing matrix. The PR description demonstrates the before/after behavior against Node. CI is still building.
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I didn't find any issues — the stack-buffer lifetime and EPROTO shape both check out against the C path — but this is unsafe Rust on the TLS handshake error path with a raw-pointer lifetime contract, so a human pass would be worthwhile.
Extended reasoning...
Overview
This PR fixes error reporting in SSLWrapper::update_handshake_state (src/uws/lib.rs), the Rust TLS engine used when tls.connect() is given a Duplex or Windows named pipe instead of a native socket. Previously, on a fatal handshake failure (SSL_ERROR_SSL/SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL), the code called ERR_clear_error() immediately and then reported SSL_get_verify_result() of a non-existent peer certificate, surfacing a phantom UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT instead of the real alert (e.g. no_application_protocol). The fix peeks the BoringSSL error queue before clearing it and passes the captured reason through the handshake callback as the same {error_no: -71, code: "EPROTO", reason} shape the uSockets C path uses in ssl_dispatch_parked_reason (openssl.c:1431-1432). A new test in node-tls-connect.test.ts covers both the direct and duplex-proxy variants.
Security risks
The change is in TLS handshake code, which is security-adjacent, but it only affects which error is reported after a handshake has already definitively failed. It does not alter whether handshakes succeed, certificate verification, or trust decisions — set_fatal_error(is_fatal) and trigger_close_callback() still fire exactly as before. If anything, surfacing the real failure reason rather than a misleading certificate error is a net positive for clients that key retry/fallback logic on e.code. No injection, auth-bypass, or data-exposure surface is introduced.
Level of scrutiny
This warrants a human look despite being small and well-tested:
- It is unsafe Rust touching BoringSSL FFI on a TLS error path.
- The new
peek_fatal_ssl_errorreturns aus_bun_verify_error_twhosereasonfield points into a caller-provided stack[u8; 256]. I traced the consumption chain (trigger_handshake_callback→UpgradedDuplex::on_handshake(clones into ownedCertError) →DuplexUpgradeContext::on_handshake→TLSSocket::on_handshake→verify_error_to_js) and it is fully synchronous, withreason_bufdeclared inupdate_handshake_stateoutliving the entire call. This mirrors the C path's stack-localchar reason[256]exactly. But pointer-lifetime contracts across a multi-hop fn-pointer vtable are the kind of thing a maintainer should sign off on.
Other factors
- The fix is a faithful port of the existing C-path mechanism (
ssl_dispatch_parked_reasonin openssl.c), so the design is already established. - The
is_fatalboolean is hoisted but semantically unchanged;ERR_clear_error()still runs in the same place. - The new test slots into the existing direct/duplex-proxy matrix and asserts the exact
code/libraryplus thatcheckServerIdentityis never invoked, which would catch regressions in either engine. - The author's analysis of why this does not fix #9365/#20727 is careful and correct, which raises confidence in the change itself.
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I didn't find any issues — the EPROTO shape, the -71 error_no, and the stack-buffer lifetime all line up with ssl_dispatch_parked_reason in openssl.c, and UpgradedDuplex::on_handshake clones the reason synchronously — but this is unsafe Rust touching raw-pointer lifetimes in the TLS handshake path, so it's worth a human look.
Extended reasoning...
Overview
This PR fixes error reporting in SSLWrapper::update_handshake_state (src/uws/lib.rs), the TLS engine used when tls.connect() is given a generic Duplex or Windows named pipe. On a fatal handshake failure (SSL_ERROR_SSL/SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL), the wrapper was calling ERR_clear_error() immediately after SSL_get_error(), discarding the queued BoringSSL alert reason, then reporting the unrelated X509 verify result instead. The fix peeks ERR_peek_last_error() into a 256-byte stack buffer before the clear and passes it to the handshake callback as {error_no: -71, code: "EPROTO", reason: buf} — exactly the shape ssl_dispatch_parked_reason in packages/bun-usockets/src/crypto/openssl.c already produces for the native TCP path. net.ts already recognizes code === "EPROTO" as a protocol failure and decomposes it into the ERR_SSL_* code. A regression test is added to the existing tls.connect / tls.connect using duplex proxy matrix.
Security risks
None identified. The change only affects which error value is reported when a handshake has already failed; it doesn't change verification logic, trust decisions, or whether the handshake succeeds. If anything it improves security ergonomics by surfacing the real failure reason instead of a misleading certificate error.
Level of scrutiny
This warrants human review. The change is small and well-argued, but it's unsafe Rust in the TLS handshake path: it constructs a us_bun_verify_error_t whose reason field points into a stack-local [u8; 256], hands that struct through a callback vtable, and relies on the callback chain consuming it synchronously before the frame unwinds. I traced this and it holds — reason_buf lives for all of update_handshake_state, trigger_handshake_callback runs synchronously within it, and UpgradedDuplex::on_handshake immediately boxes the CStr into this.ssl_error before forwarding (matching the C path's stack-local reason[] in ssl_dispatch_parked_reason). But pointer-lifetime reasoning across an FFI/callback boundary in a TLS engine is exactly the kind of thing a maintainer should sign off on.
Other factors
- The fix is a faithful port of existing, already-shipped logic from
openssl.c(.error = -71, .code = "EPROTO", .reason = reason), reducing novel-design risk. - No CODEOWNERS entries cover the modified files.
- The test is well-targeted: it runs in both the direct and duplex-proxy variants, asserts the exact
code/library, and verifiescheckServerIdentityis never invoked. - robobun reported CI failures on an earlier commit (4173c41); two "ci: retrigger" commits followed, so the current build status should be confirmed before merge.
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The remaining CI red is all infrastructure; neither run has a single failing test. Across both Buildkite builds on this PR (65810 and the retriggered 66005), zero test files failed. Every red job is one of:
None of those mechanisms can be affected by this diff, which only changes which error object the TLS handshake callback carries after a handshake has already failed. The change itself is verified: the new test fails on an unfixed build (the duplex variant reports |
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Rebased onto main (import-list conflict in Also switched the peek from Both duplex-proxy tests fail on main and pass with this change; the direct |
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The ERR_peek_last_error → ERR_peek_error fix in 40f57c2 addresses my earlier finding — both engines now report the same root-cause code and the test asserts it exactly. No further issues found; deferring to a human for the final sign-off since this is TLS handshake error-handling.
What was reviewed:
peek_fatal_ssl_errornow matchesssl_park_fatal_reasonin openssl.c (sameERR_peek_errorposition, same{-71, "EPROTO", reason}shape).reason_buflifetime: stack-local, live across the synchronoustrigger_handshake_callback; every consumer (UpgradedDuplex,WindowsNamedPipe,TLSSocket::on_handshake,ProxyTunnel,WebSocketProxyTunnel) clones or ignores the pointer before returning.- Tests assert exact codes in both the direct and duplex-proxy variants; the handshake_failure regex is gone.
Extended reasoning...
Overview
This PR fixes error reporting in SSLWrapper::update_handshake_state (src/uws/lib.rs) — the memory-BIO TLS engine used for tls.connect({ socket: <Duplex> }) and Windows named pipes. On a fatal handshake failure it was calling ERR_clear_error() immediately after SSL_get_error(), discarding the queued alert reason, then reporting whatever SSL_get_verify_result() said about a certificate that was never received. The fix peeks the oldest queued error before clearing and passes it through as the same EPROTO shape the native uSockets C path already produces via ssl_dispatch_parked_reason.
Two tests are added to the existing tls.connect / tls.connect using duplex proxy matrix in test/js/node/tls/node-tls-connect.test.ts.
Security risks
The change is confined to which error object the handshake callback carries after SSL_do_handshake has already failed. It does not alter any verification decision — is_fatal was already computed before this PR; the only new behavior is reading the queued reason instead of the (meaningless) X509 verify result. It actually closes a security-relevant misbehavior: with rejectUnauthorized: false on the duplex path, a fatal handshake alert previously fell through to secureConnect on a TLS layer that was never established.
The stack-local reason_buf pointer stored in us_bun_verify_error_t was checked against every SSLWrapper on_handshake consumer: UpgradedDuplex and WindowsNamedPipe clone into an owned CertError, TLSSocket::on_handshake boxes code_bytes()/reason_bytes(), and ProxyTunnel/WebSocketProxyTunnel only read error_no or clone via HTTPCertError::from_verify_error. None retains the raw pointer past the synchronous call. The C path this mirrors (ssl_dispatch_parked_reason, openssl.c:1652-1658) uses the identical stack-local pattern.
Level of scrutiny
TLS handshake error handling warrants a maintainer look even for a small diff. The change itself is narrow (~25 net lines in lib.rs), directly ports a mechanism that already exists in the native path, and is covered by tests that assert exact error codes on both engines — but it lives in SSLWrapper, which every duplex/named-pipe TLS flow goes through.
Other factors
- I previously flagged that the helper read
ERR_peek_last_error()(newest entry) instead ofERR_peek_error()(oldest / root cause) — 40f57c2 fixes that, matching openssl.c:1627 and Node'scrypto_tls.cc. The handshake_failure test was correspondingly tightened from a regex to the exactERR_SSL_SSLV3_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILUREcode. - The comment-cop lint on verbose comments was addressed in 873f747.
- All prior inline threads on this PR are resolved.
- CI on 40f57c2 was still building at the time of the last robobun status update; earlier builds had only infrastructure failures (artifact-download timeouts, expired agent slots) with zero test failures.
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The ERR_peek_last_error → ERR_peek_error switch from my earlier review is applied and the handshake_failure test now pins the exact code — thanks. I didn't find anything else, but this is native TLS handshake-failure handling with a stack-buffer pointer crossing an FFI callback, so I'd like a human to sign off.
What was reviewed:
peek_fatal_ssl_errorshape (error_no: -71,code: "EPROTO",reason→ stack buf) matchesssl_dispatch_parked_reasonin openssl.c line-for-line.reason_buflifetime: declared in the same scope asfatal_reason, live across the synchronoustrigger_handshake_callback; both consumers (UpgradedDuplex::on_handshakeandSocketBody::on_handshake) clone into ownedCertError/StoredVerifyErrorbefore returning.ERR_peek_error()reads the oldest queue entry, matching openssl.c:1627 and Node'scrypto_tls.cc; both engines now agree on the exact code and the tests assert it.
Extended reasoning...
Overview
The PR fixes SSLWrapper::update_handshake_state in src/uws/lib.rs so that when SSL_do_handshake fails with SSL_ERROR_SSL/SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL, the queued BoringSSL error reason is captured via ERR_peek_error() before ERR_clear_error() discards it, and passed to the handshake callback as an EPROTO-shaped us_bun_verify_error_t. Without this the duplex/named-pipe TLS path reported a phantom UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT (from SSL_get_verify_result on a peer that never sent a cert) or, with rejectUnauthorized: false, fell through to a spurious secureConnect. Two new tests in node-tls-connect.test.ts cover both an ALPN-mismatch alert and a raw handshake_failure alert, in both the native and duplex-proxy variants of the existing test matrix.
Security risks
This is TLS handshake code, so security-adjacent by nature. The change strictly improves error reporting on an already-failed handshake — no verification decision is altered, and the secureConnect-on-a-dead-session case (which was the security-relevant symptom) is closed. I don't see a way for this to weaken any check: the new branch only fires when SSL_get_error has already returned a fatal code, and it substitutes the real BoringSSL reason for a meaningless verify-result on a nonexistent certificate. Still, native TLS handshake handling is exactly the kind of code the approval guidelines flag for human review.
Level of scrutiny
High. Native FFI, BoringSSL error-queue semantics, and a raw-pointer (reason) into a stack buffer that must outlive a callback that runs JS. I traced the buffer's lifetime through both consumers of the SSLWrapper handshake callback (UpgradedDuplex::on_handshake at src/runtime/socket/UpgradedDuplex.rs:167-183 and SocketBody::on_handshake at src/runtime/socket/socket_body.rs:1695-1705) and confirmed both clone the code/reason bytes into owned storage synchronously before the stack frame unwinds — the same contract the C path's stack-local reason[] in ssl_dispatch_parked_reason (openssl.c:1652-1658) already relies on, and which the existing verify_error field comment ("EPROTO reasons are stack-copied in uSockets") documents. I also confirmed ERR_error_string_n NUL-terminates into the zero-initialized 256-byte buffer, so CStr::from_ptr on the consumer side is sound.
Other factors
My earlier review flagged that the helper originally read ERR_peek_last_error() (newest entry) instead of ERR_peek_error() (oldest / root cause), diverging from ssl_park_fatal_reason and Node. That was fixed in 40f57c2, the test's regex was tightened to an exact-code assertion, and the divergence comment removed. The comment-cop bot's complaints about long comments were also addressed (the doc comment is now a one-line cross-reference). All prior inline threads are resolved. Given it's native TLS code I'm deferring rather than approving, but I have no remaining concerns of my own.
