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With an Agent that uses a proxy, establishTunnel() calls tls.connect() when the proxy has answered the CONNECT. That is after https.request() returned. tls.connect() throws when it rejects the TLS options of the request, so the throw was an uncaught exception. The request emitted no 'error' and no 'close', and the proxy connection stayed open. Catch the throw, close the proxy connection, and give the error to the request. This is a port of nodejs/node#66096. Co-authored-by: Christian Aurich Zanettini Martins <christian.aurichzm@gmail.com>
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Included review availability: This review used your included allowance. Your plan provides up to 10 included reviews per hour; 1 remain after this review. WalkthroughThe HTTPS proxy tunnel now handles synchronous TLS connection errors by destroying the proxy socket and passing the error and socket to ChangesHTTPS proxy TLS errors
Priority: ➖ Normal Merge Risk: ⚪ Minimal · up to The proxy TLS error handling has no established outstanding merge blocker. The outdated test-command concern no longer applies; normal build and test checks remain necessary. 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4✅ Passed checks (4 passed)
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LGTM — a small, direct port of the upstream Node fix that routes a synchronous tls.connect() throw through the tunnel's existing failure channel.
What was reviewed:
- The catch in establishTunnel() (src/js/node/https.ts:202-209): cleanup() has already removed the proxy socket's 'error' listener, so the bare socket.destroy() cannot raise a second uncaught error, and afterSocket(err, socket) lands in the same Agent oncreate -> onSocketCreated -> req.onSocket(socket, err) path the non-200, 'end', timeout and handshake-error siblings already use.
- The falsy-throw edge case: the Agent books the destroyed socket as a success and the request fails with ECONNRESET; nothing is written to the proxy, and the new test pins this to the behavior the PR attributes to Node 27.
- The ECONNRESET-only filter in the ported parallel test: the proxy has finished writing its 200 before the client destroys the tunnel, and the TLS target sends nothing unsolicited, so no EPIPE-style proxy error is expected to slip past it.
Extended reasoning...
The change is a 9-line try/catch in src/js/node/https.ts around the tls.connect() call made after the proxy answers CONNECT, plus a 230-line node:test describe block in test/js/node/http/node-http-agent-tls-options.test.mts and a new ported Node test using the existing ../common/proxy-server.js and fixture keys. It touches the TLS-over-proxy tunnel in the node: compat layer, but only the failure path: the proxy socket is destroyed before the error is handed back, so no request bytes reach the proxy in plaintext and no security check is weakened. The fix reuses the exact error-delivery path of its sibling tunnel-failure sites, the fixtures and tls.setDefaultCACertificates/getCACertificates used by the tests exist in the repo, and the changed files are not covered by .github/CODEOWNERS; the one thing not verifiable here was the byte-identical claim for the ported test, since outbound fetches were not permitted in this session.
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Updated 4:35 PM PT - Oct 1st, 2026
✅ @robobun, your commit 5f27aa9190373f73dcecd3b85486512b50642efd passed in 🧪 To try this PR locally: bunx bun-pr 44346That installs a local version of the PR into your bun-44346 --bun |
The global agent takes the proxy from the environment when node:https loads, so this form needs a process of its own. Also say in the comment of the Node gate that no Node release has nodejs/node#66096 yet.
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LGTM — an 11-line port of the upstream Node fix with thorough coverage; the new NODE_USE_ENV_PROXY subprocess test from the latest commit rounds out the entry points.
What was reviewed:
- The catch in
establishTunnel()against the surrounding flow:cleanup()has already removed the proxy socket's'error'listener, so the baresocket.destroy()(no error argument) is the right call, andafterSocket(err, socket)lands in_http_agent.tsonSocketReady->onSocketCreated->req.onSocket(socket, err), whereonSocketNTcallssocket.destroy(err)on an already-destroyed socket (a no-op) before emitting'error'then'close'. - The falsy-throw path: a null error is treated as success by the agent, giving the request a destroyed socket and ECONNRESET; the test asserts that, plus that nothing after the CONNECT reached the proxy.
- Tests: every wait is on an observable (
'close'on the proxy connection, request'close', subprocess exit) with cleanup infinallybefore assertions,setDefaultCACertificatesis restored, the subprocess test drains stdout/stderr concurrently and asserts positive stdout, and the referenced fixtures (agent8-*.pem,fake-startcom-root-cert.pem,cert.encrypted.key,proxy-server.js) all exist.
Extended reasoning...
The runtime change is confined to the try/catch around tls.connect() in establishTunnel() in src/js/node/https.ts, mirroring the cited nodejs/node hunk; everything else is tests in the existing node-http-agent-tls-options file plus a ported upstream test. It touches the TLS tunnel error path but only tightens it (the proxy socket is now destroyed and the error delivered via the request's 'error' event instead of an uncaught exception), with no change to validation, trust, or credential handling. Deciding factors for approve: the diff is small and traces cleanly through the agent and client callback chain, there is no CODEOWNER on the changed paths, the hunt ran dry, and the only prior review state is COMMENTED with a follow-up commit and author reply since. I could not execute the tests in this environment (no debug build and test execution was not permitted), so the pass/fail claims rest on static reading of the fixtures and harness.
node-https-proxy-invalid-tls-options.test.ts runs under Bun and under Node, like node-https-agent-checkserveridentity-reuse.test.ts. node-http-agent-tls-options.test.mts is as on main again.
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Actionable comments posted: 3
- 🪄 Fix CodeRabbit comments on this PR
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Inline comments:
Review comments at
@test/js/node/http/node-https-proxy-invalid-tls-options.test.ts:
- Around line 2-3: Update the file’s introductory test-command comment to use
the build-aware command `bun bd test
test/js/node/http/node-https-proxy-invalid-tls-options.test.ts` instead of `bun
test`, preserving the note that the tests also run under Node.js.
