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Navigate logical layers of code changes, visualize relationships, and explore their blast radius. WalkthroughTLS shutdown handling now resumes sockets to receive peer shutdown replies and clears the paused flag before normal closure. New regression tests cover paused TLS shutdowns, queued ciphertext delivery, and closure after an idle timeout with an unread request body. ChangesTLS shutdown and closure
Suggested reviewers: Priority: ⬆️ High Merge Risk: 🔵 Low · up to The change makes paused TLS sockets close once a graceful shutdown completes. The remaining issue is a test-only style nit, so merge risk is low. A later pause from a data callback can still leave a socket open, which the PR already documents as a limitation. 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4✅ Passed checks (4 passed)
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LGTM — minimal, correctly-placed fix at the layer that owns the deferred wait.
What was reviewed:
us_socket_resumeis a no-op when!is_paused, so the added call is inert on the common path; it also guardsis_closedand raw-closes on a failed re-registration, so no new hang is introduced.- Checked the non-TLS sibling: plain
end()sends FIN and doesn't defer on a read, so no equivalent fix is needed there (matches the PR's control run). - Test follows harness conventions —
port: 0,using,Promise.withResolvers()awaiting the actualcloseevents, failure events wired to reject on the client,describe.concurrent.eachover both peer-reply shapes.
Extended reasoning...
Overview
One code line added to packages/bun-usockets/src/crypto/openssl.c in us_internal_ssl_close: when a graceful TLS close (code 0) sends close_notify and defers the raw close until the peer's reply is read, call us_socket_resume(s) so a socket that was paused at the time of end() re-arms its readable poll. Without it, the JS wrapper is already detached by end(), nothing can resume the socket, and it never observes the peer's close_notify/FIN — leaking the fd and never firing close. A parametrized test in test/js/bun/net/socket.test.ts covers both peer replies (end() → close_notify+FIN, close() → FIN alone).
Security risks
None. This re-enables reads on a socket whose owner has already issued its final close; any data arriving ahead of the reply is dropped exactly as it would be for an unpaused end(). No new input parsing, no auth/crypto surface change.
Level of scrutiny
Low-to-moderate. The native change is a single call to an existing, idempotent helper (us_socket_resume early-returns when !is_paused, guards is_closed, and raw-closes on a failed us_poll_change), placed exactly where the deferred wait begins. The fix is at the shared TLS layer above the epoll/kqueue/libuv backends, so it applies uniformly. The non-SSL sibling was checked: plain TCP end() does not defer on a read, and the PR's own control (TLS:false, pause-end) confirms it already closes.
Other factors
The test is added to the existing module file, uses port: 0, using for cleanup, describe.concurrent.each for the two peer-reply variants, and awaits real close events via Promise.withResolvers() with error/connectError wired to reject — no sleeps or timeouts. No CODEOWNERS entry covers either changed path. The PR description includes strace evidence and a mechanism-level explanation (why end(); pause() and node:tls don't hit it, why not close immediately), and the hunt exited on dry_streak with no findings.
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Updated 10:43 PM PT - Oct 1st, 2026
✅ @robobun, your commit 5e42023107203b8b8ae61aff942b3a090258f50a passed in 🧪 To try this PR locally: bunx bun-pr 42352That installs a local version of the PR into your bun-42352 --bun |
…r the peer us_internal_ssl_close with code 0 sends close_notify and keeps the fd open until the peer's close_notify or FIN is read. On a socket that was paused at that point the reads stayed off, so the reply was never read: no close callback, and the fd stayed open for the life of the process. Two owners reach it. Bun.listen and Bun.connect sockets detach from the native socket in end(), so a later resume() from JS could not arm the reads. The Bun.serve idle timeout closes the same way, on a socket that an unread request body has paused. The deferred close now calls us_socket_resume. Whoever paused the socket gave it up with the close, and only a read can complete it. NewSocket clears its own paused flag when that close starts, so the flag matches the native socket.
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Inline comments:
Review comments at @test/js/bun/http/serve.test.ts:
- Around line 3314-3355: Remove the explicit 15_000 timeout argument from the
concurrent test containing the “idle timeout closes a tls connection whose
request body is paused” case; leave its test body and default runner timeout
unchanged.
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Nothing blocking. The comments below are optional suggestions. There is no need to push a fix for them before merging.
Beyond the inline findings, I also checked the new us_socket_resume(s) call in us_internal_ssl_close for use-after-free: ssl_handle_shutdown returning 0 runs no user callbacks (only SSL_shutdown and the BIO write), so s is still live, and if us_poll_change fails inside resume the raw close only unlinks the socket into the loop's closed list, so return s stays valid for the rest of the iteration.
Extended reasoning...
The diff adds a resume on the deferred TLS graceful-close path in packages/bun-usockets/src/crypto/openssl.c and clears the JS-side IS_PAUSED flag in src/runtime/socket/socket_body.rs, plus tests in serve.test.ts and socket.test.ts. It touches the TLS close path but no auth, crypto parameter, or input-parsing surface. Two confirmed findings are posted inline, so a human look is already signalled; this note only records the re-entrancy check that was examined and ruled out.
usockets lifts the native pause for the close, but the caller never called resume(). With the flag still set, a pause() from a later data callback stays a no-op, so it cannot switch the reads off again under the close that waits for the peer.