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A second case takes the same code path: a server rejects a client that sends no certificate. Setup on bun 1.4.1:
Bun emits The alert arrives before the client has the server's Finished message. So Two more facts:
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Inline comments:
In `@test/js/node/tls/node-tls-connect.test.ts`:
- Around line 240-244: Remove the inline bug-context comments around the TLS
handshake failure setup and assertions, including the comments near the
referenced lines. Keep the test setup, assertions, and behavior unchanged.
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Re-reviewed after the latest push and found no bugs — the switch to ERR_peek_error() addresses my earlier comment, and both new tests now assert the exact ERR_SSL_* code (no regex). Given this sits in the TLS handshake-failure path and changes when secureConnect fires, a human sign-off is still worthwhile.
What was reviewed:
reason_buflifetime: the stack[u8; 256]outlives the synchronoustrigger_handshake_callback→on_handshakechain; bothUpgradedDuplexandWindowsNamedPipeconsumers clonereasoninto an ownedCertErrorbefore returning, matching the C path's stack-localreason[]inssl_dispatch_parked_reason.- Shape parity with
openssl.c:ERR_peek_error(oldest entry),error_no: -71/"EPROTO", and fallback toget_verify_error()all mirrorssl_park_fatal_reason/ssl_dispatch_parked_reasonexactly. - Tests: added to the existing matrix so both the direct-TCP and duplex-proxy engines assert the same code;
port: 0, local server, botherrorandsecureConnectwired to resolve the awaited promise.
Extended reasoning...
Overview
The PR fixes SSLWrapper::update_handshake_state (the Rust TLS engine used when tls.connect wraps a generic Duplex or Windows named pipe) to peek the BoringSSL error queue before ERR_clear_error() wipes it, and to surface that alert reason as an EPROTO-shaped us_bun_verify_error_t instead of falling through to SSL_get_verify_result() on a certificate that was never presented. It adds an ERR_peek_error FFI binding in src/boringssl_sys/boringssl.rs and two tests in test/js/node/tls/node-tls-connect.test.ts covering ALPN mismatch and a raw handshake_failure alert.
Security risks
This is security-adjacent in the good direction: previously, with rejectUnauthorized: false, a fatal handshake alert over the Duplex path could fall through to secureConnect on a TLS layer that was never established. The fix closes that gap. It does not relax any verification, does not touch certificate checking, and only runs on the already-fatal SSL_ERROR_SSL/SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL branch. The main memory-safety question — a *const c_char into a stack buffer being passed through a callback that runs JS — checks out: reason_buf lives in update_handshake_state's frame for the duration of the synchronous trigger_handshake_callback call, and both concrete on_handshake consumers (UpgradedDuplex.rs:182-192, WindowsNamedPipe.rs:413-423) immediately clone the C string into an owned CertError field. This is the same pattern as the C path's stack-local char reason[] in ssl_dispatch_parked_reason (openssl.c:1961-1967).
Level of scrutiny
Moderate-to-high. The change is small (~40 native lines) and is a near-literal port of the existing, reviewed ssl_park_fatal_reason/ssl_dispatch_parked_reason mechanism from packages/bun-usockets/src/crypto/openssl.c into the Rust SSLWrapper sibling — exactly the "fix the whole class / SSL siblings" pattern REVIEW.md asks for. But it lives in the TLS handshake state machine and alters which event (error vs secureConnect) user code observes, so per the approval guidelines for crypto/auth paths I'm deferring rather than approving outright.
Other factors
My earlier inline comment (use ERR_peek_error, not ERR_peek_last_error, so the duplex and native-socket paths agree on the root-cause alert) was addressed in the latest push: the helper now reads the oldest queue entry, the new binding is added alongside the existing ERR_peek_last_error, and the handshake_failure test asserts the exact ERR_SSL_SSLV3_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE code instead of a loosened regex. The -71 literal mirrors openssl.c:1966 verbatim rather than introducing a new named constant; the tests follow harness conventions (existing file, port: 0, 127.0.0.1, await using server, both terminal events wired to resolve, single .toEqual on a combined object). No CODEOWNERS entry covers these paths.
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Nothing blocking. The comments below are optional suggestions. There is no need to push a fix for them before merging.
Beyond the inline findings, I also checked the reason pointer into the 256-byte stack reason_buf in update_handshake_state (src/uws/lib.rs) against every SSLWrapper handshake consumer: UpgradedDuplex::on_handshake and WindowsNamedPipe copy code/reason into owned Box<CStr> before returning, socket_body.rs copies into Box<[u8]>, and ProxyTunnel/WebSocketProxyTunnel read only error_no — so nothing retains the pointer past the synchronous callback. I also checked the new ERR_clear_error() before SSL_do_handshake: the queue was already cleared unconditionally right after SSL_get_error on the old path, so no downstream reader loses entries it previously saw.
Extended reasoning...
The change touches the Rust SSLWrapper handshake path (src/uws/lib.rs) used by node:tls over a Duplex and Windows named pipes, adds an ERR_peek_error extern, and adds two client-side tests. It is TLS error-reporting code, not a trust or verification decision, so it does not alter what connections are accepted. Inline findings already cover the remaining concerns; this note records the stack-buffer lifetime and error-queue ordering checks that were ruled out from the consumer code.
…R_SSL_*
An Http2SecureServer that is handed a raw socket through
emit('connection') runs its handshake in _http2_upgrade.ts, which emitted
the native handshake error unchanged. With the fatal reason now reaching
JS as EPROTO, that path reported code 'EPROTO' and the raw OpenSSL string
where node:tls and Node report ERR_SSL_<REASON> with library and reason.
Move tlsHandshakeError from net.ts to internal/tls.ts and use it on this
path too, so every consumer of the handshake callback builds the same
error. The function body is unchanged. The callers require it on the
failure branch only.
…hen needed The capacity mirrors US_SSL_FATAL_ERROR_REASON_MAX in openssl.c. The buffer is now initialized only when SSL_get_error reports a fatal error, so a handshake step that returns WANT_READ or WANT_WRITE no longer zeroes 256 bytes. Tests: cover the server half of the wrapper (a server TLSSocket over a Duplex that receives a first record that is not TLS), and use a jest.fn() spy for the checkServerIdentity assertion.
With the shared error builder, a client that closes before sending a ClientHello is reported as ECONNRESET 'socket hang up', as Node and the node:tls server path report it. It was a code-less 'TLS handshake failed'.
HandshakeOutcome::HandshakeError now holds Option<&CStr>, so the compiler checks that the reason buffer outlives the handshake callback, and the EPROTO value is built in one place by us_bun_verify_error_t::protocol_failure.
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Nothing blocking. The comments below are optional suggestions. There is no need to push a fix for them before merging.
The latest commits address everything raised in the previous round (shared tlsHandshakeError in _http2_upgrade.ts, named FATAL_ERROR_REASON_MAX, jest.fn spy, server-over-Duplex test). Beyond the inline note, I also traced the borrowed reason pointer through both SSLWrapper handshake consumers: UpgradedDuplex.rs:199-207 and WindowsNamedPipe.rs:399-407 copy code/reason into owned Box<CStr> before invoking the JS-facing handler, so nothing retains the stack reason_buf past the synchronous callback today.
Extended reasoning...
The change spans the Rust SSLWrapper in src/uws/lib.rs (error-queue peek before clear, a lifetime on HandshakeOutcome, a new protocol_failure constructor in src/uws_sys/lib.rs), a verbatim move of tlsHandshakeError into src/js/internal/tls.ts shared by net.ts and _http2_upgrade.ts, and three new tests. It touches the TLS handshake error path and unsafe FFI, which is why an approve is not appropriate even though the only surviving finding is a doc-comment nit. The stack-buffer lifetime was checked against the two actual consumers and both copy before the pointer could escape.
The accessor docs said reason points into BoringSSL's static error table. That holds for an X509 verdict. An EPROTO reason is a stack buffer of the reporter, in openssl.c (ssl_dispatch_parked_reason) and now in SSLWrapper, and is valid only while the report is delivered.
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Inline comments:
Review comments at @src/uws_sys/lib.rs:
- Line 54: Update `protocol_failure` and the report/accessor types so the
borrowed `CStr` reason cannot outlive its source through safe Rust calls; use a
lifetime-bearing report or owned reason storage. Ensure `reason()` and
`reason_bytes()` remain safe only while the reason is valid.
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Nothing blocking. The comments below are optional suggestions. There is no need to push a fix for them before merging.
Beyond the inline findings, I also checked the stack-buffer borrow behind protocol_failure: every on_handshake consumer (UpgradedDuplex.rs, WindowsNamedPipe.rs, socket_body.rs, SystemError.rs) copies reason into an owned Box/BunString before returning, so nothing outlives reason_buf in update_handshake_state. The new ERR_clear_error() before SSL_do_handshake also cannot drop entries pushed by verify callbacks, since those run inside that call.
Extended reasoning...
The two inline findings cover what remains; this note records the lifetime and error-queue-ordering checks that were examined and ruled out on the native side of the change.
us_bun_verify_error_t::protocol_failure was a safe public constructor that turned a borrowed CStr into a Copy struct with no lifetime, next to safe accessors that read the pointer. Remove it. The reason stays a borrowed CStr up to trigger_handshake_callback, which builds the C struct and passes it to the synchronous callback in the same function.
…esses The three server-side cases awaited one event, so a regression showed as a timeout. Each now settles on the other outcomes too (the handshake completing, or a close with no error report) and asserts on the event.
There was a problem hiding this comment.
I re-reviewed the two pushes since my last comments (ded5792, 79ca29c) and found no bugs; because this hands a stack-buffer pointer across the FFI handshake callback in a TLS path, a human look is still worthwhile.
What was reviewed:
HandshakeOutcome::HandshakeError(Option<&CStr>)borrow:reason_buflives inupdate_handshake_stateacrosstrigger_handshake_callback, and everyon_handshakeconsumer (UpgradedDuplex, WindowsNamedPipe, socket_body, js_valkey) copiesreasoninto owned storage or converts to JS before returning — no pointer escapes the call.ERR_clear_error()now precedesSSL_do_handshake, and the buffer is written only on theSSL_ERROR_SSL/SSL_ERROR_SYSCALLbranch; theNonecase falls back to the verify result as before.tlsHandshakeErrorbody moved verbatim from net.ts to internal/tls.ts;ConnResetExceptionremains live in net.ts. The three server-side tests now settle onsecureConnection/secure/closetoo, so a regression reports the event instead of timing out.
Extended reasoning...
The diff touches the Rust SSLWrapper (src/uws/lib.rs) that backs TLS over Duplex/http2-upgrade/named pipes, the uws_sys verify-error struct docs, one new BoringSSL FFI declaration, and moves a JS error-shaping helper into internal/tls.ts so the http2 upgrade path uses it; three regression tests are added. It is a TLS handshake error-reporting path with unsafe FFI and a borrowed stack buffer passed by raw pointer to callbacks, which is security-adjacent even though no credential, auth, or injection surface is involved. The bug hunt ran dry with no findings and the commits since my last inline comments address each of them (inline struct construction replacing the lifetime-erasing constructor, named capacity constant, test event wiring). No CODEOWNERS entry covers the changed files; one third-party inline thread at src/uws_sys/lib.rs:54 is unresolved, but the constructor it was attached to was deleted in ded5792. The unsafe pointer lifetime across FFI is the fact that decided defer over approve.