- Around line 132-134: Move the regression coverage from the new module test
into the existing node-http-agent-tls-options test, keeping its module format
compatible; preserve the Node-compatible coverage separately only if the
existing test cannot run under Node.
- Line 267: Move the Bun-only subprocess driver that uses bunEnv, bunExe, and
nodeExe into an existing Bun test module, and import harness at module scope
there. Keep this Node-run test module free of harness imports.
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src/js/node/https.tstest/js/node/http/node-https-proxy-invalid-tls-options.test.ts
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…ptions The tests are in the existing file for TLS options of https requests again. That file is now node-http-agent-tls-options.test.ts: .mts is not one of the endings that test/CLAUDE.md lists for test files.
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I reviewed the latest push and found no bugs; moving the tunnel tests into node-http-agent-tls-options.test.ts addresses my earlier comment. A maintainer still needs to make the call the PR itself asks for: landing nodejs/node#66096 while it is on Node main and v26.x-staging but in no Node release.
What was reviewed:
- The try/catch in establishTunnel(): cleanup() has already removed the proxy socket's error listener, so the bare socket.destroy() before afterSocket(err, socket) is the right order, and the early return keeps onProxyData's return contract; the falsy-throw path (treated as success with a destroyed socket, ending in ECONNRESET) has a test.
- The .mts to .ts rename: the only other reference to the old name was the expected-durations.json key, which is updated.
- The maxTotalSockets test is gated to Node >= 27, so the "all tests pass in Node.js" run is unaffected on the Node 22/24 that CI uses; whether Node 27's own agent drains the queue the way Bun's does is worth checking once a Node 27 is on PATH.
- The PR description still names test/js/node/http/node-https-proxy-invalid-tls-options.test.ts, which the last commit removed.
Extended reasoning...
The change is a 10-line try/catch in src/js/node/https.ts establishTunnel() so a synchronous throw from tls.connect() after the proxy's CONNECT reply is delivered to the request's 'error' event instead of escaping as an uncaught exception, plus a renamed and extended node:test file, a new Node-style parallel test, and an expected-durations key update. It touches the TLS-over-proxy tunnel path in a built-in module, which is security-adjacent, though the new code only changes error delivery and does not alter TLS option handling. The source hunk is small and mirrors the cited upstream Node change, and the bug hunt ran dry with no findings. What keeps this from an approve is that the PR explicitly ports behaviour ahead of any Node release, which the author flags as needing a maintainer's acceptance, and the Node >= 27 gate on the new describe block cannot be exercised here (Node 22 on PATH, no network).
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Two points of that review, checked:
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#44454 ports the upstream commit before this one (nodejs/node 84e367579e). It makes The two PRs merge with no textual conflict. After both, The PR that lands second must change that line to |
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Superseded by #44618, which consolidates the open TLS pull requests. This fix and its tests are in there, either as written, rewritten smaller, or merged with the other PRs that patched the same cause (see the "By area" list in that PR). Closing in favor of it. |
…unnel (#44346) establishTunnel() calls tls.connect() from the proxy socket's 'readable' handler, after https.request() has returned. An option it rejects (minVersion, a wrong passphrase) was thrown with nothing to catch it: an uncaught exception, no 'error' or 'close' on the request, and the CONNECT socket left open. Catch it, close the proxy socket and report it through the same callback as the other tunnel failures. Port of nodejs/node#66096.
…unnel (#44346) establishTunnel() calls tls.connect() from the proxy socket's 'readable' handler, after https.request() has returned. An option it rejects (minVersion, a wrong passphrase) was thrown with nothing to catch it: an uncaught exception, no 'error' or 'close' on the request, and the CONNECT socket left open. Catch it, close the proxy socket and report it through the same callback as the other tunnel failures. Port of nodejs/node#66096.
…unnel (#44346) establishTunnel() calls tls.connect() from the proxy socket's 'readable' handler, after https.request() has returned. An option it rejects (minVersion, a wrong passphrase) was thrown with nothing to catch it: an uncaught exception, no 'error' or 'close' on the request, and the CONNECT socket left open. Catch it, close the proxy socket and report it through the same callback as the other tunnel failures. Port of nodejs/node#66096.
…unnel (#44346) establishTunnel() calls tls.connect() from the proxy socket's 'readable' handler, after https.request() has returned. An option it rejects (minVersion, a wrong passphrase) was thrown with nothing to catch it: an uncaught exception, no 'error' or 'close' on the request, and the CONNECT socket left open. Catch it, close the proxy socket and report it through the same callback as the other tunnel failures. Port of nodejs/node#66096.