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Superseded by #44618, which consolidates the open TLS pull requests. This fix and its tests are in there, either as written, rewritten smaller, or merged with the other PRs that patched the same cause (see the "By area" list in that PR). Closing in favor of it. |
…r the peer (#42352) us_internal_ssl_close(s, 0) sends close_notify and keeps the fd until it reads the peer's reply. A paused socket never reads, and end() detached the owner, so nobody could resume it: no close event, fd held for the life of the process. The tail that decides to wait now resumes the socket.
…r the peer (#42352) us_internal_ssl_close(s, 0) sends close_notify and keeps the fd until it reads the peer's reply. A paused socket never reads, and end() detached the owner, so nobody could resume it: no close event, fd held for the life of the process. The tail that decides to wait now resumes the socket.
…r the peer (#42352) us_internal_ssl_close(s, 0) sends close_notify and keeps the fd until it reads the peer's reply. A paused socket never reads, and end() detached the owner, so nobody could resume it: no close event, fd held for the life of the process. The tail that decides to wait now resumes the socket.
…r the peer (#42352) us_internal_ssl_close(s, 0) sends close_notify and keeps the fd until it reads the peer's reply. A paused socket never reads, and end() detached the owner, so nobody could resume it: no close event, fd held for the life of the process. The tail that decides to wait now resumes the socket.
…ps, WebSocket, SQL) (#44618) ### What does this PR do? Consolidates the open TLS pull requests into one. Each was reproduced on `main` and, for `node:*` behavior, on Node v26.3.0 first. About a third are ported as written, the rest are rewritten smaller or merged into one fix where several PRs patched the same cause. One commit per fix, so it can be read commit by commit. Fixes #43520, fixes #31396, fixes #43635, fixes #37193, fixes #43846, fixes #17932, fixes #41061, fixes #36887, fixes #31810, fixes #35240, fixes #32234, fixes #44365, fixes #43807, fixes #42280, fixes #44517. Addresses #41856 (SNI and `servername`; not `checkServerIdentity` for SQL), #24845 (the spin is gone, shown with fault injection on Linux; not run on macOS), #19754 (node-fetch forwards the agent's TLS options; the Kubernetes client itself was not run). #### The ones that matter most | | On `main` | PRs | |---|---|---| | Client certificate disclosure | `https.request()` with a client certificate sends it to a server it then refuses (wrong name, `checkServerIdentity`, `destroy()` in `'secureConnect'`, `terminate()` in `handshake`). A server can force it with a junk record behind its Finished | #43946 | | False `authorized` | Over a Duplex, `secureConnect` with `authorized === true` for a peer that failed the key proof; `secureConnect` for a plaintext peer with `rejectUnauthorized: false` | #44422, #32929 | | Cleartext https | `https.createServer()` without a usable key/cert answers plain HTTP | #41672, #33539 | | Revoked client certificates | An https mTLS server never sees `crl`, so a revoked client is `authorized` | #41641 | | Pooled sockets | Requests with different client certificates or CAs share an `https.Agent` socket and session | #42498 | | Silent plaintext | `tls: [...]` given to `Bun.listen` / `Bun.connect` is plain TCP | #41490 | | Server weakened by a client knob | `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0` turns off a server's client-certificate enforcement | #35245 | | Pins never checked | `WebSocket` never calls `tls.checkServerIdentity` and ignores `tls.serverName` | #41648 | | `verify-full` dropped | `PGSSLMODE=verify-*` is lost next to a `TLS_*` URL variable; `tls: true` sends no SNI | #44498 | | Crashes | use-after-free from `destroy()` in `ALPNCallback` over a Duplex; `abort()` on a late `setSession()`; SIGABRT in `fetch` with an https proxy from the environment and a `Bun.file()` body | #44462, #41671, #44458 | | Stream corruption | A TLS `write()` can lose 16 KiB it reported as written while another socket on the loop is stalled | #44529 | | Hangs and spins | 100% CPU on a failing `send()`; a fatal `SSL_write` leaves the socket open forever; `idleTimeout` never sheds a TLS client that ignores `close_notify` | #34510, #38176, #42336 | | Wrong certificate (regression since 1.3.14) | Connections accepted before `stop()` / `close()` get the default certificate and skip their entry's `requestCert` / `ca` | #42355 | | Quadratic Duplex / proxy tunnel | Reading one chunk over a Duplex, CPU: 8 MB 0.88 s → 0.14 s, 16 MB 3.18 s → 0.23 s, 32 MB 11.75 s → 0.39 s; `fetch` upload through CONNECT: 1.7 s → 0.18 s (debug build) | #44464 | #### By area - **fd engine, write path** (`openssl.c`, `socket.c`): #42352, #34510 + #38176 + #42336 as one change, #44529, #44458, #44192. A rejected `send()` ends the write side only and closes at the next writable event unless the peer's bytes are still queued (a 413 sent before a reset is still read). No new per-socket state. Also, on kqueue, **a FIN no longer ends a socket that waits in the low-priority queue** (`loop.c`): with more than 5 TLS handshakes at once, a client