…ists (#44196) A TLS socket over a `stream.Duplex` (`tls.connect({ socket })`, `new TLSSocket(duplex)`) has no fd. Bun runs a TLS engine over the stream, and a queued task starts that engine after the wrap. "Before the engine" below is the rest of the script, `process.nextTick`, microtasks and promise jobs. The lost EOF needs the close hook of #39066. The freed listener functions need the `pending_close` branch of #42176. No release has either. ### What the TLS socket emits | The transport, before the engine | Node v26.10 | main | This PR | |---|---|---|---| | Client: EOF, close | `end`, ECONNRESET, `close` true | `close` false | as Node | | Server wrap: EOF, close | `end`, `close` false | `close` false | as Node | | Client: bytes, EOF, close | `end`, ECONNRESET, `close` true | `close` false | as Node | | Server wrap: bytes, EOF, close | `end`, `close` false | `close` false | as Node | | Client: non-TLS bytes, EOF | ERR_SSL_HTTP_REQUEST, `close` true | `secureConnect`, `end`, `close` false | `end`, ECONNRESET, `close` true | | Server wrap: a complete ClientHello, EOF | `end`, 1 write | `end`, 1 write | as Node | | Server wrap: a complete ClientHello, EOF, close | `close` false | `close` false | `end`, `close` false | Last row: Node writes its answer to the ended transport, and that failure closes the socket ahead of `end`. The same rows after the engine started do not change. ### What happens to the transport | Case | Node v26.10 | main | This PR | |---|---|---|---| | `tls.connect({ socket: netSocket }).destroy()` in the same tick | raw socket closed, peer gets a FIN | raw socket open, no FIN | as Node | | The socket or the transport is destroyed after the engine started | no `end()`, `writableEnded` false | `end()` on the destroyed transport, `writableEnded` true | as Node | | 16 wraps closed before the engine, a GC, then 8 new wraps | | 7 of 8 never reach `secureConnect` | 8 of 8 answer | Last row: the close left the four listener functions of the context set. The GC freed them, and the task that frees the context then wrote into the freed cells. ### What the transport throws | Case | Node v26.10 | main | This PR | |---|---|---|---| | The `write` getter throws (the ClientHello) | `uncaughtException` | the exception stays pending on the VM (debug build: panic) | `error` on the socket, `close` true | | The `end` getter throws, close after the engine started | `end` is not read | the exception stays pending on the VM (debug build: assertion) | `uncaughtException` | | `end()` throws, close after the engine started | `end()` is not called | dropped | `uncaughtException` | | `end()` or its getter throws, close before the engine | `end()` is not called | `end()` is not called | `uncaughtException` | The `end` rows need a transport that is not ended and not destroyed when the socket closes. ### Behavior changes | Case | Before | After | |---|---|---| | Close before the engine, transport not ended and not destroyed | the transport is left as it is | `end()` is called on it | | `end()` of the transport throws during the close | dropped | uncaught exception | | Close after the engine started, transport destroyed | `end()` is called, `writableEnded` true | no call, `writableEnded` false | | EOF before the engine | held until the engine starts | reported inside the transport's `'end'` | | Client, EOF only, before the engine | 1 write (the ClientHello) | 0 writes (Node: 1) | | Client, bytes ahead of an EOF, before the engine | the engine reads them | not read, so an SSL error in them shows as ECONNRESET | | Server wrap, `socket.end()` in an `'end'` listener | transport `writableEnded` true, `final` not called | `writableEnded` false, `final` not called (Node: true, `final` called, see #42350) | ### Not in this PR - #32929: non-TLS bytes give a client `secureConnect`. - #38058: a server wrap whose handshake fails gets no `'close'`. - #43392: an extra `'end'` ahead of `'close'` when the socket is destroyed after the engine started. - #42350: `socket.end()` ends the transport. - #38028: destroy a wrapped `net.Socket`, as Node does. This PR ends it. ### Tests `node-tls-connect.test.ts` and `node-tls-duplex-close-throw-uaf.test.ts`: 25 fail on main (9f70da0), 0 fail with this PR. `test/js/node/tls` and `test/js/node/http2`: 1077 pass, 0 fail. Debug + ASAN, macOS arm64. <!-- robobun:evidence:begin --> --- **[human-review]** gate passed · iteration 3 · 4 files touched <details><summary>fails on main (without fix)</summary> ```console ASAN without fix: 15 failed, 18 skipped $ BUN_DEBUG_QUIET_LOGS=1 bun scripts/build.ts --profile=debug --quiet test "--reporter=junit" "--reporter-outfile=/tmp/pr_gate.xml" test/js/node/tls/node-tls-connect.test.ts test/js/node/tls/node-tls-duplex-close-throw-uaf.test.ts bun test v1.4.3 (367d939) test/js/node/tls/node-tls-duplex-close-throw-uaf.test.ts: (pass) tls.connect({socket: Duplex}) does not read freed Handlers > when a pre-open duplex error races StartTLS [1332.69ms] (pass) tls.connect({socket: Duplex}) does not read freed Handlers > when duplex.end() throws after close [1443.48ms] 25 | const [stdout, stderr, exitCode] = await Promise.all([proc.stdout.text(), proc.stderr.text(), proc.exited]); 26 | 27 | // On failure stderr carries the ASAN "use-after-poison" report; include 28 | // it in the assertion so the diff shows the crash rather than just an 29 | // empty stdout. 30 | expect({ stdout: stdout.trim(), stderr, exitCode }).toEqual({ stdout: expected, stderr: "", exitCode: 0 }); ^ error: expect(received).toEqual(expected) { "exitCode": 0, "stderr": "", "stdout": - "the duplex closes, end() calls: 1 - the soc ... (truncated) release without fix: 34 failed, 22 skipped bun test v1.4.3-canary.1 (367d939) test/js/node/tls/node-tls-duplex-close-throw-uaf.test.ts: (skip) tls.connect({socket: Duplex}) does not read freed Handlers > when duplex.end() throws after close (skip) tls.connect({socket: Duplex}) does not read freed Handlers > when a pre-open duplex error races StartTLS (skip) tls.connect({socket: Duplex}) does not read freed Handlers > when duplex.end() throws after a close that comes before StartTLS (skip) tls.connect({socket: Duplex}) does not read freed Handlers > when an EOF listener destroys the socket and throws before StartTLS test/js/node/tls/node-tls-connect.test.ts: (pass) should have checkServerIdentity [0.20ms] (pass) should thow ECONNRESET if FIN is received before handshake [8.07ms] (pass) initializes authorizationError to null in the TLSSocket constructor [0.16ms] (pass) setMaxSendFragment mirrors OpenSSL's [512, 16384] acceptance without throwing [3.07ms] (pass) should be able to grab the JSStreamSocket constructor [0.23ms] (skip) tls.connect > should work with alpnProtocols (pass) tls.connect > Bun.serve() should work with tls and Bun.file() [42.60ms] (pass) tls.connect > should have peer certificate when ... (truncated) ``` </details> <details><summary>passes on PR (with fix)</summary> ```console ASAN with fix: 18 skipped $ BUN_DEBUG_QUIET_LOGS=1 bun scripts/build.ts --profile=debug --quiet test "--reporter=junit" "--reporter-outfile=/tmp/pr_gate.xml" test/js/node/tls/node-tls-connect.test.ts test/js/node/tls/node-tls-duplex-close-throw-uaf.test.ts bun test v1.4.3 (367d939) test/js/node/tls/node-tls-duplex-close-throw-uaf.test.ts: (pass) tls.connect({socket: Duplex}) does not read freed Handlers > when duplex.end() throws after close [2203.98ms] (pass) tls.connect({socket: Duplex}) does not read freed Handlers > when a pre-open duplex error races StartTLS [1670.45ms] (pass) tls.connect({socket: Duplex}) does not read freed Handlers > when duplex.end() throws after a close that comes before StartTLS [2263.36ms] (pass) tls.connect({socket: Duplex}) does not read freed Handlers > when an EOF listener destroys the socket and throws before StartTLS [2238.29ms] test/js/node/tls/node-tls-connect.test.ts: (pass) should have checkServerIdentity [2.07ms] (pass) should thow ECONNRESET if FIN is received before handshake [276.06ms] (pass) initializes authorizationError to null in the TLSSocket constructor [6.64ms] (pass) setMaxSendFragment mirrors OpenSSL's [512, 16384] acceptance without th ... (truncated) release with fix: 22 skipped $ bun scripts/build.ts --profile=release [configured] bun-profile → bun (stripped) target linux-x64-gnu build type Release build dir ./build/release revision 562c022 features lto, baseline 23 deps, 136 codegen, 1176 objects in 4630ms ninja: Entering directory `/workspace/bun/build/release' [1/4] fetch lolhtml [lolhtml] up to date [2/4] fetch rust-argon2 [rust-argon2] up to date [2/4] cargo plan → /workspace/bun/build/release/rust-target/plan.json 244 units: 172 lib, 16 proc-macro (host), 19 custom-build (host), 15 run custom-build, 17 lib (host), 4 run custom-build (host), 1 rlib [3/4] reconfigure [1/1499] mkdir stamps [2/1499] mkdir codegen [3/1499] install /workspace/bun bun install v1.4.3-canary.1 (367d939) Checked 26 installs across 65 packages (no changes) [730.00ms] [4/1499] rustc unicode_ident [5/1499] rustc build_script_build [6/1499] rustc heck [7/1499] install /workspace/bun/packages/bun-error bun install v1.4.3-canary.1 (367d939) Checked 1 install across 2 packages (no changes) [110.00ms] [8/1499] rustc build_script_build [9/1499] rustc unicode_xid [10/1499] rustc build_script_build [11/1499] rustc build_s ... (truncated) ``` </details> <details><summary>diff hotspot</summary> ``` src/runtime/socket/UpgradedDuplex.rs | 41 +-- src/runtime/socket/socket_body.rs | 2 +- test/js/node/tls/node-tls-connect.test.ts | 332 ++++++++++++++++++++- .../tls/node-tls-duplex-close-throw-uaf.test.ts | 103 ++++++- 4 files changed, 451 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-) ``` </details> **gate history** · 1 passed · 3 rejected · iteration 3 <details><summary>evidence per changed file</summary> ``` file reads edits tests src/runtime/socket/UpgradedDuplex.rs 8 6 68 src/runtime/socket/socket_body.rs 7 2 68 test/js/node/tls/node-tls-connect.test.ts 6 5 54 test/js/node/tls/node-tls-duplex-close-throw-uaf.test.ts 2 1 43 ``` </details> <!-- robobun:evidence:end --> --------- Co-authored-by: Jarred Sumner <jarred@jarredsumner.com>
…r end() (#44290) Regression from #42181 (in no release). Merge before 1.4.3 is tagged, and before #43957 and #43962. ### Problem - After `end()` during its handshake, a node:tls client accepts a trusted certificate for another name: no error, and it reads the server's data. Node and Bun 1.4.2 report `ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID`. - `on_handshake` (`src/runtime/socket/socket_body.rs`) passed its name verdict to the handler as the success flag. After `end()`, `onClientHandshake` (`src/js/node/net.ts:496`) reads a failure with no error as the client's own close and skips `checkServerIdentity`. ### Fix - `on_handshake` no longer runs the native name check for a node:tls socket. The handler's flag is the handshake result. - `Bun.connect` and `upgradeTLS` sockets do not change. - Verified: `node-tls-duplex-end-verify.test.ts`, 19 new tests. `main` fails 18. Node v26.3.0 passes 49, skips 1. - Self-reviewed: 10 concerns raised, 10 addressed. One is #44422 (`onClientHandshake` reads some failed handshakes as established). ### Background - node:tls checks the name in JS (`checkServerIdentity`), on sockets that `DEFERS_SERVER_IDENTITY` marks. The native check ran for them: another name gave `(false, null)`, like a handshake that fails after this side's FIN. - Considered a `getAuthorizationError()` test in the guard, or a second flag variable: both keep an unused native check. ### Downsides - Needs a maintainer's yes: the internal `socket._handle.authorized` and `getAuthorizationError()` of a node:tls client drop the name check (no reader in `src/js` or `test`). The public values do not change. - Still open (#43957): only the first such connection of a process reports if its server keeps its side open. <details><summary>Notes</summary> **The regression** (`tls.connect({ socket })` on a connected socket, then `end()`. Trusted chain, certificate for another name, server in the same process, 3 runs each) | Runtime | Output | |---|---| | Node v26.3.0 | `finish, error ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID, close` | | Bun 1.4.2 (744846f) | `error ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID, close` | | Bun 1.3.13 | `end, finish, error ECONNRESET, close` | | canary 1.4.3-canary.1 (367d939, has #42181) | `finish, end, close`, no error | | this PR | `finish, error ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID, close` | - #42181 (44e51b7) is on `main` and is not an ancestor of the tag `bun-v1.4.2`. The client handler at that tag has no such guard. **Merge order, and why** - This PR first. Both later PRs let more handshakes complete after `end()`, and on `main` each of those accepts a certificate for another name. - #43957 removes the engine defect that today keeps the second and later connections of a process from completing such a handshake. Merged before this PR, it turns one silently accepted connection into all of them. Measured with five connections in one process (`tls.connect({ socket })`, another name, server keeps its side open): on `main` 1 of 5 handshakes completes, and the client reports no error for it. On `main` with the source change of #43957, 5 of 5 complete with no error. - #43962 sends a client's FIN after its ClientHello. It contains this PR's commits. - With #43957 only the test file conflicts: both PRs insert a block. Keep both. **Where the native check came from** - #31339 added the native name check for all clients. - #32359 proposed to remove it and was closed for #33755. #33755 added `DEFERS_SERVER_IDENTITY`: the check stayed enforced for `Bun.connect`, and for node:tls it was computed but not enforced. It took node:tls sockets out of `reject_unauthorized` and out of the error argument. - #42181 then added the guard for "failed after our own FIN", which is the same pair as "computed, another name". - #43863 says "Each connection has one server name check", and lists node:tls as "checked after the handshake, in JS". - This PR is the node:tls half of #32359. It does not touch the check for `Bun.connect`. - #43865, #43924 and #43947 are the fixes of the chain check in the same test file. **What the client handler gets from the fd engine** (`packages/bun-usockets/src/crypto/openssl.c`) `on_handshake` calls the handler with `(socket, flag, error)`. For a node:tls client: | Case | Before | Now | |---|---|---| | Handshake completed, chain and name good | `true, null` | `true, null` | | Handshake completed, chain good, another name | `false, null` | `true, null` | | Handshake completed, chain bad | `true, X509 error` | `true, X509 error` | | Chain refused inside the handshake | `false, X509 error` | `false, X509 error` | | Handshake failed after this side's FIN | `false, null` | `false, null` | | Handshake failed with a TLS reason | `false, EPROTO` | `false, EPROTO` | | The peer closed before the handshake finished | `false, ECONNRESET` | `false, ECONNRESET` | - Row 2 and row 5 were the same pair. The guard that #42181 added for row 5 also caught row 2 once the client had ended. - With no `end()`, row 2 already reached `checkServerIdentity`, because the guard tests `writableFinished`. So a client that does