…ps, WebSocket, SQL) (#44618) ### What does this PR do? Consolidates the open TLS pull requests into one. Each was reproduced on `main` and, for `node:*` behavior, on Node v26.3.0 first. About a third are ported as written, the rest are rewritten smaller or merged into one fix where several PRs patched the same cause. One commit per fix, so it can be read commit by commit. Fixes #43520, fixes #31396, fixes #43635, fixes #37193, fixes #43846, fixes #17932, fixes #41061, fixes #36887, fixes #31810, fixes #35240, fixes #32234, fixes #44365, fixes #43807, fixes #42280, fixes #44517. Addresses #41856 (SNI and `servername`; not `checkServerIdentity` for SQL), #24845 (the spin is gone, shown with fault injection on Linux; not run on macOS), #19754 (node-fetch forwards the agent's TLS options; the Kubernetes client itself was not run). #### The ones that matter most | | On `main` | PRs | |---|---|---| | Client certificate disclosure | `https.request()` with a client certificate sends it to a server it then refuses (wrong name, `checkServerIdentity`, `destroy()` in `'secureConnect'`, `terminate()` in `handshake`). A server can force it with a junk record behind its Finished | #43946 | | False `authorized` | Over a Duplex, `secureConnect` with `authorized === true` for a peer that failed the key proof; `secureConnect` for a plaintext peer with `rejectUnauthorized: false` | #44422, #32929 | | Cleartext https | `https.createServer()` without a usable key/cert answers plain HTTP | #41672, #33539 | | Revoked client certificates | An https mTLS server never sees `crl`, so a revoked client is `authorized` | #41641 | | Pooled sockets | Requests with different client certificates or CAs share an `https.Agent` socket and session | #42498 | | Silent plaintext | `tls: [...]` given to `Bun.listen` / `Bun.connect` is plain TCP | #41490 | | Server weakened by a client knob | `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0` turns off a server's client-certificate enforcement | #35245 | | Pins never checked | `WebSocket` never calls `tls.checkServerIdentity` and ignores `tls.serverName` | #41648 | | `verify-full` dropped | `PGSSLMODE=verify-*` is lost next to a `TLS_*` URL variable; `tls: true` sends no SNI | #44498 | | Crashes | use-after-free from `destroy()` in `ALPNCallback` over a Duplex; `abort()` on a late `setSession()`; SIGABRT in `fetch` with an https proxy from the environment and a `Bun.file()` body | #44462, #41671, #44458 | | Stream corruption | A TLS `write()` can lose 16 KiB it reported as written while another socket on the loop is stalled | #44529 | | Hangs and spins | 100% CPU on a failing `send()`; a fatal `SSL_write` leaves the socket open forever; `idleTimeout` never sheds a TLS client that ignores `close_notify` | #34510, #38176, #42336 | | Wrong certificate (regression since 1.3.14) | Connections accepted before `stop()` / `close()` get the default certificate and skip their entry's `requestCert` / `ca` | #42355 | | Quadratic Duplex / proxy tunnel | Reading one chunk over a Duplex, CPU: 8 MB 0.88 s → 0.14 s, 16 MB 3.18 s → 0.23 s, 32 MB 11.75 s → 0.39 s; `fetch` upload through CONNECT: 1.7 s → 0.18 s (debug build) | #44464 | #### By area - **fd engine, write path** (`openssl.c`, `socket.c`): #42352, #34510 + #38176 + #42336 as one change, #44529, #44458, #44192. A rejected `send()` ends the write side only and closes at the next writable event unless the peer's bytes are still queued (a 413 sent before a reset is still read). No new per-socket state. Also, on kqueue, **a FIN no longer ends a socket that waits in the low-priority queue** (`loop.c`): with more than 5 TLS handshakes at once, a client that ended right after its handshake could be reset and its server socket report `socket hang up`, because the eof that the sentinel read knote reports was acted on ahead of the unread Finished. That is on `main` too (the macOS entry for `node-tls-server.test.ts` in `test/flaky-tests.txt`: 7 of 48 recent builds of other branches), and this branch made it likelier (6 of 8 builds), since Finished now leaves in one segment with the close_notify. - **Error reporting, both engines**: #44422, #32929, #44516, #37094, #41272 + #42324 + #44223 as one change, #44021, #37472, #43946, #33630. One channel: a fatal error on an established session is reported, then **the engine closes the connection itself**, whatever the owner does with the report. `test/js/bun/net/tls-fatal-error-closes.test.ts` asserts closed-and-nothing-delivered for every owner (node:tls, `Bun.connect`, `Bun.listen`, `fetch` direct and through CONNECT, `Bun.serve`, `WebSocket` direct and through a proxy, Postgres, MySQL, Valkey, Duplex). - **Duplex engine** (`SSLWrapper`, `UpgradedDuplex`): #44462, #43529, #42332, #44464. #43877 + #44394 were in and are **out again**, see "Worth a look" 5. - **node:tls wrap lifecycle** (`net.ts`, `tls.ts`): #38007, #38058, #38028 + #38122 + #38076 as one change (six copies of the attach code become two helpers), #38311, #39008, #38154, #42340 + #42343 + #42339 + #42453 as one change, #43791, #42425, #44085, #42683, #39088, #39040, #40375, and what was still real of #36534. - **SNI, ALPN, server contexts**: #43080, #42050, #37195 + #43849 as one change (**one** SNI matcher for TCP and HTTP/3), #42355, #42285, #33253, part of #37896, part of #37013. A `tls.Server` has one `SSL_CTX`. - **Verification and options**: #44738, #41490, #37005 + the cwd pin of #40984, #31811, #43982, #33483 + #35245, #41810, #32235, #44441, #38092. - **node:tls API and CA store**: #41671, #38145, #32824, #43594, #39997, #41696, #33534, #34748, #42991, #42996, #42970. - **node:https, Agent, `ws`, node-fetch**: #41672 (https half), #41641, #38261, #42498, #44346, #35609, #31397, #42325. - **WebSocket client**: #41648, #37487 + #43048 as one change. - **SQL, Redis**: #33666, #41711, #44498, part of #42054. - **Tests only**: #41426, #40040, #44395, #44016, #37860, #40591, #44440, #41424. Found on the way and fixed here: an upload that a TLS 1.2 server interrupts with a renegotiation never completes on `main` (0 of 32 runs over `https.request`, `fetch`, `node:tls` and `Bun.connect`: the renegotiation ClientHello