that ended right after its handshake could be reset and its server socket report `socket hang up`, because the eof that the sentinel read knote reports was acted on ahead of the unread Finished. That is on `main` too (the macOS entry for `node-tls-server.test.ts` in `test/flaky-tests.txt`: 7 of 48 recent builds of other branches), and this branch made it likelier (6 of 8 builds), since Finished now leaves in one segment with the close_notify. - **Error reporting, both engines**: #44422, #32929, #44516, #37094, #41272 + #42324 + #44223 as one change, #44021, #37472, #43946, #33630. One channel: a fatal error on an established session is reported, then **the engine closes the connection itself**, whatever the owner does with the report. `test/js/bun/net/tls-fatal-error-closes.test.ts` asserts closed-and-nothing-delivered for every owner (node:tls, `Bun.connect`, `Bun.listen`, `fetch` direct and through CONNECT, `Bun.serve`, `WebSocket` direct and through a proxy, Postgres, MySQL, Valkey, Duplex). - **Duplex engine** (`SSLWrapper`, `UpgradedDuplex`): #44462, #43529, #42332, #44464. #43877 + #44394 were in and are **out again**, see "Worth a look" 5. - **node:tls wrap lifecycle** (`net.ts`, `tls.ts`): #38007, #38058, #38028 + #38122 + #38076 as one change (six copies of the attach code become two helpers), #38311, #39008, #38154, #42340 + #42343 + #42339 + #42453 as one change, #43791, #42425, #44085, #42683, #39088, #39040, #40375, and what was still real of #36534. - **SNI, ALPN, server contexts**: #43080, #42050, #37195 + #43849 as one change (**one** SNI matcher for TCP and HTTP/3), #42355, #42285, #33253, part of #37896, part of #37013. A `tls.Server` has one `SSL_CTX`. - **Verification and options**: #44738, #41490, #37005 + the cwd pin of #40984, #31811, #43982, #33483 + #35245, #41810, #32235, #44441, #38092. - **node:tls API and CA store**: #41671, #38145, #32824, #43594, #39997, #41696, #33534, #34748, #42991, #42996, #42970. - **node:https, Agent, `ws`, node-fetch**: #41672 (https half), #41641, #38261, #42498, #44346, #35609, #31397, #42325. - **WebSocket client**: #41648, #37487 + #43048 as one change. - **SQL, Redis**: #33666, #41711, #44498, part of #42054. - **Tests only**: #41426, #40040, #44395, #44016, #37860, #40591, #44440, #41424. Found on the way and fixed here: an upload that a TLS 1.2 server interrupts with a renegotiation never completes on `main` (0 of 32 runs over `https.request`, `fetch`, `node:tls` and `Bun.connect`: the renegotiation ClientHello lands inside an application record that is still unsent, or the socket gets no `drain` again) and completes here, with two tests from robobun; the fix for #40653 (final flight and first write in one segment) stopped working whenever another TLS socket on the loop was stalled, on `main` too; the `tls.Server` prototype pinned the last server constructed and every `SSL_CTX` it owned; `Object.create(process.env).NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED = "0"` turned verification off process-wide once a `SHARE_ENV` worker existed; two debug panics when wrapping a shut-down or still-connecting socket; a `fetch` POST through a proxy sent its headers twice when the origin renegotiated; `BlockList` ignored IPv6 zone ids; a test now ties `root_certs.der` to `certdata.txt`. #### Behavior changes - **A server's `ca` without `requestCert` no longer asks for a client certificate** (`Bun.serve`, `Bun.listen`, HTTP/3, node:tls). It matches the docs and Node. On `main` such a server refused clients with no certificate but served any unrelated self-signed one, so it was never authentication. **Set `requestCert: true` to require a certificate.** A matrix test pins that `requestCert: true` still refuses no certificate and an untrusted one on 8 kinds of server, TLS 1.2 and 1.3, with `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED` unset and `0`. - `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0` no longer relaxes a server. - `Bun.connect` / `Bun.listen` hear of a fatal TLS error after the handshake through `error(socket, err)`. With no `error` handler the socket just closes. - HTTP/3 server names match like TCP: `*.` covers exactly one label, case is ignored, a trailing dot is ignored, the last registration of a name wins. - `requestCert` on node:https is `=== true`, as in Node. - An array where a generated options dictionary is expected throws (`tls: []`, `jest.useFakeTimers([])`). - `key` / `cert` arrays serve every identity. A client that can use both gets ECDSA, where `main` served whichever pair came last. - `ecdhCurve` is forwarded by node:https, `ws` and node-fetch now, so a group BoringSSL lacks (`X448`) throws there as it already does in `tls.createServer`. - A wrapped socket's error is re-emitted on the TLS socket as in Node, so `raw.destroy(err)` with a listener on `raw` only is uncaught, as in Node. - `sql.options.tls` is always an object, never `true`. `RedisClient` sends SNI. - `tls: { secureContext }` alone asks for TLS on `Bun.listen` / `Bun.connect` (it was plain TCP), and a value that is not a `SecureContext` throws. The context is served as it is: the `requestCert` / `rejectUnauthorized` it was created with hold whatever the options