not end behaves as before. - `Bun.connect` and `upgradeTLS` sockets do not carry `DEFERS_SERVER_IDENTITY`. Their flag is `authorized`, as documented. **Rows that this PR does not change** The engine for a Duplex, a named pipe and TLS inside TLS (`SSLWrapper`, `src/uws/lib.rs`) reports no TLS reason. A failed handshake arrives as `(false, null)` after a verified chain and as `(false, X509 code)` otherwise. `onClientHandshake` reads both as an established session unless the client rejects the code. Measured on this PR with a client over a Duplex that does not call `end()`: | The peer answers the ClientHello with | `rejectUnauthorized` | `main`, Bun 1.4.2 and this PR | Node v26.3.0 | |---|---|---|---| | a fatal `handshake_failure` alert | `true` | `error UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT, close` | `error ERR_SSL_SSL/TLS_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, close` | | a fatal `handshake_failure` alert | `false` | `secureConnect authorized=false authError=UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT`, `end` | `error ERR_SSL_SSL/TLS_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, close` | | bytes that are not TLS | `false` | `secureConnect authorized=false authError=UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT`, `end` | `error ERR_SSL_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER, close` | | a `close_notify` alert | either | no event | `end, error ECONNRESET, close` | - These rows are older than this PR: Bun 1.4.2 prints them too. The native socket is marked unusable after a failed handshake (`transport_unusable` in `on_handshake`). - Owners: #32929 (the engine reports the fatal alert over a Duplex), #44223 and #44021 (a refused renegotiation). - #44422 makes a handshake that did not complete terminal in `onClientHandshake`, as it is in the server handler. This PR is the step before it: while `(false, null)` could be a completed handshake, that arm could not go. It stays out of this PR so that this PR can land, or be reverted, alone. **What the native handle of a node:tls client reports** (trusted chain, another name, `rejectUnauthorized: false`, measured) | Value | `main` | This PR | |---|---|---| | `socket.authorized` | `false` | `false` | | `socket.authorizationError` | `ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID` | `ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID` | | `socket._handle.authorized` | `false` | `true` | | `socket._handle.getAuthorizationError()` | `ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID` | `null` | - The native check for these sockets had three effects on `main`: the flag in row 2 above, and the two internal values. - The in-handshake check (`server_identity`) already left node:tls sockets out. Both sites now agree. - `Flags::HOSTNAME_MISMATCH` has no reader on `main`. This PR does not remove it. - The hunk that stops the native check came from an optional finding of an automated review. No person has reviewed it yet. **Measured** (Linux x64, debug builds, Node v26.3.0, server in its own Node process, 40 s watchdog) `tls.connect({ socket })` on a connected socket, then `end()`. The chain is trusted, the certificate is for another name, `rejectUnauthorized: true`: | Server | TLS | Node | `main` (d115f54) | This PR | |---|---|---|---|---| | keeps its side open | 1.3 | `finish, error ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID, close` | `finish`, never exits | same as Node | | ordinary | 1.3 | `finish, error ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID, close` | `finish, end, close`, no error | same as Node | | keeps its side open | 1.2 | `finish`, never exits | `finish`, never exits | same as Node | | ordinary | 1.2 | `finish, end, error ECONNRESET, close` | same as Node | same as Node | - `end()` in the same tick and `end()` one `setImmediate` later give the same lines. - In the new tests the handshake completes after the client's `end()` under TLS 1.2 and over a Duplex as well. There `main` delivers `secret-banner` to a client with `rejectUnauthorized: true`. - A client that passes its own `checkServerIdentity` is asked: one test asserts the name that it gets, and `authorized=true` when it accepts. **Still open, the engine** - Each line of the table above is the first connection of its process. Five such connections, one after the other in one process, against a server that keeps its side open: with this PR the first reports and the other four print `finish` only. `main` does the same when the name is good. The flight that the first socket seals after its FIN takes the event loop's one spill slot and never leaves it. #43957 is open for that. - `tls.connect(port)` followed at once by `end()` still sends its FIN before its ClientHello, so no handshake runs there. #43962 changes that order. - #43957 is open for the spill slot. Measured with its source change on this PR: all five connections report, for another name and for a good name. - A handshake that fails after `end()` with no certificate still reports nothing. The tests of #42181 and #43947 for that case pass. **Tests** - 19 new tests against `main`: the name check after `end()` over a Duplex, over TCP behind a record proxy (TLS 1.2 and 1.3) and on a connected `net.Socket` (3 each), `end()` and `end("")` in the turn of `tls.connect()` over a socket that is still connecting and over a Duplex (6), and a resumed session (1, Bun only). - 7 of them are the commit of another branch (`robobun/baba0385/tls-early-end-hostname-check`), taken as it is. The resumed-session test now asserts `isSessionReused()`. - `main` (4b02e10) fails 18 of the 19. The one that passes is `end("")` over a Duplex. **Suites** (this machine ran at a load average of 200 to 800) - On this head: `node-tls-duplex-end-verify` (50 of 50), `node-tls-connect` (121), `tls-reject-before-client-cert` (121), `node-https-agent-checkserveridentity-reuse` (30), `renegotiation` (21), `node-tls-wrapped-socket-close` (15), `node-tls-connect-hostname-verification` (11), `node-tls-upgrade` (5), `node-tls-raw-end` (4), `node-https-checkServerIdentity` (4). - On the head before the rebase: 14 vendored Node tests that use `checkServerIdentity` or the name error, `fetch.tls` (61). `socket.test.ts`, `node-tls-cert` and `node-tls-server` had only failures that `main` has on this machine too (timeouts of child processes, and one test that needs `www.example.com`). - Not run on this machine: macOS, Windows. </details>
…t wraps (#37664) ### Problem - `new tls.TLSSocket(socket)` on the client side (STARTTLS) does nothing on main. A write throws `TypeError: socket.@Write is not a function`. `_start()` throws `ERR_MISSING_ARGS`. - Since #42181 (not released), `end()` throws an uncaught `TypeError: socket.shutdown is not a function` at `endNT (node:net)`. - Cause: the constructor stored the wrapped stream as `_handle` (`src/js/node/tls.ts`). Nothing replaced it with a TLS handle. ### Fix - The constructor runs the upgrade of `tls.connect({ socket })` (`kUpgradeClientTLS`, `src/js/node/net.ts`). `_handle` is never the stream. `_start()` is a no-op. - The wrap completes like node's `_finishInit`: `'secure'` and `ssl.verifyError()`. It gets no hostname check and no `'secureConnect'`, and `authorized` stays `false`. - Verified: `test/js/node/tls/node-tls-connect.test.ts`. 16 of its 21 new tests fail on main. Also `test/js/node/tls/` and 657 vendored node tests. ### Background - STARTTLS changes a plaintext connection to TLS in place. The `mysql` driver 2.18.1 does it with this constructor. No user filed an issue for it. - In `node:net`, `_write`, `_final` and `_destroy` call into `_handle` as a native handle. - Only `tls.connect()` adds node's `onConnectSecure` (hostname check, `authorized`, `'secureConnect'`). A wrap gets `_finishInit` only. - Considered a start on `_start()`, as in node. Each handle call then needs a guard. ### Downsides - An unused wrap now sends a ClientHello of 1450 bytes (main and node: 0). `setServername()` and `setSession()` after construction have no effect on that handshake. - Unlike node, a wrap rejects an untrusted certificate unless the caller passes `rejectUnauthorized: false`. An app that does its own check must pass `false`. <details><summary>Notes</summary> **Scope.** This head is the core only, as the review of 2026-09-24 asked. The same review decided that a wrap rejects an untrusted certificate by default. Two parts of the earlier head are gone, because other changes own them. #42235 landed the forwarding of the `'error'` of a `Duplex`, and #43791 owns it for a `net.Socket`. #38028 owns the destroy of a wrapped socket that has not connected yet. The `UpgradedDuplex.rs` hunk landed with #36909. The review of 2026-09-25 asked for three more changes: commits 6657bc3 and ae669bf, and this body. The review of 2026-09-30 asked for one more: commit a460a9d. **Changes since the earlier head that the review did not list.** - The `open` handler of an upgraded socket applies the `session` option on the native socket. See "Sessions" below. - A wrap gives the `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0` warning of `tls.connect()`. - `authorized` and `authorizationError` keep their initial values on a wrap, as in node. The earlier head set `authorized = true` for a good chain. The wrap checks no host name, so that value accepted a certificate of any host. The verdict is `ssl.verifyError()`. - A wrap does not get `onConnectEnd`. A peer that closes during the handshake gives `'end'`, `'finish'`, `'close'` and no `ECONNRESET`, as in node. `tls.connect({ socket })` keeps its `ECONNRESET`. - `servername` is passed into the upgrade. Before, it reached the ClientHello only when the caller gave no `secureContext`. - `kStandaloneWrap` is initialised in the `Socket` constructor. **Differences from node v26.3.0 that stay.** The review kept the start of the handshake in the constructor. The `mysql` driver, the main user of this API, calls `_start()` right after the constructor, so it sees no difference. | shape | node | this PR | | --- | --- | --- | | wrap that is never used | sends nothing | sends a ClientHello (1450 bytes) | | `setServername()` after the constructor | applies, the handshake starts later | too late. Pass `servername` as an option. | | `setSession()` after the constructor | applies | no effect. Pass `session` as an option. | | untrusted certificate, `rejectUnauthorized` absent or `true` | `'secure'`, the caller must read `ssl.verifyError()` | destroy with the verify error, `'_tlsError'`, no `'secure'` | | untrusted certificate, `rejectUnauthorized: false` | `'secure'`, data flows | the same | | `new TLSSocket(raw)`, then `tls.connect({ socket: raw })` | `EALREADY` on the wrap | `Invalid socket` on the `tls.connect` client (main: works, because its wrap does nothing) | Node never rejects a certificate on a wrap. It leaves the check to the app, so an app that forgets the check accepts any certificate. Here the wrap uses the rule of `tls.connect()`: it rejects unless the caller passes `rejectUnauthorized: false`, or `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED` is `0`. Before commit 4d8b9e5, only `rejectUnauthorized: true` rejected, and a wrap with default options accepted each certificate, as in node. The `mysql` driver listens to `'secure'` and to `'_tlsError'`. If the wrap emitted `'secure'` and then destroyed itself, the driver would report a bad chain two times. The replay test asserts one report. **Sessions.** BoringSSL's `SSL_set_session` calls `abort()` when the handshake has started, in release builds too. `TLSSocket.prototype.setSession()` calls the native function at once, on main and on this head. #41671 puts the guard in the native function, for each caller: a late `setSession()` then throws `Already started.`. An earlier head of this PR made `setSession()` only store the session. The review asked to take that rule out, and commit ae669bf did. For a client-side wrap the review then asked for one narrow rule, in commit a460a9d: the `TLSSocket` constructor sets `kStandaloneWrap`, and `setSession()` returns at once when it is set. | shape | node | main | this PR | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | `new TLSSocket(raw)`, `setSession()`, `_start()` | resumes | throws `ERR_MISSING_ARGS` | no effect, full handshake | | `tls.connect({ socket })`, then `setSession()` | no effect | process aborted | process aborted | | `setSession()` inside `'secureConnect'` | no effect | process aborted | process aborted | | `tls.connect({ port })`, then `setSession()` before it connects | resumes | resumes | resumes | | `tls.connect({ port })`, then `setSession()` in the `'connect'` listener | full handshake | resumes | resumes | | `tls.connect({ socket, session })` | resumes | full handshake | resumes | | `new TLSSocket(raw, { session })` | resumes | throws `ERR_MISSING_ARGS` | resumes | In the first row, the wrap has sent its ClientHello when `setSession()` runs. Without the check in `setSession()`, that row aborts the process (exit 134). The rule also holds for a wrap over a socket that is still connecting: node resumes there, and this PR runs a full handshake. The last two rows come from one hunk that stays. `SocketHandlers2.open` applies the `session` option on the native socket. An fd upgrade assigns `_handle` after `open`, so `self.setSession()` dropped the option there. **Two bugs of main that this PR does not fix. An open PR owns each.** - The native `setSession()` has no check of the handshake state. `socket.setSession()` in the `handshake` callback of a `Bun.connect` socket aborts the process (exit 134, release build of main). #41671 fixes it in `set_session` in `src/runtime/socket/tls_socket_functions.rs`, for each caller. It makes a late `setSession()` throw `Already started.`. - Over a `Duplex`, TLS inside TLS, or a named pipe, a handshake that fails is reported as success. A peer that answers the ClientHello with plaintext gives `'secureConnect'` for `tls.connect({ socket: duplex, rejectUnauthorized: false })` on main, and `'secure'` for a wrap with `rejectUnauthorized: false` here. Node gives `ERR_SSL_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER`. Over a TCP socket the result is correct. The stream engine in `src/uws/lib.rs` reports no protocol error. #32929 fixes it there. One more door of the same bug: with `rejectUnauthorized: true` and the `session` of an earlier verified connection, `tls.connect({ socket: duplex })` emits `'secureConnect'` with `authorized` true on main, and a wrap emits `'secure'` with `ssl.verifyError()` null here. A write after that fails with `ERR_SOCKET_CLOSED`, and no byte reaches the transport. Reproduction for the first one (needs a key and a certificate, for example `test/js/node/tls/fixtures/agent1-*.pem`): ```ts const server = Bun.listen({ hostname: "127.0.0.1", port: 0, tls: { key, cert }, socket: { data() {}, open() {}, error() {} } }); await Bun.connect({ hostname: "127.0.0.1", port: server.port, tls: { rejectUnauthorized: false }, socket: { data() {}, error() {}, handshake(socket) { socket.setSession(socket.getSession()); /* the process aborts here */ } }, }); ``` Reproduction for the second one: ```js const tls = require("tls"), { Duplex } = require("stream"); let answered = false; const raw = new Duplex({ read() {}, write(chunk, encoding, callback) { callback(); if (!answered) { answered = true; setImmediate(() => this.push(Buffer.from("HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request\r\n\r\n"))); } }, }); const socket = tls.connect({ socket: raw, rejectUnauthorized: false }); socket.on("secureConnect", () => console.log("secureConnect")); // main prints this socket.on("error", error => console.log(error.code)); // node prints ERR_SSL_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER ``` **Gaps that this PR does not close.