lands inside an application record that is still unsent, or the socket gets no `drain` again) and completes here, with two tests from robobun; the fix for #40653 (final flight and first write in one segment) stopped working whenever another TLS socket on the loop was stalled, on `main` too; the `tls.Server` prototype pinned the last server constructed and every `SSL_CTX` it owned; `Object.create(process.env).NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED = "0"` turned verification off process-wide once a `SHARE_ENV` worker existed; two debug panics when wrapping a shut-down or still-connecting socket; a `fetch` POST through a proxy sent its headers twice when the origin renegotiated; `BlockList` ignored IPv6 zone ids; a test now ties `root_certs.der` to `certdata.txt`. #### Behavior changes - **A server's `ca` without `requestCert` no longer asks for a client certificate** (`Bun.serve`, `Bun.listen`, HTTP/3, node:tls). It matches the docs and Node. On `main` such a server refused clients with no certificate but served any unrelated self-signed one, so it was never authentication. **Set `requestCert: true` to require a certificate.** A matrix test pins that `requestCert: true` still refuses no certificate and an untrusted one on 8 kinds of server, TLS 1.2 and 1.3, with `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED` unset and `0`. - `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0` no longer relaxes a server. - `Bun.connect` / `Bun.listen` hear of a fatal TLS error after the handshake through `error(socket, err)`. With no `error` handler the socket just closes. - HTTP/3 server names match like TCP: `*.` covers exactly one label, case is ignored, a trailing dot is ignored, the last registration of a name wins. - `requestCert` on node:https is `=== true`, as in Node. - An array where a generated options dictionary is expected throws (`tls: []`, `jest.useFakeTimers([])`). - `key` / `cert` arrays serve every identity. A client that can use both gets ECDSA, where `main` served whichever pair came last. - `ecdhCurve` is forwarded by node:https, `ws` and node-fetch now, so a group BoringSSL lacks (`X448`) throws there as it already does in `tls.createServer`. - A wrapped socket's error is re-emitted on the TLS socket as in Node, so `raw.destroy(err)` with a listener on `raw` only is uncaught, as in Node. - `sql.options.tls` is always an object, never `true`. `RedisClient` sends SNI. - `tls: { secureContext }` alone asks for TLS on `Bun.listen` / `Bun.connect` (it was plain TCP), and a value that is not a `SecureContext` throws. The context is served as it is: the `requestCert` / `rejectUnauthorized` it was created with hold whatever the options next to it say, and `requestCert` in the options over a context that does not ask throws at `listen()`. - `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS` reaches every client once assigned (`fetch`, `WebSocket`, `Bun.connect`, `RedisClient`, `Bun.SQL`, `S3Client`, proxy tunnels) and servers again. A list that selects no cipher throws `ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_MATCH` at the assignment. `fetch.preconnect()` dials nothing after an assignment. - The warning for an unreadable `NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS` is Node's one line, without the `warn:` prefix. - `BUN_CONFIG_WS_CLOSE_TIMEOUT` (default 30 s): how long a `WebSocket` client waits for the server to close the connection after the closing handshake. #### Worth a look in review 1. **#44529**: the kernel-refused remainder of a TLS write moves from the loop's one slot onto the connection (in the existing rare struct), so the write BIO never refuses a sealed record. Nothing is allocated on an unstalled path (200 writes: 0 appends, same `send()` count as `main`), memory with 16 stalled writers is lower than on `main` (276 KB vs 340 KB, which `main` holds inside BoringSSL's buffers), `us_socket_t` stays 80 bytes. It needs a bound on how long a deferred close waits, or a peer that stops reading pins the fd past `destroy()`: `US_SSL_CLOSE_AFTER_SPILL_TIMEOUT` is a fixed 10 s, not re-armed on progress. Separate commits, but the fix that keeps the client certificate off the wire beside a stalled socket builds on them. 2. **The default name check of node:tls also runs inside the handshake**, so a wrong-name server gets no client certificate on TLS 1.2 either. JS still runs it after every successful handshake, so a difference between the two matchers can only refuse. Error objects are byte-identical. 3. **#44441** widens trust by design: a self-issued leaf whose `keyUsage` lacks `keyCertSign` (`dotnet dev-certs`) is its own anchor when the store holds a byte-identical copy. No BoringSSL change. Expired pin, same subject with another key, wrong EKU and a pinned intermediate are tested to fail. 4. **#32235** only adds Ed25519 and ECDSA P-521 to the verify list. A captured ClientHello shows `main`'s list with the two inserted; `rsa_pkcs1_sha1` stays. 5. **A stream that a TLS socket wraps, when that TLS socket closes.** An earlier state of this branch lost data here while CI was green (found by #44709's report): with the peer closing first, 4 of 8 MiB arrived with TLS in TLS, 4 of 32 MiB on the http2 `emit("connection")` path, and a `write()` with no `'error'` listener ended the process. Three Node-parity changes only hold together: destroying the wrapped stream at the close (#38028 + #38122 + #38076, #38154) is safe only if every write has really completed (#43877), which in turn needs Node's handling of the peer's close_notify, which needs half-open sockets that the GC can collect. So: - #43877 + #44394 are reverted and reopened. A write over a stream completes once the stream has taken the ciphertext, as on `main`. - Until the verdict on the peer lets the session through, the application cannot have written over it. There the wrapped stream is destroyed as in Node, with the sessions below it. That keeps the release of the connection after a failed handshake, a rejected certificate and an early `destroy()`. The same for an http2 socket the application never got, and for `resetAndDestroy()`. - After that it is `main`'s