next to it say, and `requestCert` in the options over a context that does not ask throws at `listen()`. - `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS` reaches every client once assigned (`fetch`, `WebSocket`, `Bun.connect`, `RedisClient`, `Bun.SQL`, `S3Client`, proxy tunnels) and servers again. A list that selects no cipher throws `ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_MATCH` at the assignment. `fetch.preconnect()` dials nothing after an assignment. - The warning for an unreadable `NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS` is Node's one line, without the `warn:` prefix. - `BUN_CONFIG_WS_CLOSE_TIMEOUT` (default 30 s): how long a `WebSocket` client waits for the server to close the connection after the closing handshake. #### Worth a look in review 1. **#44529**: the kernel-refused remainder of a TLS write moves from the loop's one slot onto the connection (in the existing rare struct), so the write BIO never refuses a sealed record. Nothing is allocated on an unstalled path (200 writes: 0 appends, same `send()` count as `main`), memory with 16 stalled writers is lower than on `main` (276 KB vs 340 KB, which `main` holds inside BoringSSL's buffers), `us_socket_t` stays 80 bytes. It needs a bound on how long a deferred close waits, or a peer that stops reading pins the fd past `destroy()`: `US_SSL_CLOSE_AFTER_SPILL_TIMEOUT` is a fixed 10 s, not re-armed on progress. Separate commits, but the fix that keeps the client certificate off the wire beside a stalled socket builds on them. 2. **The default name check of node:tls also runs inside the handshake**, so a wrong-name server gets no client certificate on TLS 1.2 either. JS still runs it after every successful handshake, so a difference between the two matchers can only refuse. Error objects are byte-identical. 3. **#44441** widens trust by design: a self-issued leaf whose `keyUsage` lacks `keyCertSign` (`dotnet dev-certs`) is its own anchor when the store holds a byte-identical copy. No BoringSSL change. Expired pin, same subject with another key, wrong EKU and a pinned intermediate are tested to fail. 4. **#32235** only adds Ed25519 and ECDSA P-521 to the verify list. A captured ClientHello shows `main`'s list with the two inserted; `rsa_pkcs1_sha1` stays. 5. **A stream that a TLS socket wraps, when that TLS socket closes.** An earlier state of this branch lost data here while CI was green (found by #44709's report): with the peer closing first, 4 of 8 MiB arrived with TLS in TLS, 4 of 32 MiB on the http2 `emit("connection")` path, and a `write()` with no `'error'` listener ended the process. Three Node-parity changes only hold together: destroying the wrapped stream at the close (#38028 + #38122 + #38076, #38154) is safe only if every write has really completed (#43877), which in turn needs Node's handling of the peer's close_notify, which needs half-open sockets that the GC can collect. So: - #43877 + #44394 are reverted and reopened. A write over a stream completes once the stream has taken the ciphertext, as on `main`. - Until the verdict on the peer lets the session through, the application cannot have written over it. There the wrapped stream is destroyed as in Node, with the sessions below it. That keeps the release of the connection after a failed handshake, a rejected certificate and an early `destroy()`. The same for an http2 socket the application never got, and for `resetAndDestroy()`. - After that it is `main`'s teardown: a `net.Socket` only gets the engine's `end()`, closes at its peer's FIN, keeps its own timeout and reports its own errors. Any other stream is destroyed with the TLS socket. The regular suites cannot see any of this (999 files were green on every broken variant), so it was steered by eleven seeded differential fuzzers run on this build, `main`, Node v26.3.0 and the earlier state: close, `end()`, `destroy()`, `destroySoon()`, resets, hung and half-open peers, paused writers, timeouts, two and three sessions deep, over TCP and over Duplexes, before, at and after the handshake, and http2 requests. See "How did you verify". #### Known limits - `fetch` with a `checkServerIdentity` function still sends the client certificate (not the request) to a server the function refuses. On TLS 1.2 any verdict a JS callback gives is too late, as in Node. - `addContext()` / `SNICallback` still do not apply to a server-side socket on the stream engine (`emit("connection", duplex)`, TLS in TLS, unflushed writes, named pipes), as on `main`. - A CA bundled in a pfx extends an explicit `ca` only, for `ws` / node-fetch / `WebSocket`: the native `ca` can only replace the default store, and that store keeps `SSL_CERT_FILE` / `SSL_CERT_DIR`. - P-521 leaves work on TLS 1.3 only. TLS 1.2 needs secp521r1 in every ClientHello (`it.todo`). - Once `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS` is assigned, `fetch(url, { protocol: "http3" })` is `HTTP3Unsupported`, as with an explicit `ciphers`. - `addCACert()` by hand does not extend the chains of a context with several identities. - A throwing `ALPNCallback` sends `no_application_protocol` on both engines. Node sends nothing and its client sees `ECONNRESET`. - TLS in TLS, peer FIN