** Each one also exists on main for `tls.connect({ socket })`, with the same result. | shape | node | this PR | owner | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | `end()` or `destroySoon()` before the socket connects | waits for `'connect'`, then sends the FIN | `'finish'` at once, no FIN | #42339 | | refused connection under a wrap | `'_tlsError'`, `'close'` | uncaught `ECONNREFUSED`, the wrap stays open | #38122 | | `end()` over a `Duplex` before the handshake completes | runs the `final()` of the `Duplex` | `'finish'`, no `final()` | #42350 | A wrapped `Duplex` that fails when it is read was in this list. #42235 landed, and the wrap now reports `'_tlsError'` and then `'close'`, as node does (measured on d31efd7). **Inherited options.** `kUpgradeClientTLS` passed a plain `{ socket, servername }` object to `Socket.prototype.connect`, and that function reads `rejectUnauthorized` through the prototype chain. With `Object.prototype.rejectUnauthorized = false`, the wrap accepted an untrusted certificate, also with an explicit `rejectUnauthorized: true`. Commit 6657bc3 passes the decision of the constructor as an own property, as `tls.connect()` does. Measured on this head under that pollution: a wrap with default options, with `{}` and with an explicit `true` rejects, and an own `false` accepts. `new TLSSocket(raw, { rejectUnauthorized: undefined })` with `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0` rejects. **`'finish'`.** `new TLSSocket(new PassThrough()).end()` emits `'finish'` and `'close'` on this head. The shutdown cells do not assert `'finish'`. A separate check reports that `'finish'` is lost there when #43962 is applied on top of this PR. This session did not build that combination. Cell by cell for the 21-cell matrix of #42330 on the earlier head: #37664 (comment) **Releases.** Earlier comments in this thread measured the same failures on Bun 1.4.0 and 1.4.3. This session measured main only. **User.** `Connection.prototype._startTLS` in mysql 2.18.1 (`lib/Connection.js`) is the known caller of the client-side constructor. The replay test matches that function line by line, and `lib/protocol/sequences/Handshake.js` sends the SSLRequest and starts TLS with no reply in between. The xmpp report in this thread is for `tls.connect({ socket })`, a different path. A search of the open and closed issues finds no report for the constructor. **Guard design.** #42330 kept the stream as `_handle` and added a guard at 2 of the 6 places that call it as a native handle. **Signatures on main.** `destroy()` on the wrap fails with `handle.close is not a function`. `end()`, `end(cb)` and `destroySoon()` throw `socket.shutdown is not a function` from `process.nextTick`. **Tests.** All are in `test/js/node/tls/node-tls-connect.test.ts`, block `new tls.TLSSocket(socket) on the client side`. - Four reports come from `node-tls-client-wrap-fixture.mjs`. Bun calls its functions in the test process. Node runs the same file as a script. The expected report is the same for both. - `shutdown`: 16 cells. The methods are `end()`, `end(cb)`, `destroySoon()` and `destroy()`. The streams are a connected, a connecting and a never-connected `net.Socket`, and a `Duplex`. Each cell calls the method and then `destroy()`. It asserts no throw, no `'error'` and `'close'`. The cells run together. On main each cell fails with `socket.shutdown is not a function` or `handle.close is not a function`. - `mysql`: the calls of `Connection.prototype._startTLS` in mysql 2.18.1, in the driver's order and at its time. The driver writes the SSLRequest and starts TLS in the same turn, and the server sends no reply in between. Three configurations: `rejectUnauthorized: false`, the CA of the server, no CA. `onSecure` runs one time in each. - `peerCloses`: the peer closes when the ClientHello arrives. - `session`: the `session` option on the three paths, and `setSession()` before the socket connects. Each one resumes. - Both sides of `rejectUnauthorized` run in the test process only, because node accepts in each case. `unlike node, an untrusted certificate destroys the wrap with the verify error` has one case for default options and one for `true`. `with rejectUnauthorized: false, 'secure' fires for an untrusted certificate and a write goes out over TLS` is the other side. `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0 turns the default off, as for tls.connect()` pins the environment variable. - `an inherited rejectUnauthorized cannot turn the check of a wrap off` runs in a child process with `Object.prototype.rejectUnauthorized = false`: default options and an own `true` reject, an own `false` accepts. It fails on d31efd7. ``an own `rejectUnauthorized: undefined` still rejects with NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0, as for tls.connect()`` pins that rule. - `setSession() on a wrap has no effect: it does not abort the process and does not throw` runs in a child process, because the failure is a process abort. Without the check it gets exit code 134. No test covers a late `setSession()` on a `tls.connect()` socket: it aborts the process until #41671 lands. - On main (canary 367d939, release build), 16 of the 21 tests in the block fail. 8 fail at once, and 8 fail by the timeout, because main starts no handshake. The 5 that pass are the http2-wrapper guard and the 4 rows that run node. - The SNI test fails when only the `servername` argument is reverted (`Expected: "sni.example"`, `Received: undefined`). **Cost for callers that never wrap a socket,** from the diff: - per `net.Socket`: one more property store in the constructor. - per TLS `connect()`, per client handshake and per `setSession()`: one more property read and branch. - per `internalConnect` and `internalConnectMultiple`: two property reads and branches fewer. Each `[buntls]` options object has one property fewer. - `tls.connect({ socket })` puts the same bytes on the wire as on main (1452). - This session did not measure instructions, syscalls or binary size: `perf`, `valgrind`, `strace` and `bloaty` are not in the test container. A separate differential check of d31efd7 merged onto main reports equal instruction counts: 10,162,756 (main) and 10,159,922 (this PR) for each TLS connection, and 2,195 and 2,200 for `new net.Socket()`. **Suites run with a debug build of this head.** - On the head a460a9d: `test/js/node/tls/node-tls-connect.test.ts` gives 107 pass, 18 skip, 0 fail with a 30 s limit, in 2 of 2 runs. With the default 5 s limit, 4 to 8 tests reach the timeout in each run on this machine, and the set differs from run to run. Most of them came from main. The load average was 450 to 970 on 16 cores. - One of those tests from main (`server write() and end(data) from inside ALPNCallback`) takes the same time with the source of main and with this PR: 3.9 to 6.4 s and 3.8 to 6.0 s, 10 runs each. - `tsc --noEmit -p src/js/tsconfig.json` and `bun lint` pass on a460a9d. - The suites below ran on the head c81cee3, before the merge of main. - `test/js/node/tls/` (28 files): 2 failures in each run, and this change causes neither. `SNICallback runs even when the requested servername matches the bind hostname` fails on the release build of main too. `concurrent Workers all see the same CA certificate lists` fails 5 of 5 times with the `net.ts` and `tls.ts` of main on the same debug build. In the last run the machine was overloaded, and 2 more tests reached the 5 s timeout. Both pass alone in 3 of 3 runs, and neither builds a client-side wrap. - `test-tls-*`, `test-https-*`, `test-net-*`, `test-http2-*` in `test/js/node/test/parallel` (657 files): no failure from this change. 10 files fail on main too (`test-https-proxy-request*.mjs`, `test-https-request-proxy-post.mjs`, `test-tls-client-allow-partial-trust-chain.js`). `test-https-timeout.js` hangs on a debug build, with the source of main too. - `test/js/bun/net/socket.test.ts`: 94 pass, 1 fail. The failure needs DNS for `www.example.com` and fails on main too. </details> <!-- robobun:evidence:begin --> --- **[human-review]** gate passed · iteration 0 · 5 files touched <details><summary>fails on main (without fix)</summary> ```console ASAN without fix: 16 failed, 18 skipped $ BUN_DEBUG_QUIET_LOGS=1 bun scripts/build.ts --profile=debug --quiet test "--reporter=junit" "--reporter-outfile=/tmp/pr_gate.xml" test/js/node/tls/node-tls-connect.test.ts bun test v1.4.3 (367d939) test/js/node/tls/node-tls-connect.test.ts: (pass) should have checkServerIdentity [3.32ms] (pass) should thow ECONNRESET if FIN is received before handshake [351.98ms] (pass) initializes authorizationError to null in the TLSSocket constructor [9.71ms] (pass) setMaxSendFragment mirrors OpenSSL's [512, 16384] acceptance without throwing [175.18ms] (pass) should be able to grab the JSStreamSocket constructor [18.49ms] (skip) tls.connect > should work with alpnProtocols (pass) tls.connect > Bun.serve() should work with tls and Bun.file() [114.28ms] (pass) tls.connect > should have peer certificate when using self asign certificate [269.78ms] (skip) tls.connect > should have peer certificate (skip) tls.connect > getCipher, getProtocol, getEphemeralKeyInfo, getSharedSigalgs, getSession, exportKeyingMaterial and isSessionReused should work (skip) tls.connect > should process options correctly when connect is called with only options (skip) tls.connect > should process port ... (truncated) release without fix: 34 failed, 18 skipped bun test v1.4.3-canary.1 (367d939) test/js/node/tls/node-tls-connect.test.ts: (pass) should have checkServerIdentity [20.95ms] (pass) should thow ECONNRESET if FIN is received before handshake [48.67ms] (pass) initializes authorizationError to null in the TLSSocket constructor [0.39ms] (pass) setMaxSendFragment mirrors OpenSSL's [512, 16384] acceptance without throwing [5.88ms] (pass) should be able to grab the JSStreamSocket constructor [0.30ms] (skip) tls.connect > should work with alpnProtocols (pass) tls.connect > Bun.serve() should work with tls and Bun.file() [5.44ms] (pass) tls.connect > should have peer certificate when using self asign certificate [24.26ms] (skip) tls.connect > should have peer certificate (skip) tls.connect > getCipher, getProtocol, getEphemeralKeyInfo, getSharedSigalgs, getSession, exportKeyingMaterial and isSessionReused should work (skip) tls.connect > should process options correctly when connect is called with only options (skip) tls.connect > should process port and host correctly (skip) tls.connect > should process port, host, and callback correctly (skip) tls.connect > should handle the absence of a callback gracefully (skip) tl ... (truncated) ``` </details> <details><summary>passes on PR (with fix)</summary> ```console ASAN with fix: 18 skipped $ BUN_DEBUG_QUIET_LOGS=1 bun scripts/build.ts --profile=debug --quiet test "--reporter=junit" "--reporter-outfile=/tmp/pr_gate.xml" test/js/node/tls/node-tls-connect.test.ts bun test v1.4.3 (367d939) test/js/node/tls/node-tls-connect.test.ts: (pass) should have checkServerIdentity [3.27ms] (pass) should thow ECONNRESET if FIN is received before handshake [394.13ms] (pass) initializes authorizationError to null in the TLSSocket constructor [8.43ms] (pass) setMaxSendFragment mirrors OpenSSL's [512, 16384] acceptance without throwing [196.56ms] (pass) should be able to grab the JSStreamSocket constructor [33.22ms] (skip) tls.connect > should work with alpnProtocols (pass) tls.connect > Bun.serve() should work with tls and Bun.file() [298.86ms] (pass) tls.connect > should have peer certificate when using self asign certificate [101.96ms] (skip) tls.connect > should have peer certificate (skip) tls.connect > getCipher, getProtocol, getEphemeralKeyInfo, getSharedSigalgs, getSession, exportKeyingMaterial and isSessionReused should work (skip) tls.connect > should process options correctly when connect is called with only options (skip) tls.connect > should process port ... (truncated) release with fix: 18 skipped $ bun scripts/build.ts --profile=release [configured] bun-profile → bun (stripped) target linux-x64-gnu build type Release build dir ./build/release revision d31efd7 features lto, baseline 23 deps, 136 codegen, 1176 objects in 6018ms ninja: Entering directory `/workspace/bun/build/release' [1/4] fetch lolhtml [lolhtml] up to date [2/4] fetch rust-argon2 [rust-argon2] up to date [2/4] cargo plan → /workspace/bun/build/release/rust-target/plan.json 244 units: 172 lib, 16 proc-macro (host), 19 custom-build (host), 15 run custom-build, 17 lib (host), 4 run custom-build (host), 1 rlib [3/4] reconfigure [1/1499] mkdir stamps [2/1499] mkdir codegen [3/1499] install /workspace/bun bun install v1.4.3-canary.1 (367d939) Checked 26 installs across 65 packages (no changes) [231.00ms] [4/1499] rustc unicode_xid [5/1499] rustc heck [6/1499] rustc build_script_build [7/1499] rustc build_script_build [8/1499] rustc unicode_ident [9/1499] rustc build_script_build [10/1499] rustc build_script_build [11/1499] install /workspace/bun/packages/bun-error bun install v1.4.3-canary.1 (367d939) Checked 1 install across 2 packages (no changes ... (truncated) ``` </details> <details><summary>diff hotspot</summary> ``` src/js/internal/net/symbols.ts | 2 + src/js/node/net.ts | 68 ++-- src/js/node/tls.ts | 47 +-- test/js/node/tls/node-tls-client-wrap-fixture.mjs | 387 ++++++++++++++++++++++ test/js/node/tls/node-tls-connect.test.ts | 356 +++++++++++++++++++- 5 files changed, 806 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-) ``` </details> **gate history** · 2 passed · 0 rejected · iteration 0 <details><summary>evidence per changed file</summary> ``` file reads edits tests src/js/internal/net/symbols.ts 0 0 72 src/js/node/net.ts 8 0 73 src/js/node/tls.ts 1 0 74 test/js/node/tls/node-tls-client-wrap-fixture.mjs 2 3 77 test/js/node/tls/node-tls-connect.test.ts 0 0 69 ``` </details> <!-- robobun:evidence:end -->
|
Superseded by #44618, which consolidates the open TLS pull requests. This fix and its tests are in there, either as written, rewritten smaller, or merged with the other PRs that patched the same cause (see the "By area" list in that PR). Closing in favor of it. |
…32929) SSLWrapper cleared the error queue and reported a failed SSL_do_handshake with the X509 verdict, so a fatal alert, bytes that are not TLS or an ALPN mismatch came out as UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT. It also never flushed the alert that BoringSSL queued, so the peer saw a bare end of stream. The wrapper now reports {EPROTO, oldest queued reason}, the report openssl.c gives, and writes the pending alert before it tells the owner. tlsHandshakeError moves to internal/tls so the http2 raw upgrade shares it, and builds ERR_SSL_<REASON> whatever library queued the reason, as Node does.