teardown: a `net.Socket` only gets the engine's `end()`, closes at its peer's FIN, keeps its own timeout and reports its own errors. Any other stream is destroyed with the TLS socket. The regular suites cannot see any of this (999 files were green on every broken variant), so it was steered by eleven seeded differential fuzzers run on this build, `main`, Node v26.3.0 and the earlier state: close, `end()`, `destroy()`, `destroySoon()`, resets, hung and half-open peers, paused writers, timeouts, two and three sessions deep, over TCP and over Duplexes, before, at and after the handshake, and http2 requests. See "How did you verify". #### Known limits - `fetch` with a `checkServerIdentity` function still sends the client certificate (not the request) to a server the function refuses. On TLS 1.2 any verdict a JS callback gives is too late, as in Node. - `addContext()` / `SNICallback` still do not apply to a server-side socket on the stream engine (`emit("connection", duplex)`, TLS in TLS, unflushed writes, named pipes), as on `main`. - A CA bundled in a pfx extends an explicit `ca` only, for `ws` / node-fetch / `WebSocket`: the native `ca` can only replace the default store, and that store keeps `SSL_CERT_FILE` / `SSL_CERT_DIR`. - P-521 leaves work on TLS 1.3 only. TLS 1.2 needs secp521r1 in every ClientHello (`it.todo`). - Once `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS` is assigned, `fetch(url, { protocol: "http3" })` is `HTTP3Unsupported`, as with an explicit `ciphers`. - `addCACert()` by hand does not extend the chains of a context with several identities. - A throwing `ALPNCallback` sends `no_application_protocol` on both engines. Node sends nothing and its client sees `ECONNRESET`. - TLS in TLS, peer FIN while the outer handshake runs: the inner socket gets one `write EPIPE`, where Node gives `ECONNRESET` (`main` gives it no error at all). - `@SECLEVEL` in `ciphers` is dropped by the `ws` / node-fetch shims, which used to ignore `ciphers`. node:tls keeps throwing `ERR_SSL_INVALID_COMMAND`. - Beside a stalled TLS socket only the first record (16 KiB) of the first write leaves with the handshake flight. The rest goes record by record, which is what bounds the memory of stalled writers. - After a fatal error on an established session the socket emits `'error'` and then `'close'`. Node emits `'error'` and leaves the socket open. - A paused reader whose own write the kernel rejects loses what it had not read yet, with an `EPIPE`, as on Node. `main` reports no error there and delivers it. - On `main` too: a `Bun.listen` socket without `allowHalfOpen` that has unsent ciphertext when the client's `shutdown()` arrives loses that ciphertext (32 KiB), and over plain TCP `end()` with the peer still sending is a close over unread input, so a reset. - Differences from both `main` and Node that the differential runs below found and that stay, all with a peer that aborts: `ECONNRESET` instead of a clean `'end'` after the socket's own `'finish'` when the peer destroyed with unread data; under TLS 1.2, a zero-length `write()` followed by `destroy()` in `'secureConnection'` leaves the client without `'secureConnect'` (a plain `destroy()` there matches Node); a TLS 1.2 client that destroys in `'secureConnect'` gets no `'session'`; a `ClientRequest` whose handshake fails with an alert emits `'error'` and `'close'` but no `'finish'` (`writableFinished` is true). - Once `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS` is assigned, `fetch.preconnect()` opens nothing: `fetch()` then uses a context of its own, and a socket warmed under the default one would never be picked up. - A TLS `send()` that the kernel refuses outside a `write()` call (the drain of unsent ciphertext) is reported with the close, as `read EPIPE` / `read ECONNRESET`. Node says `write EPIPE`. `main` does not report it at all. - Once the application has a session over a `net.Socket` (TLS in TLS, http2 `emit("connection")`), a peer that never sends its FIN holds that socket after the TLS socket closed, as on `main`. Node destroys it. Two tests of #38154 are `todo` for this. Closing it any earlier (at its `'finish'`, say) makes the kernel drop what it has not sent yet as soon as the peer's close_notify arrives. - Plaintext that was queued on a socket before it was wrapped (STARTTLS with a backlog) is dropped when the TLS socket is destroyed, or its handshake fails, before the session is accepted. Node drops it too, except on `destroySoon()`. `main` sends it. - Over a stream that is no `net.Socket`, `end()` can still cut what that stream has buffered, and there is no backpressure, both as on `main` (#43877). - `tls.secureContext` (the undocumented door node:tls uses) is not read by a Windows named pipe listener, which builds its context from the options. On `upgradeTLS({ isServer: true })` the options next to it are the policy, as with Node's `SetVerifyMode`. - `selectServerName()` rebuilds the name tree per ClientHello for injected sockets of a server with `addContext()` entries: 0.4 µs for 1 entry, 3.7 µs for 10, 41 µs for 100, against 631–1111 µs for a handshake. #### Not included Left open, because they need a decision or are not TLS: #43877 + #44394 (see "Worth a look" 5; #43874 stays open with them), #38548, #38591 (both shrink who is trusted), #41589 (`verify-full` vs `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0`), #37197, #41706, #43216, #33487, #33545, #36707, #32435, #37255, #28691, #40275, #30314 (features), #38120 (needs the BoringSSL fork, as did #33517, which the stale bot has closed since), #38529 (needs a Windows measurement), #34342, #38232, #43089, #44454, #40451, #42710, #44527, #38088, #38093, #41898. #37896, #42054 and #37013 stay open for the halves not taken. `http.createServer({ key, cert })` keeps serving TLS on purpose. One open question: `tls: {}` (an object that names no TLS option) is plain TCP on `Bun.listen` / `Bun.connect`, here and on `main`. It is the same trap as `tls: []`, but changing it changes a Bun default, so it is left alone. ### How did you verify your code works? - Every new test fails on `main` for the stated reason and passes here, except guards that pin