while the outer handshake runs: the inner socket gets one `write EPIPE`, where Node gives `ECONNRESET` (`main` gives it no error at all). - `@SECLEVEL` in `ciphers` is dropped by the `ws` / node-fetch shims, which used to ignore `ciphers`. node:tls keeps throwing `ERR_SSL_INVALID_COMMAND`. - Beside a stalled TLS socket only the first record (16 KiB) of the first write leaves with the handshake flight. The rest goes record by record, which is what bounds the memory of stalled writers. - After a fatal error on an established session the socket emits `'error'` and then `'close'`. Node emits `'error'` and leaves the socket open. - A paused reader whose own write the kernel rejects loses what it had not read yet, with an `EPIPE`, as on Node. `main` reports no error there and delivers it. - On `main` too: a `Bun.listen` socket without `allowHalfOpen` that has unsent ciphertext when the client's `shutdown()` arrives loses that ciphertext (32 KiB), and over plain TCP `end()` with the peer still sending is a close over unread input, so a reset. - Differences from both `main` and Node that the differential runs below found and that stay, all with a peer that aborts: `ECONNRESET` instead of a clean `'end'` after the socket's own `'finish'` when the peer destroyed with unread data; under TLS 1.2, a zero-length `write()` followed by `destroy()` in `'secureConnection'` leaves the client without `'secureConnect'` (a plain `destroy()` there matches Node); a TLS 1.2 client that destroys in `'secureConnect'` gets no `'session'`; a `ClientRequest` whose handshake fails with an alert emits `'error'` and `'close'` but no `'finish'` (`writableFinished` is true). - Once `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS` is assigned, `fetch.preconnect()` opens nothing: `fetch()` then uses a context of its own, and a socket warmed under the default one would never be picked up. - A TLS `send()` that the kernel refuses outside a `write()` call (the drain of unsent ciphertext) is reported with the close, as `read EPIPE` / `read ECONNRESET`. Node says `write EPIPE`. `main` does not report it at all. - Once the application has a session over a `net.Socket` (TLS in TLS, http2 `emit("connection")`), a peer that never sends its FIN holds that socket after the TLS socket closed, as on `main`. Node destroys it. Two tests of #38154 are `todo` for this. Closing it any earlier (at its `'finish'`, say) makes the kernel drop what it has not sent yet as soon as the peer's close_notify arrives. - Plaintext that was queued on a socket before it was wrapped (STARTTLS with a backlog) is dropped when the TLS socket is destroyed, or its handshake fails, before the session is accepted. Node drops it too, except on `destroySoon()`. `main` sends it. - Over a stream that is no `net.Socket`, `end()` can still cut what that stream has buffered, and there is no backpressure, both as on `main` (#43877). - `tls.secureContext` (the undocumented door node:tls uses) is not read by a Windows named pipe listener, which builds its context from the options. On `upgradeTLS({ isServer: true })` the options next to it are the policy, as with Node's `SetVerifyMode`. - `selectServerName()` rebuilds the name tree per ClientHello for injected sockets of a server with `addContext()` entries: 0.4 µs for 1 entry, 3.7 µs for 10, 41 µs for 100, against 631–1111 µs for a handshake. #### Not included Left open, because they need a decision or are not TLS: #43877 + #44394 (see "Worth a look" 5; #43874 stays open with them), #38548, #38591 (both shrink who is trusted), #41589 (`verify-full` vs `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0`), #37197, #41706, #43216, #33487, #33545, #36707, #32435, #37255, #28691, #40275, #30314 (features), #38120 (needs the BoringSSL fork, as did #33517, which the stale bot has closed since), #38529 (needs a Windows measurement), #34342, #38232, #43089, #44454, #40451, #42710, #44527, #38088, #38093, #41898. #37896, #42054 and #37013 stay open for the halves not taken. `http.createServer({ key, cert })` keeps serving TLS on purpose. One open question: `tls: {}` (an object that names no TLS option) is plain TCP on `Bun.listen` / `Bun.connect`, here and on `main`. It is the same trap as `tls: []`, but changing it changes a Bun default, so it is left alone. ### How did you verify your code works? - Every new test fails on `main` for the stated reason and passes here, except guards that pin existing behavior, each shown to fail when its clause is removed. `node:*` tests also pass on Node v26.3.0; the few that cannot say which Node version has the behavior. - 212 test files that touch TLS, sockets, http, http2, fetch, WebSocket, SQL, Valkey and workers: 6154 pass, 2 fail. Both are seen on `main` too: `serve.test.ts` "root range port" (the box runs as root), and `worker_threads.test.ts` "terminate(): nothing of the worker's runs after the request", which is flaky there and passed in the run below. - 58 of those files the way the ASAN lane runs them (LeakSanitizer + `BUN_JSC_validateExceptionChecks`): 58 files, 48 of them with leak checking, 4132 pass, 3 fail. All three also fail on `main`: `serve.test.ts` "root range port", `node-net.test.ts` "should not leak when