…32929) SSLWrapper cleared the error queue and reported a failed SSL_do_handshake with the X509 verdict, so a fatal alert, bytes that are not TLS or an ALPN mismatch came out as UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT. It also never flushed the alert that BoringSSL queued, so the peer saw a bare end of stream. The wrapper now reports {EPROTO, oldest queued reason}, the report openssl.c gives, and writes the pending alert before it tells the owner. tlsHandshakeError moves to internal/tls so the http2 raw upgrade shares it, and builds ERR_SSL_<REASON> whatever library queued the reason, as Node does.
…32929) SSLWrapper cleared the error queue and reported a failed SSL_do_handshake with the X509 verdict, so a fatal alert, bytes that are not TLS or an ALPN mismatch came out as UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT. It also never flushed the alert that BoringSSL queued, so the peer saw a bare end of stream. The wrapper now reports {EPROTO, oldest queued reason}, the report openssl.c gives, and writes the pending alert before it tells the owner. tlsHandshakeError moves to internal/tls so the http2 raw upgrade shares it, and builds ERR_SSL_<REASON> whatever library queued the reason, as Node does.
…32929) SSLWrapper cleared the error queue and reported a failed SSL_do_handshake with the X509 verdict, so a fatal alert, bytes that are not TLS or an ALPN mismatch came out as UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT. It also never flushed the alert that BoringSSL queued, so the peer saw a bare end of stream. The wrapper now reports {EPROTO, oldest queued reason}, the report openssl.c gives, and writes the pending alert before it tells the owner. tlsHandshakeError moves to internal/tls so the http2 raw upgrade shares it, and builds ERR_SSL_<REASON> whatever library queued the reason, as Node does.
…ps, WebSocket, SQL) (#44618) ### What does this PR do? Consolidates the open TLS pull requests into one. Each was reproduced on `main` and, for `node:*` behavior, on Node v26.3.0 first. About a third are ported as written, the rest are rewritten smaller or merged into one fix where several PRs patched the same cause. One commit per fix, so it can be read commit by commit. Fixes #43520, fixes #31396, fixes #43635, fixes #37193, fixes #43846, fixes #17932, fixes #41061, fixes #36887, fixes #31810, fixes #35240, fixes #32234, fixes #44365, fixes #43807, fixes #42280, fixes #44517. Addresses #41856 (SNI and `servername`; not `checkServerIdentity` for SQL), #24845 (the spin is gone, shown with fault injection on Linux; not run on macOS), #19754 (node-fetch forwards the agent's TLS options; the Kubernetes client itself was not run). #### The ones that matter most | | On `main` | PRs | |---|---|---| | Client certificate disclosure | `https.request()` with a client certificate sends it to a server it then refuses (wrong name, `checkServerIdentity`, `destroy()` in `'secureConnect'`, `terminate()` in `handshake`). A server can force it with a junk record behind its Finished | #43946 | | False `authorized` | Over a Duplex, `secureConnect` with `authorized === true` for a peer that failed the key proof; `secureConnect` for a plaintext peer with `rejectUnauthorized: false` | #44422, #32929 | | Cleartext https | `https.createServer()` without a usable key/cert answers plain HTTP | #41672, #33539 | | Revoked client certificates | An https mTLS server never sees `crl`, so a revoked client is `authorized` | #41641 | | Pooled sockets | Requests with different client certificates or CAs share an `https.Agent` socket and session | #42498 | | Silent plaintext | `tls: [...]` given to `Bun.listen` / `Bun.connect` is plain TCP | #41490 | | Server weakened by a client knob | `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0` turns off a server's client-certificate enforcement | #35245 | | Pins never checked | `WebSocket` never calls `tls.checkServerIdentity` and ignores `tls.serverName` | #41648 | | `verify-full` dropped | `PGSSLMODE=verify-*` is lost next to a `TLS_*` URL variable; `tls: true` sends no SNI | #44498 | | Crashes | use-after-free from `destroy()` in `ALPNCallback` over a Duplex; `abort()` on a late `setSession()`; SIGABRT in `fetch` with an https proxy from the environment and a `Bun.file()` body | #44462, #41671, #44458 | | Stream corruption | A TLS `write()` can lose 16 KiB it reported as written while another socket on the loop is stalled | #44529 | | Hangs and spins | 100% CPU on a failing `send()`; a fatal `SSL_write` leaves the socket open forever; `idleTimeout` never sheds a TLS client that ignores `close_notify` | #34510, #38176, #42336 | | Wrong certificate (regression since 1.3.14) | Connections accepted before `stop()` / `close()` get the default certificate and skip their entry's `requestCert` / `ca` | #42355 | | Quadratic Duplex / proxy tunnel | Reading one chunk over a Duplex, CPU: 8 MB 0.88 s → 0.14 s, 16 MB 3.18 s → 0.23 s, 32 MB 11.75 s → 0.39 s; `fetch` upload through CONNECT: 1.7 s → 0.18 s (debug build) | #44464 | #### By area - **fd engine, write path** (`openssl.c`, `socket.c`): #42352, #34510 + #38176 + #42336 as one change, #44529, #44458, #44192. A rejected `send()` ends the write side only and closes at the next writable event unless the peer's bytes are still queued (a 413 sent before a reset is still read). No new per-socket state. Also, on kqueue, **a FIN no longer ends a socket that waits in the low-priority queue** (`loop.c`): with more than 5 TLS handshakes at once, a client that ended right after its handshake could be reset and its server socket report `socket hang up`, because the eof that the sentinel read knote reports was acted on ahead of the unread Finished. That is on `main` too (the macOS entry for `node-tls-server.test.ts` in `test/flaky-tests.txt`: 7 of 48 recent builds of other branches), and this branch made it likelier (6 of 8 builds), since Finished now leaves in one segment with the close_notify. - **Error reporting, both engines**: #44422, #32929, #44516, #37094, #41272 + #42324 + #44223 as one change, #44021, #37472, #43946, #33630. One channel: a fatal error on an established session is reported, then **the engine closes the connection itself**, whatever the owner does with the report. `test/js/bun/net/tls-fatal-error-closes.test.ts` asserts closed-and-nothing-delivered for every owner (node:tls, `Bun.connect`, `Bun.listen`, `fetch` direct and through CONNECT, `Bun.serve`, `WebSocket` direct and through a proxy, Postgres, MySQL, Valkey, Duplex). - **Duplex engine** (`SSLWrapper`, `UpgradedDuplex`): #44462, #43529, #42332, #44464. #43877 + #44394 were in and are **out again**, see "Worth a look" 5. - **node:tls wrap lifecycle** (`net.ts`, `tls.ts`): #38007, #38058, #38028 + #38122 + #38076 as one change (six copies of the attach code become two helpers), #38311, #39008, #38154, #42340 + #42343 + #42339 + #42453 as one change, #43791, #42425, #44085, #42683, #39088, #39040, #40375, and what was still real of #36534. - **SNI, ALPN, server contexts**: #43080, #42050, #37195 + #43849 as one change (**one** SNI matcher for TCP and HTTP/3), #42355, #42285, #33253, part of #37896, part of #37013. A `tls.Server` has one `SSL_CTX`. - **Verification and options**: #44738, #41490, #37005 + the cwd pin of #40984, #31811, #43982, #33483 + #35245, #41810, #32235, #44441, #38092. - **node:tls API and CA store**: #41671, #38145, #32824, #43594, #39997, #41696, #33534, #34748, #42991, #42996, #42970. - **node:https, Agent, `ws`, node-fetch**: #41672 (https half), #41641, #38261, #42498, #44346, #35609, #31397, #42325. - **WebSocket client**: #41648, #37487 + #43048 as one change. - **SQL, Redis**: #33666, #41711, #44498, part of #42054. - **Tests only**: #41426, #40040, #44395, #44016, #37860, #40591, #44440, #41424. Found on the way and fixed here: an upload that a TLS 1.2 server interrupts with a renegotiation never completes on `main` (0 of 32 runs over `https.request`, `fetch`, `node:tls` and `Bun.connect`: the renegotiation ClientHello lands inside an application record that is still unsent, or the socket gets no `drain` again) and completes here, with two tests from robobun; the fix for #40653 (final flight and first write in one segment) stopped working whenever another TLS socket on the loop was stalled, on `main` too; the `tls.Server` prototype pinned the last server constructed and every `SSL_CTX` it owned; `Object.create(process.env).NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED = "0"` turned verification off process-wide once a `SHARE_ENV` worker existed; two debug panics when wrapping a shut-down or still-connecting socket; a `fetch` POST through a proxy sent its headers twice when the origin renegotiated; `BlockList` ignored IPv6 zone ids; a test now ties `root_certs.der` to `certdata.txt`. #### Behavior changes - **A server's `ca` without `requestCert` no longer asks for a client certificate** (`Bun.serve`, `Bun.listen`, HTTP/3, node:tls). It matches the docs and Node. On `main` such a server refused clients with no certificate but served any unrelated self-signed one, so it was never authentication. **Set `requestCert: true` to require a certificate.** A matrix test pins that `requestCert: true` still refuses no certificate and an untrusted one on 8 kinds of server, TLS 1.2 and 1.3, with `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED` unset and `0`. - `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0` no longer relaxes a server. - `Bun.connect` / `Bun.listen` hear of a fatal TLS error after the handshake through `error(socket, err)`. With no `error` handler the socket just closes. - HTTP/3 server names match like TCP: `*.` covers exactly one label, case is ignored, a trailing dot is ignored, the last registration of a name wins. - `requestCert` on node:https is `=== true`, as in Node. - An array where a generated options dictionary is expected throws (`tls: []`, `jest.useFakeTimers([])`). - `key` / `cert` arrays serve every identity. A client that can use both gets ECDSA, where `main` served whichever pair came last. - `ecdhCurve` is forwarded by node:https, `ws` and node-fetch now, so a group BoringSSL lacks (`X448`) throws there as it already does in `tls.createServer`. - A wrapped socket's error is re-emitted on the TLS socket as in Node, so `raw.destroy(err)` with a listener on `raw` only is uncaught, as in Node. - `sql.options.tls` is always an object, never `true`. `RedisClient` sends SNI. - `tls: { secureContext }` alone asks for TLS on `Bun.listen` / `Bun.connect` (it was plain TCP), and a value that is not a `SecureContext` throws. The context is served as it is: the `requestCert` / `rejectUnauthorized` it was created with hold whatever the options next to it say, and `requestCert` in the options over a context that does not ask throws at `listen()`. - `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS` reaches every client once assigned (`fetch`, `WebSocket`, `Bun.connect`, `RedisClient`, `Bun.SQL`, `S3Client`, proxy tunnels) and servers again. A list that selects no cipher throws `ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_MATCH` at the assignment. `fetch.preconnect()` dials nothing after an assignment. - The warning for an unreadable `NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS` is Node's one line, without the `warn:` prefix. - `BUN_CONFIG_WS_CLOSE_TIMEOUT` (default 30 s): how long a `WebSocket` client waits for the server to close the connection after the closing handshake. #### Worth a look in review 1. **#44529**: the kernel-refused remainder of a TLS write moves from the loop's one slot onto the connection (in the existing rare struct), so the write BIO never refuses a sealed record. Nothing is allocated on an unstalled path (200 writes: 0 appends, same `send()` count as `main`), memory with 16 stalled writers is lower than on `main` (276 KB vs 340 KB, which `main` holds inside BoringSSL's buffers), `us_socket_t` stays 80 bytes. It needs a bound on how long a deferred close waits, or a peer that stops reading pins the fd past `destroy()`: `US_SSL_CLOSE_AFTER_SPILL_TIMEOUT` is a fixed 10 s, not re-armed on progress. Separate commits, but the fix that keeps the client certificate off the wire beside a stalled socket builds on them. 2. **The default name check of node:tls also runs inside the handshake**, so a wrong-name server gets no client certificate on TLS 1.2 either. JS still runs it after every successful handshake, so a difference between the two matchers can only refuse. Error objects are byte-identical. 3. **#44441** widens trust by design: a self-issued leaf whose `keyUsage` lacks `keyCertSign` (`dotnet dev-certs`) is its own anchor when the store holds a byte-identical copy. No BoringSSL change. Expired pin, same subject with another key, wrong EKU and a pinned intermediate are tested to fail. 4. **#32235** only adds Ed25519 and ECDSA P-521 to the verify list. A captured ClientHello shows `main`'s list with the two inserted; `rsa_pkcs1_sha1` stays. 