existing behavior, each shown to fail when its clause is removed. `node:*` tests also pass on Node v26.3.0; the few that cannot say which Node version has the behavior. - 212 test files that touch TLS, sockets, http, http2, fetch, WebSocket, SQL, Valkey and workers: 6154 pass, 2 fail. Both are seen on `main` too: `serve.test.ts` "root range port" (the box runs as root), and `worker_threads.test.ts` "terminate(): nothing of the worker's runs after the request", which is flaky there and passed in the run below. - 58 of those files the way the ASAN lane runs them (LeakSanitizer + `BUN_JSC_validateExceptionChecks`): 58 files, 48 of them with leak checking, 4132 pass, 3 fail. All three also fail on `main`: `serve.test.ts` "root range port", `node-net.test.ts` "should not leak when connect({path}) fails synchronously on a reused handle" (times out under this environment), `worker_threads.test.ts` "process.exit() with a shell cp in flight" (a `ShellCpTask` leak). - 647 vendored `test-tls-*`, `test-https-*`, `test-net-*`, `test-http2-*`: the only two failures also fail on `main`. - The SNI matcher was diffed against both old matchers: 3 seeds × 1.23 M lookups × 3 registration flavours, every difference in one of the intended classes, TCP and HTTP/3 identical on every lookup. - The headline rows were also driven by hand with scripts against this build, `main` and Node v26.3.0: cleartext https, `crl`, `tls: []` / `{ secureContext }`, the `ca` / `requestCert` matrix, the client certificate on a wrong-name server, late `setSession()`, `destroy()` in `ALPNCallback`, `[rsa, ec]` identities with an intermediate from `ca`, `WebSocket` `checkServerIdentity`, a corrupted record, the Duplex read above, `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS`. - The `setSession()` guard was checked against the real `abort()` at 43 handshake states. - `bun run rust:check-all`: 12 of 12 targets. `tsc`, oxlint, source lints, prettier, rustfmt, mordant clean. - usockets' `_Nonnull` is compiled out of debug builds, so 105 of those files were also run on a local release ASAN build with the CI runner's environment (92 with leak checking): 4595 pass, 1 fail, `child_process.test.ts` "spawn reports EPERM after dropping privileges", which cannot pass as root and fails on `main` too. - The close of a TLS socket over another stream ("Worth a look" 5): eleven seeded differential fuzzers, 8,424 scenarios compared, each run on a release ASAN build of this branch, on `main`, on Node v26.3.0 and on the earlier state of the branch. Against `main`: - Data that `main` delivers in full is cut in 5 scenarios, and about 150 that `main` cuts arrive in full. Of the 5, in 2 `main` never notices the peer's close and keeps the socket for good, 2 call `end()` on the middle one of three sessions over an in-memory Duplex, and 1 does the same on Node. - No dead timeout, no silent reset and no uncaught error that `main` does not have (4 uncaught errors fewer). - A socket stays open where `main` closes it in 109, and closes where `main` keeps it in 295. 92 of the 109 do the same on Node or on the earlier state (a `destroy()` that an in-memory Duplex does not show its peer, half-open peers). 14 wait for a peer that paused reading and so does not read the FIN (#42332's backpressure, as in Node); the socket's own timeout fires there. 3 are left: one on a 5 ms timer, two with three sessions over an in-memory Duplex. - The earlier state of the branch cut data in 173 of the 400 scenarios of one of them, where `main` cuts none and this cuts none. - 23 new tests pin what they found. Each earlier attempt at this fix fails the ones that describe it, the earlier state of the branch fails 7, and all pass on Node. - After that change: 999 test files on the release ASAN build (20,246 pass; the 11 files that fail need a database, Docker, DNS or a non-root user, or share a temp directory with a parallel run and pass alone), 61 on the debug build. - TLS over a file descriptor (`openssl.c`, the path of `fetch`, `Bun.serve`, `tls.connect`, `Bun.connect`) got the same treatment after the rebase: seeded differential fuzzers on CI's release build of this branch, on `main` and, for `node:*`, on Node v26.3.0. Every runtime also against itself for the noise floor, injected faults and known bugs of `main` as positive controls, and a difference counts only if it shows in 5 of 5 fresh processes. - `node:tls` over TCP: 11,500 scenarios (one connection with Node as the oracle line by line; 2 to 60 connections beside stalled neighbours; raw peers that break the handshake). HTTPS: about 136,000 runs over `Bun.serve` + `fetch`, `node:https`, `node:http2` and `wss://`, also with the two ends in different runtimes. `Bun.connect` / `Bun.listen` / `upgradeTLS`: 11,500 scenarios and 720 slow connections, with writers driven by what `write()` returns, beside up to 6 stalled, dripping, closing or resetting neighbours, and plain TCP as a second oracle. No crash, hang, duplication, reordering or silent truncation, and no change in time or in connection reuse. - They found six things that `main` does better, none of which any test showed. All are fixed, each with a test that fails on the build before: what the peer sent lost behind a rejected `send()` (23 scenarios, and an early HTTPS response lost with only `EPIPE`), the same silently for a paused reader, `server.close()` never calling back on a half-open server after a ClientHello and a reset (17), `closeAllConnections()` taking 12 s with a stalled client, `end()` losing up to 1.3 of 4 MiB that `write()` had reported while the peer still uploads, and `end()` a little after a stall never closing beside other stalled TLS sockets. The last two fixes also deliver the 1 to 2 MiB that `main` loses there, and close the socket that `main` keeps for good without such neighbours. - All of them again after every fix, on CI's release build of it. That caught one regression of a fix itself (a reader stopped for backpressure lost 86,385 bytes, 1 of 6,000 scenarios), fixed too. On the last build: scenarios that lose data where `main` does not 23 → 2, and Node loses it in both, with the same `EPIPE`; `server.close()` that never calls