connect({path}) fails synchronously on a reused handle" (times out under this environment), `worker_threads.test.ts` "process.exit() with a shell cp in flight" (a `ShellCpTask` leak). - 647 vendored `test-tls-*`, `test-https-*`, `test-net-*`, `test-http2-*`: the only two failures also fail on `main`. - The SNI matcher was diffed against both old matchers: 3 seeds × 1.23 M lookups × 3 registration flavours, every difference in one of the intended classes, TCP and HTTP/3 identical on every lookup. - The headline rows were also driven by hand with scripts against this build, `main` and Node v26.3.0: cleartext https, `crl`, `tls: []` / `{ secureContext }`, the `ca` / `requestCert` matrix, the client certificate on a wrong-name server, late `setSession()`, `destroy()` in `ALPNCallback`, `[rsa, ec]` identities with an intermediate from `ca`, `WebSocket` `checkServerIdentity`, a corrupted record, the Duplex read above, `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS`. - The `setSession()` guard was checked against the real `abort()` at 43 handshake states. - `bun run rust:check-all`: 12 of 12 targets. `tsc`, oxlint, source lints, prettier, rustfmt, mordant clean. - usockets' `_Nonnull` is compiled out of debug builds, so 105 of those files were also run on a local release ASAN build with the CI runner's environment (92 with leak checking): 4595 pass, 1 fail, `child_process.test.ts` "spawn reports EPERM after dropping privileges", which cannot pass as root and fails on `main` too. - The close of a TLS socket over another stream ("Worth a look" 5): eleven seeded differential fuzzers, 8,424 scenarios compared, each run on a release ASAN build of this branch, on `main`, on Node v26.3.0 and on the earlier state of the branch. Against `main`: - Data that `main` delivers in full is cut in 5 scenarios, and about 150 that `main` cuts arrive in full. Of the 5, in 2 `main` never notices the peer's close and keeps the socket for good, 2 call `end()` on the middle one of three sessions over an in-memory Duplex, and 1 does the same on Node. - No dead timeout, no silent reset and no uncaught error that `main` does not have (4 uncaught errors fewer). - A socket stays open where `main` closes it in 109, and closes where `main` keeps it in 295. 92 of the 109 do the same on Node or on the earlier state (a `destroy()` that an in-memory Duplex does not show its peer, half-open peers). 14 wait for a peer that paused reading and so does not read the FIN (#42332's backpressure, as in Node); the socket's own timeout fires there. 3 are left: one on a 5 ms timer, two with three sessions over an in-memory Duplex. - The earlier state of the branch cut data in 173 of the 400 scenarios of one of them, where `main` cuts none and this cuts none. - 23 new tests pin what they found. Each earlier attempt at this fix fails the ones that describe it, the earlier state of the branch fails 7, and all pass on Node. - After that change: 999 test files on the release ASAN build (20,246 pass; the 11 files that fail need a database, Docker, DNS or a non-root user, or share a temp directory with a parallel run and pass alone), 61 on the debug build. - TLS over a file descriptor (`openssl.c`, the path of `fetch`, `Bun.serve`, `tls.connect`, `Bun.connect`) got the same treatment after the rebase: seeded differential fuzzers on CI's release build of this branch, on `main` and, for `node:*`, on Node v26.3.0. Every runtime also against itself for the noise floor, injected faults and known bugs of `main` as positive controls, and a difference counts only if it shows in 5 of 5 fresh processes. - `node:tls` over TCP: 11,500 scenarios (one connection with Node as the oracle line by line; 2 to 60 connections beside stalled neighbours; raw peers that break the handshake). HTTPS: about 136,000 runs over `Bun.serve` + `fetch`, `node:https`, `node:http2` and `wss://`, also with the two ends in different runtimes. `Bun.connect` / `Bun.listen` / `upgradeTLS`: 11,500 scenarios and 720 slow connections, with writers driven by what `write()` returns, beside up to 6 stalled, dripping, closing or resetting neighbours, and plain TCP as a second oracle. No crash, hang, duplication, reordering or silent truncation, and no change in time or in connection reuse. - They found six things that `main` does better, none of which any test showed. All are fixed, each with a test that fails on the build before: what the peer sent lost behind a rejected `send()` (23 scenarios, and an early HTTPS response lost with only `EPIPE`), the same silently for a paused reader, `server.close()` never calling back on a half-open server after a ClientHello and a reset (17), `closeAllConnections()` taking 12 s with a stalled client, `end()` losing up to 1.3 of 4 MiB that `write()` had reported while the peer still uploads, and `end()` a little after a stall never closing beside other stalled TLS sockets. The last two fixes also deliver the 1 to 2 MiB that `main` loses there, and close the socket that `main` keeps for good without such neighbours. - All of them again after every fix, on CI's release build of it. That caught one regression of a fix itself (a reader stopped for backpressure lost 86,385 bytes, 1 of 6,000 scenarios), fixed