5. **A stream that a TLS socket wraps, when that TLS socket closes.** An earlier state of this branch lost data here while CI was green (found by #44709's report): with the peer closing first, 4 of 8 MiB arrived with TLS in TLS, 4 of 32 MiB on the http2 `emit("connection")` path, and a `write()` with no `'error'` listener ended the process. Three Node-parity changes only hold together: destroying the wrapped stream at the close (#38028 + #38122 + #38076, #38154) is safe only if every write has really completed (#43877), which in turn needs Node's handling of the peer's close_notify, which needs half-open sockets that the GC can collect. So: - #43877 + #44394 are reverted and reopened. A write over a stream completes once the stream has taken the ciphertext, as on `main`. - Until the verdict on the peer lets the session through, the application cannot have written over it. There the wrapped stream is destroyed as in Node, with the sessions below it. That keeps the release of the connection after a failed handshake, a rejected certificate and an early `destroy()`. The same for an http2 socket the application never got, and for `resetAndDestroy()`. - After that it is `main`'s teardown: a `net.Socket` only gets the engine's `end()`, closes at its peer's FIN, keeps its own timeout and reports its own errors. Any other stream is destroyed with the TLS socket. The regular suites cannot see any of this (999 files were green on every broken variant), so it was steered by eleven seeded differential fuzzers run on this build, `main`, Node v26.3.0 and the earlier state: close, `end()`, `destroy()`, `destroySoon()`, resets, hung and half-open peers, paused writers, timeouts, two and three sessions deep, over TCP and over Duplexes, before, at and after the handshake, and http2 requests. See "How did you verify". #### Known limits - `fetch` with a `checkServerIdentity` function still sends the client certificate (not the request) to a server the function refuses. On TLS 1.2 any verdict a JS callback gives is too late, as in Node. - `addContext()` / `SNICallback` still do not apply to a server-side socket on the stream engine (`emit("connection", duplex)`, TLS in TLS, unflushed writes, named pipes), as on `main`. - A CA bundled in a pfx extends an explicit `ca` only, for `ws` / node-fetch / `WebSocket`: the native `ca` can only replace the default store, and that store keeps `SSL_CERT_FILE` / `SSL_CERT_DIR`. - P-521 leaves work on TLS 1.3 only. TLS 1.2 needs secp521r1 in every ClientHello (`it.todo`). - Once `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS` is assigned, `fetch(url, { protocol: "http3" })` is `HTTP3Unsupported`, as with an explicit `ciphers`. - `addCACert()` by hand does not extend the chains of a context with several identities. - A throwing `ALPNCallback` sends `no_application_protocol` on both engines. Node sends nothing and its client sees `ECONNRESET`. - TLS in TLS, peer FIN while the outer handshake runs: the inner socket gets one `write EPIPE`, where Node gives `ECONNRESET` (`main` gives it no error at all). - `@SECLEVEL` in `ciphers` is dropped by the `ws` / node-fetch shims, which used to ignore `ciphers`. node:tls keeps throwing `ERR_SSL_INVALID_COMMAND`. - Beside a stalled TLS socket only the first record (16 KiB) of the first write leaves with the handshake flight. The rest goes record by record, which is what bounds the memory of stalled writers. - After a fatal error on an established session the socket emits `'error'` and then `'close'`. Node emits `'error'` and leaves the socket open. - A paused reader whose own write the kernel rejects loses what it had not read yet, with an `EPIPE`, as on Node. `main` reports no error there and delivers it. - On `main` too: a `Bun.listen` socket without `allowHalfOpen` that has unsent ciphertext when the client's `shutdown()` arrives loses that ciphertext (32 KiB), and over plain TCP `end()` with the peer still sending is a close over unread input, so a reset. - Differences from both `main` and Node that the differential runs below found and that stay, all with a peer that aborts: `ECONNRESET` instead of a clean `'end'` after the socket's own `'finish'` when the peer destroyed with unread data; under TLS 1.2, a zero-length `write()` followed by `destroy()` in `'secureConnection'` leaves the client without `'secureConnect'` (a plain `destroy()` there matches Node); a TLS 1.2 client that destroys in `'secureConnect'` gets no `'session'`; a `ClientRequest` whose handshake fails with an alert emits `'error'` and `'close'` but no `'finish'` (`writableFinished` is true). - Once `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS` is assigned, `fetch.preconnect()` opens nothing: `fetch()` then uses a context of its own, and a socket warmed under the default one would never be picked up. - A TLS `send()` that the kernel refuses outside a `write()` call (the drain of unsent ciphertext) is reported with the close, as `read EPIPE` / `read ECONNRESET`. Node says `write EPIPE`. `main` does not report it at all. - Once the application has a session over a `net.Socket` (TLS in TLS, http2 `emit("connection")`), a peer that never sends its FIN holds that socket after the TLS socket closed, as on `main`. Node destroys it. Two tests of #38154 are `todo` for this. Closing it any earlier (at its `'finish'`, say) makes the kernel drop what it has not sent yet as soon as the peer's close_notify arrives. - Plaintext that was queued on a socket before it was wrapped (STARTTLS with a backlog) is dropped when the TLS socket is destroyed, or its handshake fails, before the session is accepted. Node drops it too, except on `destroySoon()`. `main` sends it. - Over a stream that is no `net.Socket`, `end()` can still cut what that stream has buffered, and there is no backpressure, both as on `main` (#43877). - `tls.secureContext` (the undocumented door node:tls uses) is not read by a Windows named pipe listener, which builds its context from the options. On `upgradeTLS({ isServer: true })` the options next to it are the policy, as with Node's `SetVerifyMode`. - `selectServerName()` rebuilds the name tree per ClientHello for injected sockets of a server with `addContext()` entries: 0.4 µs for 1 entry, 3.7 µs for 10, 41 µs for 100, against 631–1111 µs for a handshake. #### Not included Left open, because they need a decision or are not TLS: #43877 + #44394 (see "Worth a look" 5; #43874 stays open with them), #38548, #38591 (both shrink who is trusted), #41589 (`verify-full` vs `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0`), #37197, #41706, #43216, #33487, #33545, #36707, #32435, #37255, #28691, #40275, #30314 (features), #38120 (needs the BoringSSL fork, as did #33517, which the stale bot has closed since), #38529 (needs a Windows measurement), #34342, #38232, #43089, #44454, #40451, #42710, #44527, #38088, #38093, #41898. #37896, #42054 and #37013 stay open for the halves not taken. `http.createServer({ key, cert })` keeps serving TLS on purpose. One open question: `tls: {}` (an object that names no TLS option) is plain TCP on `Bun.listen` / `Bun.connect`, here and on `main`. It is the same trap as `tls: []`, but changing it changes a Bun default, so it is left alone. ### How did you verify your code works? - Every new test fails on `main` for the stated reason and passes here, except guards that pin existing behavior, each shown to fail when its clause is removed. `node:*` tests also pass on Node v26.3.0; the few that cannot say which Node version has the behavior. - 212 test files that touch TLS, sockets, http, http2, fetch, WebSocket, SQL, Valkey and workers: 6154 pass, 2 fail. Both are seen on `main` too: `serve.test.ts` "root range port" (the box runs as root), and `worker_threads.test.ts` "terminate(): nothing of the worker's runs after the request", which is flaky there and passed in the run below. - 58 of those files the way the ASAN lane runs them (LeakSanitizer + `BUN_JSC_validateExceptionChecks`): 58 files, 48 of them with leak checking, 4132 pass, 3 fail. All three also fail on `main`: `serve.test.ts` "root range port", `node-net.test.ts` "should not leak when connect({path}) fails synchronously on a reused handle" (times out under this environment), `worker_threads.test.ts` "process.exit() with a shell cp in flight" (a `ShellCpTask` leak). - 647 vendored `test-tls-*`, `test-https-*`, `test-net-*`, `test-http2-*`: the only two failures also fail on `main`. - The SNI matcher was diffed against both old matchers: 3 seeds × 1.23 M lookups × 3 registration flavours, every difference in one of the intended classes, TCP and HTTP/3 identical on every lookup. - The headline rows were also driven by hand with scripts against this build, `main` and Node v26.3.0: cleartext https, `crl`, `tls: []` / `{ secureContext }`, the `ca` / `requestCert` matrix, the client certificate on a wrong-name server, late `setSession()`, `destroy()` in `ALPNCallback`, `[rsa, ec]` identities with an intermediate from `ca`, `WebSocket` `checkServerIdentity`, a corrupted record, the Duplex read above, `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS`. - The `setSession()` guard was checked against the real `abort()` at 43 handshake states. - `bun run rust:check-all`: 12 of 12 targets. `tsc`, oxlint, source lints, prettier, rustfmt, mordant clean. - usockets' `_Nonnull` is compiled out of debug builds, so 105 of those files were also run on a local release ASAN build with the CI runner's environment (92 with leak checking): 4595 pass, 1 fail, `child_process.test.ts` "spawn reports EPERM after dropping privileges", which cannot pass as root and fails on `main` too. - The close of a TLS socket over another stream ("Worth a look" 5): eleven seeded differential fuzzers, 8,424 scenarios compared, each run on a release ASAN build of this branch, on `main`, on Node v26.3.0 and on the earlier state of the branch. Against `main`: - Data that `main` delivers in full is cut in 5 scenarios, and about 150 that `main` cuts arrive in full. Of the 5, in 2 `main` never notices the peer's close and keeps the socket for good, 2 call `end()` on the middle one of three sessions over an in-memory Duplex, and 1 does the same on Node. - No dead timeout, no silent reset and no uncaught error that `main` does not have (4 uncaught errors fewer). - A socket stays open where `main` closes it in 109, and closes where `main` keeps it in 295. 92 of the 109 do the same on Node or on the earlier state (a `destroy()` that an in-memory Duplex does not show its peer, half-open peers). 14 wait for a peer that paused reading and so does not read the FIN (#42332's backpressure, as in Node); the socket's own timeout fires there. 3 are left: one on a 5 ms timer, two with three sessions over an in-memory Duplex. - The earlier state of the branch cut data in 173 of the 400 scenarios of one of them, where `main` cuts none and this cuts none. - 23 new tests pin what they found. Each earlier attempt at this fix fails the ones that describe it, the earlier state of the branch fails 7, and all pass on Node. - After that change: 999 test files on the release ASAN build (20,246 pass; the 11 files that fail need a database, Docker, DNS or a non-root user, or share a temp directory with a parallel run and pass alone), 61 on the debug build. - TLS over a file descriptor (`openssl.c`, the path of `fetch`, `Bun.serve`, `tls.connect`, `Bun.connect`) got the same treatment after the rebase: seeded differential fuzzers on CI's release build of this branch, on `main` and, for `node:*`, on Node v26.3.0. Every runtime also against itself for the noise floor, injected faults and known bugs of `main` as positive controls, and a difference counts only if it shows in 5 of 5 fresh processes. - `node:tls` over TCP: 11,500 scenarios (one connection with Node as the oracle line by line; 2 to 60 connections beside stalled neighbours; raw peers that break the handshake). HTTPS: about 136,000 runs over `Bun.serve` + `fetch`, `node:https`, `node:http2` and `wss://`, also with the two ends in different runtimes. `Bun.connect` / `Bun.listen` / `upgradeTLS`: 11,500 scenarios and 720 slow connections, with writers driven by what `write()` returns, beside up to 6 stalled, dripping, closing or resetting neighbours, and plain TCP as a second oracle. No crash, hang, duplication, reordering or silent truncation, and no change in time or in connection reuse. - They found six things that `main` does better, none of which any test showed. All are fixed, each with a test that fails on the build before: what the peer sent lost behind a rejected `send()` (23 scenarios, and an early HTTPS response lost with only `EPIPE`), the same silently for a paused reader, `server.close()` never calling back on a half-open server after a ClientHello and a reset (17), `closeAllConnections()` taking 12 s with a stalled client, `end()` losing up to 1.3 of 4 MiB that `write()` had