back 17 → 0; connections held 4 → 0; requests that end in an error only where `main` has a response 6 → 0. With a Node server in another process, a request ends in an error only in 8 and 10 of 1,500 scenarios here, 5 and 3 on `main`, 10 with Node as the client. - `Bun.connect` / `Bun.listen` on the last build against `main`, in scenarios: hangs 0 against 1,031, sockets and fds never released 0 against 965, corrupted data 0 against 345, `abort()` 0 against 26 (`setSession()` after the handshake), writers that never close 0 against 101 of 720 connections. No kind of failure shows here and not on `main`. About a third of the slow connections close later than on `main`, in 1 to 16 s instead of at once, waiting for unsent ciphertext or for the peer's close_notify, and 79 more of them deliver all that `write()` reported. RSS and time with 16 to 256 stalled writers are the same. - What they found that `main` does worse: a `WebSocket` that calls `close()` with sends pending loses messages in 81 of 999 scenarios (0 here), 37 server sockets left open, 10 `server.close()` that never call back, 20 write callbacks that never run. - The kqueue fix cannot be run on Linux. The `connectionListener` count test now says what became of a missing connection, which is how the cause was found (`'tlsClientError'` "socket hang up", then `read ECONNRESET` at the client of the same port, after its `'secureConnect'`). On macOS x64 it failed every attempt of the three builds before the fix and passed at the first attempt of the build with it. - Windows and macOS were only run by CI. Four new tests asserted what only the Linux kernel does (a FIN read ahead of a reset, unread bytes surviving a reset, loopback buffer sizes, `fstat()` on a socket) and now say so per platform. --------- Co-authored-by: autofix-ci[bot] <114827586+autofix-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: robobun <117481402+robobun@users.noreply.github.com>
Problem
node:httpsrequest through a proxy ends in an uncaught exception whentls.connect()rejects a TLS option, for exampleTypeError: TLSv9 is not a valid minimum TLS protocol versionor a wrong key passphrase. The request emits no'error'and no'close', and the proxy connection stays open.establishTunnel()callstls.connect()after the proxy answers the CONNECT (src/js/node/https.ts:200), whenhttps.request()has returned.Fix
'error', then'close'.process.nextTickturn are equal.test/js/node/http/node-http-agent-tls-options.test.tsfail on main. Also the upstream test, unchanged.Background
proxyEnv,NODE_USE_ENV_PROXY=1),https.AgentsendsCONNECT host:port. After a200,establishTunnel()starts TLS to the target over that socket withtls.connect({ socket }).cleanupAndPropagate(skipped for a falsy thrown value).Downsides
v26.x-staginghave it. node:http: rewrite the client on net/tls + llhttp (Node http suite: ~55% → 82.3%, +182 vendored tests, client proxy support) #31587 says the client port follows the latest release, so a maintainer must accept this exception, or hold the PR.tls.connect()rejects after it returns (secureContext: { context: {} }). The proxy connection stays open.Notes
Reproduction
["uncaughtException ERR_TLS_INVALID_PROTOCOL_VERSION"]["uncaughtException ERR_TLS_INVALID_PROTOCOL_VERSION"]["uncaughtException ERR_TLS_INVALID_PROTOCOL_VERSION"]["error ERR_TLS_INVALID_PROTOCOL_VERSION","close"]["error ERR_TLS_INVALID_PROTOCOL_VERSION","close"]uncaughtExceptionhandler the process exits with code 1. When the entry module waits in a top-level await, the process prints the exception and does not exit. Top level await causes promise rejections insideglobal.setTimeoutto be ignored, allowing execution to continue #22546 and bun run: end the entry's top-level await when a fatal error ends the run #42686 are open for that.NODE_USE_ENV_PROXY=1withHTTPS_PROXY: main and Node v26.3.0 exit with code 1. This PR and the Node nightly print["error ERR_TLS_INVALID_PROTOCOL_VERSION","close"]and exit with code 0.Who hits it
https.AgentwithproxyEnv, the global agent underNODE_USE_ENV_PROXY=1withHTTPS_PROXY, andhttp.setGlobalProxyFromEnv(). Anhttp://proxy and anhttps://proxy.maxTotalSockets, and a direct call ofagent.createConnection(options, callback).minVersion,maxVersion,secureProtocol,ciphers: 123,key,certorcaof a wrong type, a key that is not a PEM,checkServerIdentitythat is not a function. With this PR the count is 0, and all 23 give'error', then'close', and a closed proxy connection. A key with a wrong passphrase gives the same result.ALPNProtocols: 123,secureOptions: "x"andservername: 123, Bun'stls.connect()throws an error with another code. Node acceptspassphrase: 123. ForhighWaterMark: "x"the Node nightly has a second exception that is uncaught, and Bun has none.tls.connect()rejects values that Node accepts.ciphers: "DEFAULT@SECLEVEL=0": Node starts the handshake, main throwsERR_SSL_INVALID_COMMANDuncaught, this PR gives it to the request.tls.DEFAULT_ECDH_CURVE = "X25519:X448"with no TLS option on the request: Node starts the handshake, main throwsERR_CRYPTO_OPERATION_FAILEDuncaught, this PR gives it to the request.The port
tls.connect()runs insidehttps.request(), so the caller gets the throw. That does not change.lib/https.jslines 295 to 308). Three tokens differ because the surrounding code differs:$debug, therequire("node:tls")in place, andreturn headerEndIndexwhere Node returnstrue. Node madeonProxyDatareturn a boolean in https: limit proxy CONNECT response headers nodejs/node#64545, which is not ported.socket.destroy()has no argument.cleanup()removed the'error'listener of the proxy socket before, sodestroy(err)would be a second uncaught exception.ECONNRESET. Nothing of the request goes to the proxy in plaintext. The Node nightly does the same.mainhas it (ada8c5c9).v26.x-staginghas the backport (33e4ba358b),v26.xdoes not, and no release proposal for v26 is open.src/js/node/_http_agent.tshas a catch of the same kind for a queued request since node:https: do not reuse a connection across requests that have their own checkServerIdentity #42946, where Node still throws uncaught.Measurements
Release builds of main 5a183c1 and of this PR, linux-x64. Every count was the same in each run.