too. On the last build: scenarios that lose data where `main` does not 23 → 2, and Node loses it in both, with the same `EPIPE`; `server.close()` that never calls back 17 → 0; connections held 4 → 0; requests that end in an error only where `main` has a response 6 → 0. With a Node server in another process, a request ends in an error only in 8 and 10 of 1,500 scenarios here, 5 and 3 on `main`, 10 with Node as the client. - `Bun.connect` / `Bun.listen` on the last build against `main`, in scenarios: hangs 0 against 1,031, sockets and fds never released 0 against 965, corrupted data 0 against 345, `abort()` 0 against 26 (`setSession()` after the handshake), writers that never close 0 against 101 of 720 connections. No kind of failure shows here and not on `main`. About a third of the slow connections close later than on `main`, in 1 to 16 s instead of at once, waiting for unsent ciphertext or for the peer's close_notify, and 79 more of them deliver all that `write()` reported. RSS and time with 16 to 256 stalled writers are the same. - What they found that `main` does worse: a `WebSocket` that calls `close()` with sends pending loses messages in 81 of 999 scenarios (0 here), 37 server sockets left open, 10 `server.close()` that never call back, 20 write callbacks that never run. - The kqueue fix cannot be run on Linux. The `connectionListener` count test now says what became of a missing connection, which is how the cause was found (`'tlsClientError'` "socket hang up", then `read ECONNRESET` at the client of the same port, after its `'secureConnect'`). On macOS x64 it failed every attempt of the three builds before the fix and passed at the first attempt of the build with it. - Windows and macOS were only run by CI. Four new tests asserted what only the Linux kernel does (a FIN read ahead of a reset, unread bytes surviving a reset, loopback buffer sizes, `fstat()` on a socket) and now say so per platform. --------- Co-authored-by: autofix-ci[bot] <114827586+autofix-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: robobun <117481402+robobun@users.noreply.github.com>
Problem
close, and the fd stays open until exit. Reached by theBun.serve({ tls })idle timeout after an unread request body (req.signalnever aborts), and bypause(); end()on aBun.listenorBun.connectsocket.us_internal_ssl_close(s, 0)(packages/bun-usockets/src/crypto/openssl.c:2112) sends close_notify and keeps the fd until it reads the peer's reply. A paused socket does not read, andend()detaches the JS socket, soresume()cannot help.Fix
us_internal_ssl_closedefers for the peer's reply, it callsus_socket_resume. The close is the owner's last word, and only a read can complete it.test/js/bun/net/socket.test.ts, one inserve.test.ts. Also thenode:tlsand fetch suites.us_socket_pauseduring the wait, resume behind unsent ciphertext) was dropped. It brokepause()afterend()and letBun.serveread a whole upload after its timeout.Background
close(2).Bun.servepauses a connection with 1 MB of unread request body.Downsides
pause(); end();, data that the peer still sends reachesdata, andendfires, as afterend()alone.Notes
What breaks, release 1.4.3-canary.1 (367d939) and this PR on a debug build of main faac63e:
The six new tests are these rows. All fail on the release build and on a debug build of main (4b02e10), and pass with the change.
Bun.serveprobe:idleTimeout: 1, the handler never reads the body and never answers, aBun.connectclient sends 7.5 MB of a 100 MB body. Before: the server's fd and the client's fd are both still open 12 s later, andreq.signalnever aborts. The client's own close waits behind ciphertext that the paused server never reads. With the PR: the client closes after 4.0 s,req.signalaborts, and 0 fds are left.epoll_ctlcalls on the accepted fd, from anLD_PRELOADinterposer (straceis not installed here):For a paused socket the
MOD INtakes the place of theMOD ERR|HUPthat the writable dispatch made, and theDELis the close. A socket that never pauses makes the same two calls.us_socket_resumereturns after its first test whenis_pausedis not set.The paused flag of the JS socket.
NewSocketkeeps its ownIS_PAUSEDbit so thatpause()andresume()are idempotent. This PR leaves it set afterpause(); end();, because the caller never calledresume(). Apause()from a laterdatacallback is then a no-op (it makes noepoll_ctlcall), so a handler that pauses on every chunk cannot switch the reads off again under the close. An earlier push of this PR cleared the bit to match the native socket. Review showed that the clear made such a laterpause()take effect again (the first two rows of the table below), so it was removed.Behaviour after
end(), unchanged by this PR. Afterend(), a TLSBun.listensocket still deliversdataandendif the peer sends more, because the nativedatadispatch attaches the JS socket again. What apause()from thatdatacallback does depends on whether the socket has adrainhandler:The first two rows are the same on release 367d939 and on a debug build of this PR. Each cell is 12 runs or more on each build. The peers are node and Bun, each in its own process, with 1 KiB and 1 MiB of late data. The third row is 0 of 24 runs before and 24 of 24 with this PR, and the 1 MiB arrives whole.