reported while the peer still uploads, and `end()` a little after a stall never closing beside other stalled TLS sockets. The last two fixes also deliver the 1 to 2 MiB that `main` loses there, and close the socket that `main` keeps for good without such neighbours. - All of them again after every fix, on CI's release build of it. That caught one regression of a fix itself (a reader stopped for backpressure lost 86,385 bytes, 1 of 6,000 scenarios), fixed too. On the last build: scenarios that lose data where `main` does not 23 → 2, and Node loses it in both, with the same `EPIPE`; `server.close()` that never calls back 17 → 0; connections held 4 → 0; requests that end in an error only where `main` has a response 6 → 0. With a Node server in another process, a request ends in an error only in 8 and 10 of 1,500 scenarios here, 5 and 3 on `main`, 10 with Node as the client. - `Bun.connect` / `Bun.listen` on the last build against `main`, in scenarios: hangs 0 against 1,031, sockets and fds never released 0 against 965, corrupted data 0 against 345, `abort()` 0 against 26 (`setSession()` after the handshake), writers that never close 0 against 101 of 720 connections. No kind of failure shows here and not on `main`. About a third of the slow connections close later than on `main`, in 1 to 16 s instead of at once, waiting for unsent ciphertext or for the peer's close_notify, and 79 more of them deliver all that `write()` reported. RSS and time with 16 to 256 stalled writers are the same. - What they found that `main` does worse: a `WebSocket` that calls `close()` with sends pending loses messages in 81 of 999 scenarios (0 here), 37 server sockets left open, 10 `server.close()` that never call back, 20 write callbacks that never run. - The kqueue fix cannot be run on Linux. The `connectionListener` count test now says what became of a missing connection, which is how the cause was found (`'tlsClientError'` "socket hang up", then `read ECONNRESET` at the client of the same port, after its `'secureConnect'`). On macOS x64 it failed every attempt of the three builds before the fix and passed at the first attempt of the build with it. - Windows and macOS were only run by CI. Four new tests asserted what only the Linux kernel does (a FIN read ahead of a reset, unread bytes surviving a reset, loopback buffer sizes, `fstat()` on a socket) and now say so per platform. --------- Co-authored-by: autofix-ci[bot] <114827586+autofix-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: robobun <117481402+robobun@users.noreply.github.com>
2 participants
Problem
Duplexsurfaces as a certificate error: an ALPN mismatch givesUNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT. Without verification, ahandshake_failurealert emitssecureConnect.SSLWrapper::update_handshake_state(src/uws/lib.rs) callsERR_clear_error()right afterSSL_get_error(), so the queued reason is lost. It then reports the verify result of a missing certificate.Fix
ERR_peek_error()before the clear and carry it as a&CStr. The callback gets{ -71, "EPROTO", reason }, asopenssl.creports for a real fd.SSL_do_handshake, so a stale entry is not reported.tlsHandshakeErrorderivesERR_SSL_*from it. It moves tointernal/tls.ts, so an http2 server fed throughemit("connection")uses it.node-tls-connect.test.tsandnode-http2-upgrade.test.mts. bun 1.4.3 fails each new test on the wrapper path.Background
openssl.c. ADuplexor named pipe usesSSLWrapper, a Rust wrapper over memory BIOs. Both report to one callback.ERR_peek_error()reads the oldest entry, the root cause, as Node does.net.tsalone cannot recover a dropped reason. DerivingERR_SSL_*natively changes whatBun.connectgets.Downsides
ERR_clear_error()per handshake step: 2 per TLS 1.3 client handshake, 3 per TLS 1.2.UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERTfor such a handshake now gets anERR_SSL_*code.ECONNRESET, as in Node. Before: anErrorwith no code.Notes
Repro (any cert and key. The server speaks only
h2and the client offers onlyxyz, over a Duplex):Client over a Duplex
handshake_failurealert,rejectUnauthorized: falseERR_SSL_TLSV1_ALERT_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOLERR_SSL_SSL/TLS_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE(error)UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERTsecureConnectfiresERR_SSL_TLSV1_ALERT_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOLERR_SSL_SSLV3_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE(error)The Node / Bun spelling difference in the second column is OpenSSL 3 vs BoringSSL reason strings for the same queue entry, not a queue-position difference.
Server side (the client's first record is not TLS, or the client hangs up before it sends anything)
TLSSocketover a Duplex,erroremit("connection"),tlsClientErrorERR_SSL_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBERERR_SSL_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBERECONNRESET,socket hang upUNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERTUNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERTError("TLS handshake failed"), no codeERR_SSL_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBERERR_SSL_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBERECONNRESET,socket hang upThe http2 path (
socketHandshakeinsrc/js/node/_http2_upgrade.ts) emitted the native error unchanged. With only the native half of this PR it reportedEPROTOand the raw OpenSSL string.tlsHandshakeErroris now shared: its body is unchanged, and the three callersrequire("internal/tls")on the failure branch only.Why the direct path was already correct:
ssl_update_handshakeinopenssl.cparks the queued reason viassl_park_fatal_reason(which readsERR_peek_error()) andssl_dispatch_parked_reasonemits it asEPROTObefore anything reads the verify result.SSLWrapperhad no equivalent.UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERTvsERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID: the former is theX509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERTdefault thatus_internal_verify_peer_certificatereturns when there is no peer certificate. When that fallback yieldsX509_V_OKinstead (PSK), the callback getsverifyError = nullandnet.tsfalls through intocheckServerIdentity()against an empty{}cert, which producesERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID: Cert does not contain a DNS name. Same lost-reason bug, different surface.Review history: an earlier revision read
ERR_peek_last_error(). A review pointed out thatssl_park_fatal_reasonreads the oldest entry on purpose. Forhandshake_failure, BoringSSL pushesSSLV3_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILUREand thenHANDSHAKE_FAILURE_ON_CLIENT_HELLO, so the two engines disagreed and the test needed a regex. The change now readsERR_peek_error()and the test asserts the exact code. A later review asked for the clear beforeSSL_do_handshake:ERR_peek_error()reads the oldest entry, so an entry that an earlier BoringSSL call left on the thread would be reported as the reason of this handshake. The latest review found the http2 path above, asked for a test of the server half of the wrapper and for ajest.fn()spy, and asked for a name for the 256-byte capacity (FATAL_ERROR_REASON_MAX, the same value asUS_SSL_FATAL_ERROR_REASON_MAXinopenssl.c). The buffer is also written only on the fatal branch now, so a step that returnsWANT_READorWANT_WRITEdoes not zero it. A further note asked for accurate lifetime docs onus_bun_verify_error_t::reason(): 599878a changes those comments only. They said thatreasonpoints into BoringSSL's static error table, which was already untrue for theEPROTOreason thatssl_dispatch_parked_reasonpasses onmain. A review then noted thatprotocol_failurewas a safe public function that turns a borrowedCStrinto aCopystruct with no lifetime, beside safe accessors that read the pointer. ded5792 removes it:trigger_handshake_callbackbuilds the C struct and passes it to the synchronous callback in the same function, andsrc/uws_sys/lib.rskeeps only the corrected comments. 79ca29c makes the three server-side tests settle on the other outcomes too (the handshake completes, or the connection closes with no report), so a regression fails with a diff that names the event. The added listeners never won a race with the expected event in 300 iterations of each case on Node and 150 on the debug build.Relation to #44223: that PR reports a refused renegotiation as a protocol failure and edits the same
HandshakeOutcomeenum. Both PRs give the enum a lifetime and pass a borrowed&CStrtotrigger_handshake_callback. A trial merge of this branch (79ca29c) with its head (8bebdc6) conflicts in one place: the doc lines of two adjacent enum variants.src/uws_sys/lib.rsmerges with no conflict. #44223 adds a publicus_bun_verify_error_t::protocol_failureconstructor there. This PR had the same constructor for one revision and then removed it (see the review history).Self-review: a review of the full diff was started before the last push. It did not finish in six hours, so no list of concerns is available from it.
Rebase onto 2722608:
mainnow reports a handshake result throughtrigger_handshake_callback(HandshakeOutcome)(#43924). That function computes the error from the outcome. So the queued reason now rides inHandshakeOutcome::HandshakeError(Option<&CStr>).None(the queue is empty, or the error is not fatal) falls back to the verify result, as before. An inline-rejected handshake (#43767) returns before this branch and still reports the X509 verdict, asssl_trigger_handshakedoes. The logic of the change is the same. The earlier rebase applied the change again on the&selfrefactor ofSSLWrapper(#36571, #40516, #37467, #37673). It also added thepub safe fn ERR_peek_error() -> u32;extern again, which #39585 removed as unused.Consumers of the callback on
main:UpgradedDuplex::on_handshakeandWindowsNamedPipe::on_handshakecopycodeandreasonintoBox<CStr>. The socket'son_handshake(src/runtime/socket/socket_body.rs) copies both intoBox<[u8]>.ProxyTunnelandWebSocketProxyTunnelread onlyerror_no.CI: build 121966 on 341ce42 passed on every lane (181 jobs). The commits after it: 599878a changes comments only, ded5792 moves where the C struct is built and removes the unused constructor, 79ca29c changes tests only.
Suites run on the debug build of ded5792 (Linux x64), with the tests of 79ca29c:
test/js/node/tls/node-tls-connect.test.tsandtest/js/node/http2/node-http2-upgrade.test.mts: 108 pass, 18 skip, 0 fail with a 60 s limit for each test. With the default 5 s limit, subprocess tests thatmainadded time out at random on this host under load, a different set in each run. Node needs about 2 s for the same fixture there. On bun 1.4.3 the duplex-proxy variants of the two client tests, the server-over-Duplex test and both http2 tests fail. The directtls.connectvariants pass there, sinceopenssl.calready reports the reason. Node passesnode-http2-upgrade.test.mts, the two new cases included.node-tls-duplex-end-verify,node-tls-duplex-close-throw-uaf,node-tls-duplex-write-throw-error-value,node-tls-socket-allow-half-open-optionandrenegotiationintest/js/node/tls/,test/js/web/websocket/websocket-proxy.test.ts,test/js/bun/net/tls-reject-before-client-cert.test.ts: 228 pass, 13 skip, 0 fail.test/js/bun/http/proxy.test.ts: 97 pass. The tests oftest/js/node/http2/node-http2.test.jsthat use a Duplex oremit("connection"): 33 pass. The handshake andtlsClientErrortests oftest/js/node/tls/node-tls-server.test.ts: 19 pass.test/js/node/test/parallel/(test-tls-*,test-https-client-reject,test-http2-alpn,test-http2-https-fallback: junk input, alerts, ALPN, JS streams, client abort): all pass.Known and not changed here: a server on the wrapper path does not send its fatal alert to the peer. With a server that speaks only
h2and atls.connectclient that offers onlyxyz, the client reportsECONNRESETwhen the server is an http2 server fed throughemit("connection")or a serverTLSSocketover a Duplex. That is the same on bun 1.4.3 and on this branch. Node, and bun'stls.createServeron a real fd, give the clientERR_SSL_TLSV1_ALERT_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL. The flush has to run the owner's write handler during a failed handshake, so it is reported separately with a repro.Cost count: an lldb breakpoint with auto-continue on the added
ERR_clear_error()line, debug build. A script makes N good handshakes of atls.connect({ socket: <Duplex> })client and reads the server's 5 bytes on each. Hits: 2 for 1 connection and 20 for 10 with TLS 1.3, 3 and 30 with TLS 1.2.Out of scope: #9365 (
success: truewithUNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY, a real verdict on a cert that was sent) and #20727 (a hang on the native path plus SNI-for-IP) are different bugs. See the earlier comment on this PR.[human-review] gate passed · iteration 11 · 8 files touched
fails on main (without fix)
passes on PR (with fix)
diff hotspot
gate history · 2 passed · 0 rejected · iteration 11
evidence per changed file