size): text 80677348 to 80677473 B (+125), data 110424 to 110424 B.node:httpsbuiltin text: 13204 to 13329 B (+125). The other 197 generated modules are byte-identical.node:httpsin a--compile --bytecodeexecutable (internalModuleBytecode): 17728 to 17880 B (+152).onProxyData(JSC bytecode dump): 122 to 123 executed instructions on the path of a successful new tunnel. The one more is ajmpover the catch block. Static: 177 to 192 instructions, 1070 to 1152 B, handler table 0 to 1 entries, allocating opcodes 4 to 4.read()andestablishTunnel()do not change.process.nextTickcalls 52 to 52, listener registrations 76 to 76,setImmediatecalls 2 to 2,queueMicrotaskcalls 0 to 0.200: Function 29 to 29, JSLexicalEnvironment 23 to 23, Promise 0 to 0, Object 22 to 22.'error'0 to 20,'close'0 to 20, connections to the proxy that stay established 20 to 0 (ss -tn). The Node nightly: 0, 20, 20, 0.'error'and'close'come onprocess.nextTickturn 1 after the failure callback, as in the Node nightly.destroy()runs once on the proxy socket, as in the Node nightly.tls.connect()rejects with a throw, the wrapped socket was unchanged when it threw: 26 of 26.Tests
node-http-agent-tls-options.test.ts, which runs under Bun and under Node: its last test starts Node on the same file. The file had the ending.test.mts. It is renamed, becausetest/CLAUDE.mdlists*.test.{ts,js,jsx,tsx,mjs,cjs}as the endings of test files.node-https-agent-checkserveridentity-reuse.test.tsis a file of the same kind with.test.ts.proxyEnvblock. A Node older than v27 skips the block, because no Node release has the change. When a v26 release has it, the gate in the test needs that version.http://proxy and with anhttps://proxy, the callback ofagent.createConnection(), a falsy thrown value,http.setGlobalProxyFromEnv(), a request with atimeout, and a request that waited behindmaxTotalSockets.tls.connect()throws for the same options with no proxy. The tests with a proxy that holds the connection also check that the client closes it.NODE_USE_ENV_PROXY=1and checks its output and that it exits with code 0. It runs under Bun only.node:httpsbuiltin of main and on a release build of main. With the fix: 31 of 31 pass on a debug build (the 16, and the 15 tests that the file had).socket.destroy()14, noafterSocket()15, noreturn15,afterSocket(err)with no socket 2, destroy only for a truthy error 1,socket.destroy(err)14, destroy afterafterSocket()1.test/js/node/test/parallel/test-https-proxy-request-invalid-tls-options.mjsis the test of https: handle invalid TLS options in proxied requests nodejs/node#66096, byte-identical: the git blob is065476dce27380a8ecbb02b8487f791da9b745f2here and in nodejs/node at ada8c5c9 (test/client-proxy/). It passes 20 of 20 runs. On main it prints the exception and does not exit, because it waits in a top-level await.node-http.test.ts(263, run with--timeout 60000),node-http-proxy-url.node.mts(32),node-https-agent-checkserveridentity-reuse.test.ts(30), the two Agent rows ofmodule-graph-io.test.ts, and 60 vendored Node tests (test-https-proxy-request-*,test-http-proxy-request-*,test-http-set-global-proxy-from-env-*,test-https-agent*,test-tls-over-http-tunnel).Found, not changed here
tls.connect()rejects after it returns:secureContext: { context: {} }, or a validsecureContextwithservername: 123. The TLS socket emits'error'and'close'on the next tick and is not destroyed. The request gets'error'and'close', before and after this PR, and the proxy connection stays open. The Node nightly closes it, because itstls.connect()throws for these values. When Bun'stls.connect()throws for them too, the catch of this PR closes the connection.tls.connect()accepts some option values that Node rejects:sessionIdContext: 123,minDHSize: "x",pskCallback: "x",enableTrace: "x". node: give four ERR_* codes Node's message text and throw ERR_TLS_PROTOCOL_VERSION_CONFLICT #43594 is open forsecureProtocoltogether withminVersion, and for the message ofERR_TLS_INVALID_PROTOCOL_VERSION, which has no quotes around the value. tls: minDHSize validation, replaceable createSecureContext, ECANCELED on cancelled TLS writes (+5 tests) #35386 is open forminDHSize.https.Agentwith a proxy and atimeoutthatsocket.setTimeout()rejects ("abc",-1,Infinity):https.request()throws, and the proxy connection that it already opened throws once more later. That request has no listener, so the second throw is still uncaught. With this PR the proxy connection is closed. The Node nightly has the second throw forInfinityonly, because itstls.connect()does not applytimeoutto a socket that it wraps.maxTotalSocketsafter a request whose tunnel failed is not started until another socket closes. A refused CONNECT gives the same result, on main and in the Node nightly.200of the proxy and before the end of the TLS handshake,req.destroy()and thetimeoutof the request give no event, and the proxy connection stays open. Node v26.3.0 and the Node nightly do the same.tls.connect({ socket })on a socket that still connects, when an earlier'connect'listener destroys that socket: the TLS socket emits nothing. Node emits'close'and'error'(EINVAL). node:tls: report a wrapped socket's connect failure on the TLSSocket #38122 and node:tls: emit 'connect' on a TLSSocket that wraps a connecting socket #42340 are open in that area. I did not check if they cover this case.httprequest through a proxy withpath: "//evil.example/x?y=1"toapi.internal.test:8080goes out asGET http://evil.example:8080/x?y=1, as in Node v26.3.0. The Node nightly sendsGET http://api.internal.test:8080//evil.example/x?y=1.Self-review
The 3 concerns that are not addressed:
node:net, which every caller oftls.connect({ socket })gets. Asocket.destroy()in the tunnel would hide it for one caller.Bun.ModuleGraph. It is the same for every failed queued connection, and this PR does not change it. I did not verify it.[human-review] gate passed · iteration 1 · 4 files touched
fails on main (without fix)
passes on PR (with fix)
diff hotspot
gate history · 1 passed · 1 rejected · iteration 1
evidence per changed file