Without a
drainhandler,pause()andresume()are flow control. With one, the latepause()closes the connection.us_socket_pausearms the writable poll (packages/bun-usockets/src/socket.c:841).NewSocket::on_writable(src/runtime/socket/socket_body.rs:937) returns early when the socket has nodrainhandler. If it has one,on_writablecallsinternal_flush, which runs the end a second time. The second close finds close_notify already sent and closes the fd at once, without the peer's reply. A node peer that still sends gotECONNRESETorEPIPEin 2 of 18 runs with 1 MiB, andECONNRESETin the one run with 8 MiB. The call that this PR adds is not on that path.What changes is the first state only: a pause that was in place when
end()ran is lifted, so afterpause(); end();the socket behaves as afterend()alone. An earlier version of this table had the first column only and did not say so.The broader design that was dropped. A design review picked a larger change: one bit that marks a close which waits, set at the tail and where the close waits behind unsent ciphertext, with
us_socket_pauserefusing while it is set and returning whether the reads are off. It was built and it passed its tests. A review of that diff found two regressions against main:pause()afterend()into a no-op. In my probe a handler that pauses afterend()got 8,323,072 of 8,388,608 bytes in 18datacallbacks while it was paused. Main delivers none untilresume()(a socket with nodrainhandler).Bun.serveidle timeout fired on a peer that does not read its response, the server read the peer's whole request body. The review measured 120 MB against 9 MB on main. I did not run that probe again after the design was dropped.At the tail neither happens: close_notify is sent, the uWS HTTP layer drops data on a shut-down socket, and a
Bun.listensocket is detached.Open question. Is it intended that a TLS
Bun.listensocket still deliversdataandendafterend()? A plain TCP socket closes at once and delivers nothing. This PR does not change that.Found on the way, not in this PR
Bun.serve({ tls }): a peer that gets the close_notify of an idle timeout and does not answer keeps the connection.req.signaldoes not abort and the fd stays (2 fds left in the probe, before and after this PR). The comment onHttpContext::onTimeoutsays "Force close", and the close is graceful.end(), more data arrives, thenflush()or a writable event on a socket with adrainhandler:internal_flushruns the end a second time, and the second close finds close_notify already sent and closes the fd at once, without the peer's reply. The table above shows the writable event.ws.pause(); ws.close()leaves 1 fd open onws://and 2 onwss://. WebSocket client: resume a paused socket when the connection closes #42974 is open for it.Suites, debug+ASAN build of this PR:
socket.test.ts,socket-syscall-fault.test.ts,tcp-server.test.ts,node-tls-server.test.ts,node-tls-connect.test.ts,node-tls-socket-allow-half-open-option.test.ts,renegotiation.test.ts,fetch.tls.test.ts,fetch-backpressure.test.ts,websocket-client.test.ts,bun-server.test.ts,serve.test.ts,node-http-backpressure.test.ts,node-http-req-socket-pause.test.ts. Failures that do not come from this change:socket.test.ts"should not call drain before handshake" (needs DNS),serve.test.ts"only serves /bun:info to loopback clients in development mode" and "should use correct error when using a root range port(#7187)" (both fail on a build of main in this container), andnode-tls-server.test.ts"delivers the whole stream when destroySoon follows end" (128 MB through TLS, over the 5 s limit on a loaded debug build, with and without the change). The suites ran on the first push of this version. After the paused-flag clear was removed, the six new tests and the probes ran again.History. The first version of this PR was the three lines in
openssl.c. Its description said that data which arrives afterend()is dropped. That was wrong:dataandendstill fire, as the tables show.The report came from a fuzz run. The script answers
pingwiths.write("pong"), thens.pause(); s.end();, thensetTimeout(() => s.resume(), 50), and the client closes when it gets the reply. Result on 1.4.2, canary d316760 and main 6b394bf (ASAN), 10 of 10 runs:stracefrom the report, one connection:pause()isepoll_ctl(MOD, fd, EPOLLOUT).end()writes the 24-byte close_notify, thenepoll_ctl(MOD, fd, EPOLLERR|EPOLLHUP).resume()makes noepoll_ctlat all, becauseend()detached the JS socket. The graceful close sends no FIN of its own, so the peer's FIN alone does not raiseEPOLLHUP, and nothing wakes the socket.Why not close the fd at once when the socket is paused:
close(2)with unread data in the receive queue sends an RST, and an RST can discard the reply that the peer has not read yet. The wait for the peer exists to prevent that.Why
node:tlsis not affected: itsend()is the half-close (us_internal_ssl_shutdown: close_notify and FIN), the socket stays attached, andresume()works.node:netnever calls the nativeend().Not run locally: macOS (kqueue) and Windows.
no test proof · iteration 0 · platform-specific test(s) that do not run on this machine, deferring to CI, which covers all platforms: test/js/bun/net/socket.test.ts, test/js/bun/http/serve.test.ts